On the Idea of Ethics in Technology
By
Mark H. McGuire


On the Idea of Ethics in Technology

	 In this paper I will attempt to make a practical and
conceptual connection between the two great human endeavors of ethics
and technology.  On the most fundamental level, this connection is
made clear when we view these two human activities in terms of
philosophy and science, respectively.  To a large extent what we
traditionally call moral philosophy and the structure of the
scientific endeavor in the Western world spring from many of the same
sources.  This structure represents the act of humans in the world,
attempting to understand it and better ourselves in it.  Simply
stated, the connection is first and foremost the need for humans to
advance themselves and their understandings of the universe around
them.  There can be no greater inventions of mankind, than that of
technology, the gadgets and mode of living which better our quality of
life and ethics, which better our quality of living.  Clearly from a
practical, and historical perspective the stark line some philosophers
and most scientist would like to draw between these two is not so much
a wall as a membrane, with the ability of one side to flow to the
other and vice versa.  What I would like to present is a deeper
connection.  This connection may show that the scientist and the
philosopher share the processes of their endeavors and the questions
of their purposes.  This link, which some may say is an attempt at
bridging the gap between the cold objectivity of science and the
unlovable subjectivity of ethics, perhaps is contained within the
character of those who thirst for both scientific knowledge and a
moral world.

	To demonstrate this we must first show the need, if there be
one, for a kind of ethics in technology. This is the first major
question, to show the validity of such a connection.  If we conclude
that the two worlds can live apart then good riddens to this task and
we are off on new ones.  But if we can show this connection then this
need is ever more pressing, for each day science and its children of
new technologies are becoming more and more interactive with are daily
lives by each tick of the clock and each new shinny versions of
applications.  If this need lives, then it is compounded by the ever
advisement of technology's complexities on human life.  The next major
question is whether or not these two disciplines have any possible
real connection. This being the more weighty of the questions because
the scientist, by inclination will be more reluctant to the idea of
sharing a bed with a philosopher, where as a philosopher more than
likely already sees the scientist somewhere in his house.  There is
also a need t0 show the standards of science for truth can and should
in some way be applied to the task of ethics.  We must show this
because philosophy has moved so far form its scientific background
that many are highly skeptical of any move back again. Lastly, to make
these connections have some conceatness, we must test what we have
learned about this idea of ethic in technology by applying it to some
specific situations.  Even if we find this theory to be
philosophically and scientifically sound, we will still have failed
our task if what we find is not applicable to real life and real
technology.  This is the hope of this reading for purpose and meaning.



	"Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing
admiration and awe... the starry heavens above and the moral law
within."  Immanual Kant

On the Need for an Ethics of Technology

	There are two great motivations in humans which make us noble
creatures; the desire to know the universe in absolute terms so that
we may accurately predict outcomes of actions, this is the gazing to
the stars and the desire or need rather to make of this world
something good, sustainable, purposeful for human life, this is the
movement towards the moral law within.  We may observe the grandness
of the heavens and be in awe but we still live on one small planet
with a very human need of living well. The coldness of the Astronomers
night does not tell us morally how to act.  Both of these creative
motivations are necessary to sustain and even progress human life, but
there is a rift between them in conceptualization and action which
hinders and lessons the achievements of each.  It is as if the
scientists and the moral philosophers have struck a deal saying, " you
worry about these questions and we will worry about the other type of
questions".  And never the twain shall meet.  In doing so each are
turning away from questions which if pursued could yield enlightenment
and purposefulness to each.

	Science is essentially a descriptive study.  It is primarily
concerned with questions of "is", "how" or "can".  It is designed to
discover functionality, causality, correlation.  The ideas of science
have advanced the operation of civilization by invention, discovery
and in changing modes of thinking.  Ethics is necessarily a normative
task.  It is almost exclusively concerned with questions of "ought"
and "good" or "bad".  Ethics is fundamentally different from the
functionality of science.  The lab tech does not worry about whether
or not it is good that the testing came out or did not come out the
way they expected it to. The lab tech is only, or at least primarily
concerned with what is it doing.  Conversely the moral philosopher
will be more concerned with discovering the inherent goodness or lack
there of, in actions.  The problem here is one of two worlds
bracketing themselves off from one another.  The moral philosopher
thinks they are holding the high ground of human curiosity because
they are looking at the structures behind the actions and the
scientist leaves the world of ethics to the philosopher because they
only talk of goodness and badness; unstable phenomenon.

	A philosophy professor of mine once came back from a panel
discussion group on nuclear physics and the invention of the H bomb
smirking and telling this story.  He was of course the token
philosopher there supposedly to give integrity to attempts to answer
any "metaphysical" questions.  In other words, those questions the
other physicists, chemist and mathematicians did not desire to give
legitimacy to.  He remained silent through much of the discussions on
thermodynamics bla bla and calculations, until the discussion turned
to what types of question in this type of endeavor should be asked.
Of course most agreed all questions surrounding any scientific issue
should be asked, all possibilities should be examined.  The
philosopher then posed this question, "In all your discussions I have
not heard one person ask whether or not it was right or good to
attempt to discovery how nuclear energy works.  Is this not a valid
question to be asked?"  One of the chemists said "Questions of should
and ought had nothing to do with the how's of their purposes".  What
they were doing is laying down a rule, all questions should be asked
and at the same time saying but some questions are not valid in this
place.  The point here is not just to say that a philosopher may
understand the logical implications of understanding the phrase "all
questions" but, when humans become involved directly by the truth
seeking of science, such questions of ethics must be posed, to at the
very least fill that ideal of answering "all questions".  It also
shows that just as the laws of reality science has come to know,
gravity, space/time, have implications on the truth statements
philosophers can make, so to the questions of ethics have implications
on the world of science where active observation is involved.

	Perhaps there is nothing more characteristically human than
technology, save of course morality or at least our attempts at it.
Our intuitive reaction is to see science and technology, independent
of the questions of ethics. We may even go further and say that such
theoretical questions as those of ethics have no direct impact even on
our work a day lives.  Shure we recognize the codes of conduct that
guide our work place or university but do those bland legalistic paper
trail ethical policies cause in us a feeling of duty or of honor when
we uphold them?  Could it be they only make us forget them, like some
vague set of suggestions set on the black board, not practical, not
applicable, nonbinding.  Maybe the best analogy is traffic laws.  We
know in some way that traffic laws are there to keep us all safe and
make the streets run orderly but we don't really think of them as
moral.  Thus they are not binding in the same way that say the
commitment of marriage is.  Most of the codes of conduct we operate
under today are like this.  We spend most of our time trying to find
ways around the legalistic jargon in order to get everything done we
need.  This may help us from time to time to get things done but it in
no way makes us moral creatures.

	The task of science is to know.  Technology advances that
knowledge in practical ways.  The task of ethics, is to complete such
jobs in ways that are right, proper and good.  Now it may seem a bit
off to use such terms in the discussion of technology, science being a
descriptive discipline and ethics is essentially a normative one.
However perhaps the gap can be bridged by the answering of two basic
questions.  One, can ethics meet the most fundamental requirements of
science, falseifiability?  If there are no conditions under which we
can prove that ethics has no place in the world of technology then
ethics can not be scientific because it is therefore untestable.
Second, if the scientist admits that all questions should be asked in
regards to some theory, then they must also admit that the question of
ethics must at least be asked.  These two make up the base minimum for
some kind of meaningful connection between each.  If we find that both
meet this base requirement and that the connection does indeed exist,
not only in some conceptual way but also in a useful one, then we have
all right and obligation to pursue these questions.

	 First, we must gain a little background and framework in
which to begin talking about this issue.  Presented are three very
different ethical theories.  They are not by any means the only valid
theories to this discussion but they are perhaps the most dominate in
modern times.  Most people know something of one or each of them and
if they do not know them by name, they recognize the basic arguments
of each for what is good.  Next we will take some ideas from a well
know physicists, who I feel attempted to make this connection between
science and ethics and see how the different ethical theories
presented work in general in the world of science.  Then, to give some
concreatness to any conclusions that may be drawn from this analysis
we will apply them to a specific field of study and see what
usefulness or properties they have.  Finally any conclusions that can
be made must be explained and any objections to them must be
presented.

Benthem's Pure Utilitarianism

	If ever there was a philosopher dedicated to the standards of
science in philosophy, specifically ethical theory, it was Jeremy
Benthem.  Originally beginning his career in Law, he moved to
philosophy in order to better develop his idea on ethics regarding the
structure and practice of law.  His work eventually turned into his
ethical theory termed the "Principle of Utility" in his work "An
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation".  Benthem
was developing a radical theory for his time, one which stated as the
opening lines of his work "The Foundations of Moral Legislation",
"Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign
masters, pain and pleasure.  It is for them alone to point out what we
ought to do...."(FML ch.1)

	What Benthem means to do with his theory of "the principle of
utility", is to scrap all of the ethical tradition that has come
before him and start anew.  He wishes to clear out the ethical house
of appeals to tradition and unsubstantiated metaphysics.  He desires
an ethical theory that is rational, applicable to all and is not
grounded on any mere beliefs.  His standard for truth statements will
be that of the standards for truth statements in science.  Only by
doing this, he reasons, can we ever come to an understanding of what
it is we "ought" to do.  Because before this all our judgments of
actions, he argues were clouded too much with traditions and false
appeals.  He begins with empiricism; only that which we can know from
our senses.  His problem then is how does he derive an "ought" from
the "is" of sensory experience?  His hope is that such a "new" and
radical theory as this will appeal to people's rational instincts.  To
Benthem, people already know to desire pleasure and avoid pain, they
just need some refinement on how to make assessments in
situations.(FML ch. 1) The question will be whether or not the system
and theory Benthem gives us to asses our moral decisions fosters
better decision making.
	
	Benthem solves the problem of deriving an "ought" by having a
Hedonistic conception of good.  This means his view of what is to be
termed "good", the "ought" we were speaking of , is only what we know
as pleasurable. Under this conception, the motivation towards pain is
bad and the motivation towards pleasure is good.  Benthem finds that
the only thing of intrinsic value is happiness and happiness is
manifested by pleasure.(FML ch. 1) This is what he terms "the
principle of utility".  To state in a Benthemite way, "that act which
tends to promote the good (happiness or pleasure), for all adheres to
the principle of utility."  What Benthem means by this is that we
should do those acts which maximize pleasure in a general way for all
involved and do not commit those deeds which would cause pain to the
same people. He derives a kind of "Hedonic Calculus" by which we are
made to test possible actions as potentially good or bad.  This
Calculus involves judging an action's possible good(pleasure) by
standards such as its potential intensity, duration, certainty,
propinquity, fecundity purity and extent.(FML ch. 4)
  By this standard we "ought" to perform the action which, measured
closely by the Hedonic Calculus, would grant the greatest amount of
pleasure.  The operation of this is very simple and appealing to
empiricist standards for all factors can be given a value and tested
as to their application in a given situation.

	 Benthem in a major way changes the debate on ethical theory
and presents an attractive solution to the question of having an
Ethics of Technology.  From Benthem on, philosophers must answer the
charge of "The Principle of Utility" or as it will come to be know
"Utilitarianism".  We must account for the possibility that all we do
is motivated ultimately by our desire for pleasure and our aversion of
pain.  For the moral theorist to bring in standards not testable by
sensory experience is to perhaps fall into the place of leaving
descriptive truth statements to the scientist and normative ethical
theorizing to the philosophers.  Benthem would not have been satisfied
with that configuration.  He challenges both the scientist to say why
he can not speak ethically of actions when judging them by his Hedonic
Calculus and the philosopher to show him some standard of good that is
knowable as the goodness of pleasure is knowable.  With this frame
work, Benthem fulfills the requirement of falsifiability.  If we find
that humans may be ruled buy more than motivations towards and away
from pleasure or pain, the pure "Principle of Utility" fails.

	If we look at the layout of Benthem's theory, we must conclude
its strength is simplicity and ability to hold to strict testable
standards of utility.  Its great weakness is its close proximity with
and danger of falling into moral relativism.  The standards a
Benthemit might set up for judging actions to be "good" are very
attractive.  In deciding "should we" and "how should we" go about the
development of some new technology, having a system to plug all the
possible variables into, to facilitate an approximate answer for the
question of which course of action is best, is highly desirable.
However, the image of people logging into some mainframe Hedonic
processor to decide whether or not to tell their boss about a failed
project is a bit fantastic, slightly scary and perhaps laughable.
Still the value of this for our purposes is that its conclusions are
exclusively derived from circumstantial outcomes.  Under this
configuration the question: will the course of action produce the
greatest amount of pleasure for the greatest number of people, becomes
primary.  But what if there is a dispute about what type of actions
would produce the greatest amount of what type of pleasure?  What if
we come to some conclusions that must place value on something other
than pure units of pleasure and pain?  How is this testable or even
applicable to an ethical value theory of pure utility?

	A Benthemit must hold an essentially Egalitarian view of
utility: that all types pleasure fostered by actions are to be weighed
equally by the calculus.  For Benthem there is only pleasure, measured
by Hedonic units.  If there is a need to judge something outside of
these pure units of utility, Bentham fails.  And if this need is
outside of the standards of empirical testability, it may also fail
our task of finding an ethics of technology.  Take for example the
questions of the development of some new technologies.  If there is a
need to say what type of good(pleasure), fostered from what type of
action is best, then this need may have to be filled with some value
assessment outside the real of pure utility.  The questions of "types
of pleasure" asks whether or not pure Utilitarianism can truly
calculate all factors.  If there are no standards to judge actions
outside of a pure Utilitarian analysis then perhaps there are no
testable standards by which to judge actions at all.  For if each
person is given the right by this philosophy to calculate the goodness
of their own actions based on their own values inputted into the
system of calculation, then one conclusion is just as valid as the
other.  To set any standards for what variable will be valued how, is
to conceptual step out of the bounds of raw empirical analysis.  To
fail to do so is perhaps to invite the rebuttal of the moral
relativist.  If we fall to this rebuttal we give into the moral
relativism of non judgmental values and gross hedonism.  This also
fails the Benthemite task of living by a "Principle of Utility".




Mill's Rule Utilitarianism

	John Stuart Mill was a child prodigy and a brilliant scholar
who's father was a Benthemit and brought him up with the ideas of
Utilitarianism.  Mill's form of Utilitarianism, which has been called
Rule Utilitarianism, can be seen as an attempt to expand upon the good
points of prior descriptions of Utilitarianism and to answer the
charges laid against it.  Mill attempts to refute the two main
arguments against the pure form of Utilitarianism which Benthem put
forward; the cold and almost ridiculous idea of people using
calculators to weigh choices in possible actions and the slide towards
moral relativism or gross hedonism.  Mill refutes these by attempting
to walk between the descriptions of the principle of utility he
describes as, "impracticable dry when the word utility precedes the
work pleasure, and as too practicably voluptuous when the word
pleasure precedes the word utility."(Ut ch. 1) To do this Mill
proposes what has been called Rule Utilitarianism.  The hope is that
Rule Utilitarianism can hold on to the essentially Empirical nature of
the Utilitarian quest for a "Science of Right" and also layout general
categories or rules of good which apply to the practical task of
Ethics.  Thus giving new vitality and application to the theory of
Utilitarianism with the work a day world(thus perhaps technology) and
keep the standards of right, out of the hands of the relativists.

	Mill begins much the same way as Benthem searching for the
"summum bonum" or first principle of morality. It may also be worth
noting here a direct connection Mill makes to the topic at hand.  Mill
describes the problems that ethics has had in finding this "first
principle" and the still lingering disputes science has in searching
for the same type of certainty in its first principles as essential
the same.(Ut ch. 1) The implication being that philosophy perhaps is
no worse off than science in searching for consensus.  Mill finds it
in the same place, keeping a fundamentally hedonistic view of the
good.  For Mill the Principle of Utility maintains much of the same
configuration; those acts which promote the most pleasure for the
greatest number are by definition the best acts to do.(Ut ch. 2)
However, from there Mill takes a distinctly different path by laying
out that the basis of his theory on the Principle of Utility will be
founded upon not only quantity of pleasure but also discerning issues
of quality.  In a very persuasive argument Mill states that humans
have higher needs fulfilled by higher pleasure that the pleasures,
even the wholly fulfilled pleasures of an animal can not compare
to.(Ut ch.2) This means that the pleasure some may feel of a lower
quality say of sleep or watching TV are not worth as much, under the
comparison of quality as those of a higher lot say of working hard to
invent a better product or raising good children.  This is a
compelling argument not only because humans have a higher rational
cognitive capability but also because this capability is driven
towards constant self improvement, i.e. technology and ethics.  For
Mill there is no question about it, rational human beings who know
both higher and lower pleasures will choose higher ones.

	Mill justifies this merging of a peaking order of values and
the Principle of Utility, by saying that we have all of the ethical
knowledge or rules in us we just have to order and refine them like
peoples tastes for music or food.(Ut ch. 1) Mill accepts the bulk of
what we would call common sense moral laws as good for the practice of
those cultures which maintain those laws, but for Mill the motivation
of these rules is essentially Utilitarian, pleasure seeking.  What he
is trying to do is to get people to see that perhaps it is the
Principle of Utility at work behind these traditions.  Mill makes an
analogy of his theory to a road with signs leading you to your
ultimate destination.(Ut ch. 2) The signs(rules) are not the
destination(the good) but they help you get there.  This is what is
meant by describing Mill's theory as Rule Utilitarianism because it
maintains the same first principles of a Hedonistic conception of what
is good but states that this conception must be enacted by specific
rules in specific times and places.  For Mill the door to relativism
is not open because there are reasons behind the common everyday moral
rules we have and these reasons are practical Utilitarian goals of a
civilization.  Mill is actually forwarding a powerful challenge to
society at large; to raise their understandings of what is motivating
them toward good acts and to raise their standards of what acts are to
be considered good.

	The question then is what does Mill's Rule Utilitarianism mean
for the task of an ethics in technology.  Of the two questions that
need to be answered to meet the basic requirements for this task Mill
seems to do quite well.  If it can be shown that either there is only
value to units of pleasure or pain or that there are some rules which
should be adapted on their own right aside from any Utilitarian
performance, then Mill's theory can be said to be false.  It also
appears that by maintaining an essentially Hedonistic framework he
holds the scientist accountable to answer the questions of why
Utilitarianism is not applicable to the invention and application of
new technologies.  For his best qualities Mill perhaps answers both
the needs of the moralist, to veer far away from gross Hedonism and
the technician, to show testability and usefulness.  For example, if
an engineer is faced with the choice of lying about the success of
some project to secure faith in the project and time to finish it
correctly or to tell the truth, take criticism and start all over
again, Mill's theory works fairly well.  Let us say for the sake of
argument that it would be better (foster more pleasure) ultimately for
the engineer t lie.  We still may consider this action wrong because
of the need for the application of the general rule that lying is
wrong.  Overall having moral agents believing in common rules such as,
lying is wrong, fosters more benefit overall to society than that of
the anomaly cases such as this.  Still this line of thinking brings up
other issues of Rule Utilitarianism's Ethical and testable integrity.
At its worst Rule Utilitarianism may fail to be both conceptually
sound or empirically verifiable.

	The main problem with Mill's Rule Utilitarianism is in many
ways not a Utilitarian problem at all but more one of conceptuality.
We must ask the question: if Mill finds it good to have and
essentially hedonistic make-up, why then does he not simply adopt it
fully?  Does it not in some way diminish the power of a moral theory
to govern people's lives to say the foundation of my theory is this,
but in application it is that?  Is it not a contradiction to say
pleasure and pain are the only yard sticks of good or bad and then
require people to make judgments of actions based on rules not formed
from that standard? If there are levels of good(pleasure) or rules we
should follow, why should we not then focus on these and see if there
is anything besides Utilitarianism at work behind them?  Mill then is
faced with the problem of situations with conflicting values.  Here he
retreats a bit and says about conflicts between rules, " If utility is
the ultimate source of moral obligations, utility may be invoked to
decide between them when their demands are incompatible."(Ut ch. 2)
Not only does this show a weakness of conceptual coherency but also a
wavering on the need to set criteria for when Utilitarianism is true
or false.  If faced with a situation where two values could be equally
good and the Utilitarian's only answer is to say "uh...check the
general idea of the Principle of Utility", the testability of such a
theory is lost.  Which makes going back to the application of
universal codes seem very attractive because of their conceptual
clarity and ability to define answers in yes/no terms.

Kant's Categorical Imperative

	Immanuel Kant boldly attempted to wash away all the talk of
practicality and debate over circumstances with his theory of the
Categorical Imperative. No thinker more than he is better at
presenting, in simple ways, the complicated and compelling arguments
for universal rules of what is right.  He is perhaps the most
influential thinker in modern times because of his this his most
cutting and direct way of analysis.  He cuts through and crystallizes
an idea.  He affected all fields of intellectual study and drastically
changed the West's view of the world.  His moral theory, known as the
Categorical Imperative, is powerful not only in its influence on the
world but also it is vastly important for its attempts to come at
answers to even the most complicated and long standing ethical
questions in simple logically sound terms.  His way of analysis at its
time was quite unique because of the scope and directness of his work
and conclusions.  Conclusions we may not find desirable nor easy but
still he raises the possibility that they may be right none the same
and at the very least unavoidable to answer.  In seeking to know what
"the good" is in the relationship between humans and actions,
including that of the development of technologies, Kant's arguments
for Universal laws must be met head on.

	He Begins quite differently, "Nothing can possibly be
conceived in the world, or even out of which can be called good
without qualification, except a GOOD WILL."(MFM ch. 1) The rest of
things we may consider good, especially pleasure, fade away or can be
used for evil ends.  What he means by this is to say that a good will
is good, not for what it may obtain but in and of itself.(MFM ch. 1)
This configuration is vastly askew not only to that of the two
theories we have previously examined but is extremely counter to our
common every day conception of why we go about attempting to do good
acts.  We tend to think of not murdering as good, because we are thus
not hurting people, but Kant charges that even the right act is not by
nature good unless born of a good will.(MFM ch. 1) If we grant that
there is some degree of goodness higher in a right act performed by a
good willed person, than by the same act performed by an evil willed
person, it must be that there is at least some intrinsic value to the
good will.  Indeed Kant's argument is compelling because we can see
that even the person who does not secure happiness but is good in
motivations of duty to those good actions as still having moral worth.
Kant goes even further to state that not only do only those actions
performed out of duty have moral worth but "That an action done from
duty derives its moral worth, not from the purpose which is to be
attained by it, but from the maxim by which it is determined.."(MFM
ch. 1) By these two points Kant takes circumstances and basic ideas
deciding moral actions by utility totally out of the equation.

	The operation of Kant's theory can be summed up very simply by
his argument for what he calls the Categorical Imperative.  He
formulates this by the simple rule of "Act as if the maxim of your
action were to become by your will a general law of nature."(MFM
ch. 2) In deciding whether or not an act is good, Kant argues we
should first adopt that act as a universal maxim for all humans in all
situations.  If we can not say that this universal maxim is not good
then we have a duty not to perform the act.  We may most readily think
of this Categorical Imperative as an essentially restrictive code but
it also has strong implications in terms of positive action also.  Let
us say for example in your work place someone who is under you is in
need of your help on a project.  You have the time to do so but do not
just for the ease of being able to push it off on someone else.  This
act as a universal maxim would mean all people should choose ease in
their life over helping others in need.  If we can not accept that as
a universal natural law then perhaps we have a duty to help.

	The great desirability of Kant's Categorical Imperative is the
comparable ease at which decisions can be made.  Compared to Benthem's
Hedonic calculators or Mills sometimes vague rules, Kant cuts clean to
answers of yes or no.  In terms of its application to the questions of
achieving the base requirements for an ethics of technology the
Categorical Imperative meets them but with problems just like the
others.  If it can be shown that a good will has no intrinsic value
then Kant's theory can be found false.  Kant also raises questions
that the scientist can and might not even want to avoid.  Kant's
desire for universal standards of right and wrong, that reach down and
find the fundamental structure of what makes and act good or not is
very comparable to the basis of science itself in its constant
searching out of the natural laws of the universe.  The problem comes
in testability, Kant is not basing his conception of the good on an
empirical standard but rather on something a priori; before knowledge.
If he must fall back on a stance of "well this is self evident" then
the empiricist may have him.  There is also the problem of
application.  In some situations the adoption of the universal maxim
you may have to adopt to be in accordance with the Categorical
Imperative would be ridiculous, i.e. everyone should always help
everyone else or no one should ever hurt anyone else.  In may ways we
do have an a priori sense that universal laws for actions are good and
that a good will in duty towards them is inherently good but there is
just as strong evidence to show that sometimes practical rules are in
order.

Feynman's Scientific Integrity

	Richard Feynman was one of the greatest physicists this
century.  Some of his advancements in our understanding of basic
physics will stay with us for a long time.  He is also responsible in
may ways for a quite contemporary and positive trend of attempting to
bring complicated scientific ideas down to common everyday
understandings.  But for all of this he will probably be most known
for his character or because he was one.  There is something curious
about his almost mischievous character which made him the kind of
person that could bring forward the idea of "Scientific Integrity" in
a way that is both ethically intriguing and scientifically demanding.

	Feynman was a man who would speak his mind.  This did not mean
crazily crossing all barriers of edict but stating what he knew when
it was proper, and usually in a humorous way.  In his book "Surely
Your Joking, Mr. Feynman!"  he tell a story which illustrates both the
nature of his character and the beginnings of his theory of
"Scientific Integrity."  He writes that when he was at Los Almos
working on the H bomb he met a very famous mathematician.  Feynman
being only a budding genius at the time in physics was rightly a bit
scared to do so.  When they met, this famous mathematician described a
theory of his about something he had been working on but not quite
able to figure out yet.  After listening to it Feynman quickly replies
"No, its not going to work because of bla bla bla", then the famous
mathematician presents another alternative.  Again Feynman challenges
it by saying "Well that's a bit better but it still has this damn fool
idea in it of so n so".(SYJ p115) What I think he is trying to express
by presenting this is his belief in stating the truth, beyond whether
or not others will think it acceptable or proper.  Integrity in the
scientific method can only be based on the attempts of all
knowledgeable parties to express all doubts about certain problems or
theories.  It is more than just honesty, it is an active pursuit and
respect for the truth.

	Feynman uses an analogy to illustrate this theory.  In
discussing why he thinks we are not actually living in a scientific
age he tells the story of what he calls "Cargo Cult Science".  He
tells of a group of people in the South Seas that during the war
(World War II), they saw many cargo planes land on the military air
field bringing many good things to the island.  After watching this
for a while, they decided to build some air fields of their own.  They
set up runways and shack huts with straw antennas and a man inside
with things on his ears.  They even had torches on the run ways, but
planes filled with goodies did not come.  They had it all looking the
way it should but it did not work.(SYJ p. 310) The point he is trying
to make here besides the obvious, just because it looks good does not
mean it is going to fly argument, Feynman is presenting his reasoning
for why the concept of Scientific Integrity is so important and why it
perhaps is not so well used.  The point is that we have a
responsibility to examine all possible reasons why what we are trying
to do might fail.(SYJ p.311) He uses the example of doing a report, by
this standard we have a duty to bring up all the possible problems
with our solutions.  This is the challenge of Scientific Integrity, to
raise the standard of science from just doing what will work but doing
what will work best and why it will work best.  Feynman offers an
interesting compromise between Utilitarianism and universal maxims.
The rule of Scientific Integrity would not only be based on utility
(we can find root causes better this way), but also an understanding
that when it comes to human actions abstract ideas such as integrity
in character have value unto themselves that pure pragmatic arguments
can not have.  The question for our purposes must be weather or not
"Scientific Integrity" is philosophically weighty enough to subdue the
proponents of one ethical theory or another and if the practice of
this is to constraining for the practical production of technology.

On the Concept of Honor

	The history of ethical thought reveals two things.  One, some
very intelligent people developed some very complex and rich theories
attempting to give ultimate justifications to an ought, and two, there
is very little consensus on what those ought's and those
justifications are.  Still the need for ethical standards is with us
everyday.  Today as technologies grow deeper and deeper into our lives
the demand of ethics is both intensified and under attack.
intensified perhaps by the need to make ethics applicable in
situations it had never seen before and under attack because
traditional conceptions of morality may be seen by some to not be
applicable.  Our new toys at the same time propel us beyond some
restrictions and show us the need for new ones.  Through all of these
debates and times and changes there are always two things, good and
bad people.  Even the harshest relativist will have to admit that some
persons have more integrity of character than others.  Feynman's
concept of Scientific Integrity is in many ways a bridge between the
two sometimes conflicting worlds of philosophy and science.  It is
more than just interesting that this bridge is founded on the need for
individual humans to have integrity of character in thoughts and in
actions.  Yet there is a caution in Feynman's language, perhaps
necessary given the nature of this subject, which may hinder the hope
of finding some viable truth.  Perhaps there is a larger truth behind
what Fenyman was saying.  Something that could not only find a
foundation for this connection between ethics and technology but also
answer some of the problems between the various ethical theories we
have looked at.

	The concept of honor as a deep moral idea that has been lost.
So much so, that it is either scandalous or confusing to use it in a
moral context, certainly also in a scientific context.  Yet this may
be what is needed to be flushed out from what we have looked at thus
far in order to come to some conclusions of how to achieve some ground
work and base requirements for our task.  In the Encyclopedia of
Ethics the entry entitled "Honor" describes how this concept is not
really understood by the western moral tradition.  Honor is thought of
only inters of either the giving of respect or in a military code
context.(EE p554 v1) Philosophy has not been willing to give ethical
weight in an everyday sense to the concept of honor.  In our age,
honor is almost laughable, something left over from a long gone time.
But honor is perhaps the most demanding of ethical concepts.  It
demands right action even in the face of evidence to the contrary.
This is what is perhaps at work behind Feynman's philosophy of
Scientific Integrity, honor in the pursuit of discovery.  This seems
an acceptable minimum requirement for ethics in technology because it
does not bind itself to one particular conception of how ethics should
be done in technology but rather demands thought and word follow
action.  If we say we are open to all questions, including ones of the
need for ethical restraints on science, then we have a duty to
investigate all those questions.  If we say we will honestly discuss
the possibility of philosophy being obsolete in certain areas, then we
must engage in that debate with the full intent of following it to its
logical conclusion.

	The question then comes back, "but how would the concept of
honor work in real situations?"  Would it be applied under Utilitarian
calculations or as a universal maxim?  Where is the testability of any
such concept at all?  Let us examine a situation and if the concept is
not seen to support itself as a base requirement for an ethics of
technology then we shall look else where for it.

	In the January 97 issue of Embedded Systems Programming
magazine there is an article by Jack G. Ganssle entitled "Assigning
the Blame".  In this he explains how in high tech fields assigning the
blame at the end of projects is a big and hated part of production.
Problems come up, they always do and in the heat of invention,
engineers have neither the time nor broad mindedness to solve process
problems as well as engineering ones.  Then another project comes up
and the whole game starts over again.  Ganssle proposes a "Postmortem"
in which after a project is over those involved have a meeting of
which the purpose is not to assign the blame but discover why what
went right and wrong.(ESP p.99) In this situation it seems obvious
that honesty on the part of each person presenting information is
necessary.  But just to say, be honest in the work place and in
dealing with technology, is not enough.  Perspective, ideas and
interests conflict with motivations above that of a simple "play nice"
attitude.  The requirements of the concept of honor would demand not
only honesty about personnel or project failures but also in the
giving of credit where it is due even if doing so may set that
individual or their projects back.  In this circumstance perhaps we
can see the beneficial operation of what "Scientific Integrity" was
searching for.  By the workings of an honorable postmortem, good
science and good ethics do not conflict but rather compliment each
other.

	The concept of honor here succeeds in many ways to achieve
that bridge between the two worlds of this discussion.  Though it is
not as deep or rich a conception of the good as that of the
Categorical Imperative or Utilitarianism, it employs substance from
each.  Kantian in its conception of duty and Utilitarian in its drive
of practicality honor has the ability to reach particular frameworks
of ethics and bind them by the universal need for people to act with
forthright integrity in any venture they may undertake.  If satisfying
enough to the philosopher by conception and the scientist by
operation, the concept of honor could be seen as a base requirement
for discussions on ethics in technology.

Ethics and Remote Sensing

	For over a year now I have worked for a company called
SeaSpace, based in San Diego California but doing most of its business
out of the United States.  It is a small, very high tech and fast
paced company which assembles and installs satellite data receiving
systems.  This is the field of Remote Sensing which uses this data for
applications in many different fields of study and business.  These
systems receive data from different satellites and with the help of
proprietary software converts this data into workable images.  These
images are used in a wide variety of applications from earth sciences
and meteorology to real time weather needs of ships at sea, ice
breakers mapping ice thickness and fishing boats tracking current
changes.  Most of the people who work for the company are either from
an earth sciences field or a computer or math background.  Being a
philosopher, I felt a bit out of my league when I came on.  After you
have a philosophy degree you will always have to answer the questions
of why and how you come to be where you are because wherever you are,
unless you are teaching philosophy, you will always be meet with some
degree of skepticism, humor and intrigue.  A philosopher is always
good to have to bounce ideas off of, we know something of everything,
but nothing else.  After working in the Remote Sensing and corporate
worlds, I have noticed a need for and the use of, ethical philosophies
in operations.  This also raised many questions to me about the
application of ethics to technology.

	Let us assume for now that I have made my point and we have
found some base requirements for an ethics in technology.  This theory
must first and foremost be falsifiable and present question which
science must at least address.  It must stay clear of moral relativism
while not establishing rules which under certain circumstance would
lead to absurdity and contradiction.  What then would be the true test
to see if this theory were truly applicable to all the applications of
science in the technology world?  Under what circumstances could we
say, "Because it is applicable in this case it must be in all?"
Perhaps we can truly never say that.  Science fears too much the
philosophers ethical hand of censorship.  It is paramount to hearsay
now days to imply "perhaps we should not be doing that".  This fear
may be justified, for philosophy is so desperate to make itself
relevant, it may suggest bad or unsound ideas.  Let us address the
issue at hand directly.  In the beginning I described science as
essentially descriptive and ethics and necessarily normative. The
scientist can be characterized by the act of looking through a
telescope, passively examining the universe in search of its secrets.
The philosopher summed up by the asking of the question, "Is it good
that we should seek out the secrets of the universe?"  The argument
could be made that passive observation, that which does not attempt to
change what is already there, could not possibly come under the bounds
of normative rules because it has no effect on anything other than the
observer.  Even if the scientist gives in on the point of active
science, science which does take action on that which it is
studying,(which seems a modest claim) the philosopher may ultimately
loose the argument because not all science is indeed active.  But if
the philosopher could show that even in an extreme case of truly
passive observation ethics does come into play, we may indeed have
fulfilled our requirements for at least the basis of ethics in
technology.

	Take for example the type of remote sensing that is done by
SeaSpace and those who have purchased their systems around the world.
There are many types of applications for remote sensing which deal in
active signal reading.  An active type would be one in which a signal
of some kind is sent out to the object to be observed and then the
return data is taken in for analysis.  For instance radar works in
this manner.  However most of the remote sensing application SeaSpace
works with are passive.  The question here must be what kind of
ethical implications can technology that is essentially passive
observation?  On an initial examination of this question we can see
that all of the issues discussed so far would at least have surface or
pragmatic implications.  No matter how passive all technology must be
conceived of, developed and maintained by humans and anything in the
human realm will have to deal with those ethical issues presented
earlier.  In terms of the development of new technologies there will
always be Utilitarian issues.  So to with the application of these
technologies utility must be balanced with some universal rules which
give stability, substance and direction to the endeavor of human
invention.  But what of the larger conceptual connection we have been
looking for?  How could that come into play with something that may be
purely observational?  Perhaps it is only this, what remote sensing is
attempting to do, on its most basic level is maximize human knowledge
of the earth for many different fields, in many different way.
Ethics, in much the same ways attempts to better human actions in that
world.  The link between the descriptive operation of remote sensing
and the normative judgments of ethics is the technology itself.  By
the very nature of producing better and better views of the world we
reflect the goal of ethics for human betterment.  Should not those
endeavors such as science and the inventions of new and wondrous
technologies be gone about in a manner at least fitting the minimum
requirements for decency and goodness humans have developed?  In
reaching ourselves ever and ever higher by technology, we also have a
requirement to not loose that which we have fought to know by moral
searching.  Ethics is perhaps the technology of good human
interaction.  It is thus applicable even to those inventions which may
only be observational because the observer must answer the valid
questions of ethics in the same way the philosopher must answer the
truths science discovers.

	I have suggested the concept of honor as a possible mechanism
towards this task of ethics in technology.  Honor is a concept lost in
its everyday understanding but one I feel none the less powerful in
its ability to cut through to the heart of why mankind is ethical.  We
are good not only for the betterment of our community but also to
better ourselves.  The concept of honor is by no means the end of
morality, ethical theorist have always been looking for.  Perhaps it
does not even begin to solve some of the conceptual and practical
problems in the major ethical theories presented here.  However it is
the bare minimum for any discussion on how ethical theories could be
applied to real everyday situations.  It is the hope of all base
requirements not to give final word, but to set foundation rules to
which all discussions after must follow.  The idea of ethics in
technology rests on the ability of both scientists and philosophers to
find enough common ground to set those rules.


Key of Symbols
	
FML: The Foundations of Moral Legislation, Jeremy Benthem

Ut: Utilitarianism, John Stuart Mill

MFM: Metaphysical Foundation of Morals, Immanuel Kant

SYJ: "Surely Your Joking, Mr. Feynman!", Richard Feynman

ESP: Embedded Systems Programming Magazine, Jan. 97, "Assigning the
Blame", Jack G. Ganssle