On The Derivation of Ethical Standards
by
Robert N. Barger, Ph.D.
Computer Applications Faculty, University of Notre Dame
e-mail: barger.2@nd.edu
A paper presented at the Second Annual Ethics and Technology Conference, Loyola University of Chicago, June 6, 1997
Introduction:Almost everyone would agree on the need for ethical standards. The problem comes in determining how those standards are to be derived. The area of philosophy known as "metaethics" may be helpful in this task. Metaethics is a term subject to much misunderstanding. William Halverson (1981) regards metaethics as "The generic name for inquiries that have as their object the language of moral appraisal." This definition reflects the viewpoint of a philosophy known as Linguistic Analysis. I would rather think of metaethics as the generic name for inquiries about the source of moral judgments (i.e., about the foundation for moral judgments) and how such judgments can be justified. Taken in this sense, metaethics is not about isolated individual judgments concerning whether certain actions are right or wrong. It is about how a particular world view -- or more precisely, a weltanschauung -- underlies and determines the formulation of such ethical judgments.
My holding is that before one can make a judgment on whether a particular action is right or wrong one must have adopted a weltanschauung, i.e., made an assumption that reality has a particular meaning. After that one can ask whether a particular action is in harmony with one's basic understanding of the meaning of reality and can thus judge about whether it is right or wrong. In philosophy, the study of the basic meaning of reality is called metaphysics. A person's metaphysics is basically a statement of that person's belief about fundamental reality. It is a "belief" because it is the most fundamental of assumptions one can make. As such, this assumption cannot be proven. The ancients defined metaphysics as "first principles" because once one assumes a ground of meaning, or world view, only then can one go on to interpret the meaning of particular things and actions within that larger universe of meaning. Perhaps the reason that there exists a multiplicity of metaphysics is that each person must ultimately give a personal explanation of the meaning of reality....and there are a number of possible meanings. Once a person adopts a metaphysical world view, that world view will necessarily govern that person's decisions about ethical matters (assuming that person is ethically consistent). To put this another way, a person's viewpoint on reality will condition that person's viewpoint on value questions.
The Objections of Linguistic Analysis
It is here that advocates of Linguistic Analysis would probably take issue with my position (which is the position of traditional systematic philosophy). Linguistic Analysis believes (and I would emphasize the word "believes," since the position of Linguistic Analysis is as much a belief as any of the traditional metaphysical positions) that statements about reality can be verified or validated in one of only two ways. Those ways are by the application of the laws of logic and by the application of sense observation. Thus, linguistic analysts believe that what is not able to be examined by logical analysis or by sense observation is not a proper subject for discussion.
Unfortunately, interpretations of ultimate reality are not subject to examination by logic or sense observation. By definition, as first principles, or a base whereon to stand to make sense of reality, these interpretations cannot be subject to this kind of examination. Neither can discussions of right or wrong, which arise from and are based upon these fundamental interpretations of reality, be subject to verification by logic or sense observation. Hence linguistic analysts say that these kinds of questions are beyond the bounds of verifiable discussion -- that is, they simply cannot be discussed. Linguistic analysts would admit that there are indeed questions of morality, but they can only be spoken of in "emotive" terms, that is, in terms of how one "feels" about these questions. No determination is possible about whether something is objectively good or bad...only how one feels about it. Hence one of the founders of the school of Linguistic Analysis, Ludwig Wittgenstein (1961), has said: "It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words. Ethics is transcendental" (6.421).
I believe Wittgenstein and the linguistic analysts are wrong. I do not base my dissent on the view that one basic assumption about the meaning of life is as good as another, but rather on something that linguistic analysts should recognize as acceptable verification, namely, empirical evidence. In 1989, Josephine C. Barger and I conducted research on a random sample of 347 students at a midwestern regional/comprehensive university. These students had academic majors representative of all six colleges in that university. Through the use of SPSSX discriminant analysis, Duncan multiple analysis, and SPSSX univariate analysis, we found (Barger & Barger, 1989) that there were distinguishable philosophies among the students. In other words, separate philosophical viewpoints (to be described below) were shown to be both real and measurable.
The Major Metaphysical Positions and their Resultant Ethics
The philosophies which were empirically evidenced in our research were the traditional systematic philosophies of Idealism, Realism, Pragmatism, and Existentialism (I am prepared to respond to the objection that Existentialism cannot be described as either "traditional" or "systematic," but I will spare the reader that response here). Idealism and Realism might be characterized as absolute or objective philosophies. Pragmatism and Existentialism might be characterized as relative or subjective philosophies. Idealism The metaphysical position of the philosophy of Idealism is that reality is basically spirit rather than matter. For the Idealist, the idea is more real than the thing, since the thing only reflects or represents the idea. The world of spirit or idea is static and absolute. Socrates and Plato are the best known ancient representatives of this view. Immanuel Kant and Thomas Hill Green are more modern Idealists.
Once the metaphysical view that reality is found in the idea is assumed, the ethical position that goodness is to be found in the ideal (that is, in perfection) automatically follows. Goodness is found on the immaterial level, that is, in the perfect concept or notion or idea of something. Thus, perfect goodness is never to be found in the material world. Evil, for the Idealist, consists of the absence or distortion of the ideal. Since ideals can never change (because they are a priori and absolute), moral imperatives concerning them do not admit of exceptions. That is, these imperatives may be stated in terms of "always" or "never." For example: "Always tell the truth" or (put negatively) "Never tell a lie." Since truth is the knowledge of ideal reality and a lie is a distortion of that reality, truth must always be told and lying can never be justified.
Realism
The person with a Realistic world view believes that reality is basically matter rather than spirit. For the Realist, the thing is more real than the idea. Whatever exists is therefore primarily material, natural, and physical. As such, reality exists in some quantity and therefore can be measured (as the early American experimental psychologist Edward Lee Thorndike liked to say). It exists independently of any mind and is governed by the laws of nature, primary among which are the laws of cause and effect. The universe, according to the Realist, is one of natural design and order. Aristotle was an early representative of this view. B.F. Skinner, a well-known behavioral psychologist, is a more current exponent.
The ethical position that flows from a Realist metaphysics is one that views the baseline of value as that which is natural (that is, that which is in conformity with nature). Nature is good. One need not look beyond nature to some immaterial ideal for a standard of right and wrong. Rather, goodness will be found by living in harmony with nature. Evil, for the Realist, is a departure from this natural norm either in the direction of excess or defect (i.e., having, or doing, too much or too little of something which is naturally good).
Pragmatism
For the Pragmatist, metaphysics is not so simple a matter as it is for the Idealist and Realist. Reality is neither an idea nor a thing. The Pragmatist believes it would be a mistake to view reality as either a spiritual or physical "something." Rather, the Pragmatist believes that reality is a process. It is a dynamic coming-to-be rather than a static fixed being. It is change, happening, activity, interaction...in short, it is experience. In this view, reality is more like a verb than a noun. It is flux and flow where the concentration is not so much on the things as on the relationship between the things. Since everything changes - indeed, the Pragmatist would say that everything IS change - nothing can have any permanent essence or identity. An ancient Greek Pragmatist used to say in this regard: "You can't step in the same river twice." For the Pragmatist, everything is essentially relative. The only constant is change. The only absolute is that there are no absolutes (...and a Pragmatist would see this as only a semantic contradiction, not a real one). The Americans Charles Sanders Pierce, William James, and John Dewey are representatives of this view.
The ethical result of the Pragmatic metaphysical position requires that value claims must be tested and proven in practice. This is so because meaning is inherent in the consequences of actions. In the Pragmatist's view, things are value-neutral in themselves. There is nothing that is always good, nor is there anything that is always bad. The value of anything is determined solely by its usefulness in achieving some end. In answer to the question of whether something was good, a Pragmatist would probably reply, "Good for what?" Thus the Pragmatist believes that the end justifies the means. That is, if an act is useful for achieving some socially-approved end or goal, then it becomes good. To state this yet another way, a means gets its positive value from being an efficient route to the achievement of a socially-approved end (a socially-approved end is one that results in the greatest good for the greatest number of people). Thus, a means is not valued for its own sake, but only in relation to its usefulness for achieving some socially-approved end. Results or consequences are the ultimate measure of goodness for a Pragmatist, since the usefulness of a means to an end can only be judged after the fact by its effect on the end. Thus, for the Pragmatist, there can be no assurance that something is good...until it is tried. Even then, it is only held tentatively as good since a thing is good only as long as it continues to work. There can, however, be a dispute about which means are more effective for achieving an end. Indeed, there can be a dispute about which ends should, in fact, be pursued. Thus, the Pragmatist looks for guidance from the group. The reasons for this are metaphysical: reality is experience, but it is the experience of the whole. For the Pragmatist, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. This means that the whole is more valuable than any of its parts. In the field of value judgments, the group's wisdom is more highly esteemed than the wisdom of any individual within the group.
Existentialism
The Existentialist joins with the Pragmatist in rejecting the belief that reality is a priori and fixed. But instead of believing that reality is a process whose meaning is defined primarily by the controlling group, Existentialist metaphysics holds that reality must be defined by each autonomous individual. The Existentialist notions of subjectivity and phenomenological-self emphasize that the meaning or surdity of an otherwise "absurd" universe is individually determined. Any meaning that is in the world must be put into it by the individual, and that meaning or value will hold only for that individual. Thus each person's world, as well as each person's own identity, is the product of that person's own choice. Each person can therefore be defined as the sum of that person's choices. A person's world is what that person chooses it to be. Thus, reality is different for each individual. We each live in our own world and we are who we ultimately choose to be. Soren Kierkegaard and Jean-Paul Sartre are frequently associated with this view. It might be noted that sometimes exponents of this view paradoxically reject the label of "existentialist" as being too objectifying or non-existential.
Like the Existentialist position on reality, its ethical position is that the individual must create his/her own value. There is no escape from the necessity of creating values. Just as one's world is defined by the choices that an individual makes regarding reality, so too must the individual express her/his own preferences. In making choices, or defining values, the individual becomes responsible for those choices. The individual cannot deflect praise or blame for those choices on others. If the choices were freely made, then responsibility for them must be accepted. While groups might influence what choices an individual makes, the existentialist believes that there is a zone of freedom within each individual which cannot be conditioned or predetermined. While emphasizing a highly individualized choice of values, an Existentialist is not necessarily a non-conformist. But if an Existentialist does conform to the values of a group it will be because that person has freely chosen to do so, not because she or he has been pressured to do so by the group.
The Problem of Consistency
The above outline of philosophical views might appear to oversimplify the basis for ethical decision-making. I would most readily agree that ethical decision-making in real-time is a much more difficult process than might appear from the above summaries. For instance, our research (Barger & Barger, 1989) found that while most of the students surveyed had a predominant leaning toward one of the four philosophies described above, they also had concomitant lesser leanings toward all or most of the other three philosophies. In other words, nobody is a one-hundred-percent Idealist (...or Realist, or Pragmatist, or Existentialist).
This means that simply knowing a person's dominant philosophical outlook will not allow assured prediction of how he or she might act in response to a given ethical situation. This is true for two reasons: 1) the one previously stated: that sympathies with other philosophical views besides one's dominant view might end up controlling action in this or that particular situation, and, 2) the fact that people do not always conscientiously act in a manner consistent with their beliefs. That is, they might fail to follow through in a particular situation on what they believe is the right thing to do.
Conclusion
My concern has been to show that one's philosophic world view predisposes one's ethical judgments. This does not mean, however, that values cannot be taught. It is indeed possible for people of different philosophic world views to come to agreement on similar preferences. However, as seen above, they would do so for philosophically divergent reasons. So, one could teach a child that killing is wrong. But if the child were of an Idealistic outlook, one would do well to appeal to the motive that killing is wrong because all life is sacred. If one were dealing with a Pragmatist, one would do well to appeal to the motive that killing is wrong because it is socially inexpedient.
It is not enough, in teaching values, to teach THAT something is wrong. One must also teach WHY it is wrong. Motive, in ethical matters, is crucial...and motive is determined by one's world view. The educational implication of this, for a society containing people of divergent world views, is that a multiplicity of motives should be proposed when attempting to establish a basis for moral decisions. Good teaching methodology dictates that one should appeal to as many of the senses as possible in teaching a lesson because of the diversity of learning styles among students. So too, metaethics would suggest that one should appeal to as many different philosophical motives as possible when engaging in moral discourse with an audience of diverse viewpoints.
References
Barger, Robert N., & Barger, Josephine C. (1989). Do Pragmatists Choose Business While Idealists Choose Education?. Charleston: Eastern Illinois University. (ERIC Document Reproduction Service No. ED 317 904).
Halverson, William H. (1981). Introduction to Philosophy (4th ed.). New York: Random House.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. (1961). Tractatus Logico-philosophicus (D.F. Pears & B.F. McGuinness, Trans.). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd. (Original work published 1921).