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Gunes Murat Tezcur
   
Research
BOOK
Muslim Reformers
in Iran and Turkey:
The Paradox of Moderation
(University of
Texas Press Modern Middle East Series Spring 2010)
Moderation
theory describes the process through which radical political actors develop commitments
to electoral competition, political pluralism, human rights, and rule of law
and come to prefer negotiation, reconciliation, and electoral politics over
provocation, confrontation, and contentious action. Revisiting this theory
through an examination of two of the most prominent moderate Islamic
political forces in recent history, Muslim
Reformers in Iran and Turkey analyzes the gains made and
methods implemented by the Reform Front in the Islamic Republic of Iran and
the Justice and Development Party in Turkey.
Both of
these groups represent Muslim reformers who came into continual conflict with
unelected adversaries who attempted to block their reformist agendas. Based
on extensive field research in both locales, Muslim Reformers in Iran and Turkey
argues that behavioral moderation as practiced by these groups may actually
inhibit democratic progress. Political scientist Gunes Murat Tezcur observes
that the ability to implement conciliatory tactics, organize electoral
parties, and make political compromises impeded democracy when pursued by the
Reform Front and the Justice and Development Party. Challenging conventional
wisdom, Tezcur's findings have broad implications for the dynamics of
democratic progress.
SCHOLARLY ARTICLES
"When
Democratization Radicalizes: The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in
Turkey," Journal of Peace Research (forthcoming) (Prepublication PDF file.)
This article addresses a historical puzzle: Why did the
insurgent PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan), which was militarily
defeated, which renounced the goal of secession, and whose leader was under
the custody of the Turkish state, remobilize its armed forces in a time when
opportunities for the peaceful solution of the Kurdish question were
unprecedented in Turkey?
The PKK′s radicalization at a period of EU-induced
democratization in Turkey counters the conventional argument that fostering
democracy would reduce the problems of ethnic conflict. Explanations based on
resource mobilization, political opportunity structures, and cognitive
framing fail to provide a satisfactory answer. The article argues that
democratization will not necessarily facilitate the end of violent conflict
as long as it introduces competition that challenges the political hegemony
of the insurgent organization over its ethnic constituency. Under the
dynamics of competition, the survival of the organization necessitates
radicalization rather than moderation. As long as the insurgent organization
successfully recruits new militants, democratization is not a panacea to
violent conflict. The findings indicate that research on the micro-level
dynamics of insurgency recruitment will contribute to a better understanding
of ethnic conflict management. The data comes from multiple sources including
ethnographic fieldwork, statistical analyses of quantitative data (i.e.,
spatial autocorrelation and ecological inference), and systematic reading of
original documents.
"Kurdish
Nationalism and Identity in Turkey: A Conceptual Reinterpretation," European
Journal of Turkish Studies
This
article argues that the evolution of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey is more
ambivalent and nuanced than is usually acknowledged. This claim is based on
three interpretive approaches: 1) the primary actors in national politics are
conceptualized as organizations, rather than as ethnic groups; 2) a
boundary-making approach to ethnic identities is more promising than an
insistence on an ethnic versus civic nationalism dichotomy; and 3) the
relationship of state and society relations is better understood in terms of
a series of interactions among state actors and social actors than an
insistence on a global dichotomy of state and society. These three approaches
may help develop answers to important questions regarding political identity
in Turkey. First, why do so many Kurdish-speaking citizens fail to articulate
their identity in the terms demanded by the Kurdish nationalist movement?
Second, why are the electoral returns in those areas of Turkey with large
numbers of Kurdish-speakers not more closely correlated with the ethnic
distribution of the population? Finally, why does the Kurdistan Workers′
Party (PKK) often act in ways that are inconsistent with its declared goals
of defending and expanding the political and civil rights of the Kurds?
"Judicial
Activism in Perilous Times: The Turkish Case," Law and Society Review
43, 2 (June 2009): 305-336.
Under
what circumstances do courts act in ways that challenge the political
hegemony of the military in countries with weak democratic institutions? This
article addresses this question by focusing on a critical case of judicial
activism in Turkey.
It argues that lower courts unexpectedly can be centers of judicial activism
that contributes to expansion of civil liberties and restrictions on
arbitrary state power when the high judiciary supports the political status
quo. This is because lower courts provide greater access to legal
mobilization pursued by civil society actors. At the same time, judicial
activism at lower courts is sustainable only when political power is
distributed among elites with conflicting interests, and the civilian
government offers support and protection to activist members of the
judiciary.
Available
at http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/122398979/abstract
"The
Moderation Theory Revisited: The Case of Islamic Political Actors," Party
Politics
An
influential political science literature argues that the integration of
radical political parties into the political system leads to their
moderation. These parties trade off their ideological platforms for electoral
viability and political legality. Radicals become moderates as a result of
strategic interests. This paper revisits this thesis and applies it to the
Islamic political actors in Iran
and Turkey
by employing the comparative method of agreement. It reaches three
conclusions. First, moderation thesis provides strong tools in explaining the
evolution of Islamists into Muslim democrats. Second, moderation is a
double-edged sword especially in regimes with strong undemocratic
characteristics. Moderation of radicals may result in their domestication
that does not contribute to democratic transition or consolidation. Finally,
change in the ideologies of political elites is central in understanding
behavioral change. The data sources include ethnographic work, primary
language sources, and historical narratives.
Available
at http://ppq.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/1354068809339536v1
"Religiosity
and the Islamic Rule in Iran,"
Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 47, 2 (June 2008):
211-224. (PDF file.)
This
article investigates the relationship between religiosity and support for
Islamic rule in the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI). Are high levels of
religiosity associated with an ideology characterized by clerical rule,
supremacy of Islamic law, and state enforcement of Islam? The data come from
a random sampling survey conducted in Tehran
in August 2003. It covers a range of questions on religiosity, social, and
political attitudes, and has a sample of 412 respondents. The analyses show
that religiosity is closely affiliated with an ideological understanding of
Islam in Tehran.
Interestingly, political dissatisfaction does not negatively affect this
association. Shiism in Iran
has evolved from a "world-shaking" force into a
"world-legitimating" force.
"Intra-Elite Struggles
in Iranian Elections," in Political Participation in the Middle East
and North Africa Ellen Lust-Okar and Saloua Zerhouni edited (Boulders,
CO: Lynne Reinner, 2008), pp. 51-74. (PDF
file.)
This
chapter offers an analytical survey of the elections in the Islamic Republic
of Iran (IRI) with a focus on two interrelated questions: 1) what are the
major characteristics of, and the nature of political participation within,
the elections in the Islamic Republic? 2) how do elections affect the
evolution of factional politics? A main argument of this chapter is that
elections primarily serve to perpetuate pluralist authoritarianism in the
IRI. Rather than being catalyst for democratization or simply solidifying the
regime's control over society, elections manage inter-factional conflict and
introduce an element of uncertainty and dynamism to Iranian politics
unparalleled in many other authoritarian regimes. The chapter is based on the
author's participant observant study of the 2005 presidential elections,
systematic analysis of electoral data, and compilation of printed and
electronic news in Persian especially during the electoral periods. Fieldwork
in 2005 involved observing campaigns of the presidential candidates,
interviewing campaign managers, workers, journalists and voters.
"Constitutionalism,
Judiciary and Democracy in Islamic Societies," Polity 39, 4 (October
2007): 479-501. (PDF file.)
This
article reconsiders the relationship between secularism, liberalism, and
democracy in non-secularized societies by focusing on judicial activism. The
goal is to identify the forms of constitutionalism and judicial review that
are necessary for the sustainability of democracy in societies where
exclusive and holistic interpretations of religion remain pervasive. How is
it possible to prevent majority rule from decaying into the tyranny of the
majority in such societies? Neither the guardianship regimes embodied by the
Iranian and Turkish republics nor Islamic democracy provide viable models
that overcome the tension between constitutionalism and democracy. However, a
conflict between these two principles in Islamic societies is avoidable.
Judicial review, sanctioned by democratically written liberal constitutions
and not guarded by non-elected institutions such as military, would be a
guardian of individual and minority rights in Islamic societies.
"Religious
Participation among Muslims: Iranian Exceptionalism," Critique: Critical
Middle Eastern Studies 15, 3 (Fall 2006): 217-232. (PDF file.)
Recent
research has suggested that secularization, understood either as the decline
of religious beliefs or the marginalization of religion in public life, has
not occurred in most parts of the world. Islam especially has remained
a vibrant force that affects how people make sense of social relations and
politics. However, the indicators of religiosity in predominantly Muslim
countries have not been studied extensively. Although these societies are
assumed to be characterized by high levels of religious belief, research has
demonstrated significant variance in mosque attendance rates. In particular,
mosque attendance rates in Iran
are surprisingly low. This article aims to specify the reasons for the low
rates of mosque attendance among Iranians. The data for the article comes
from the World Values Survey conducted in Muslim countries and a survey
conducted in Tehran
by the authors. Survey evidence indicates a strong correlation between
frequency of mosque attendance and positive evaluations of political
governance. Paradoxically, levels of subjective religiosity are negatively
associated with attendance in Friday congregational prayers.
CURRENT RESEARCH PROJECTS
Religious Political Parties in Electoral
Competition: A Comparative Study of Indonesia
and Turkey
(with Mirjam Kunkler)
Ongoing research
project funded by the United States Institute of Peace
Support for
Democracy in the Islamic Republic
of Iran
Working paper
Political
Geography of Turkish Elections: An Electoral Inference Analysis
Working
paper
Muslims
NGOs and Democracy Promotion
Working
paper
Women,
Islam, and Political Candidacy: An Experimental Study in Turkey (with Richard Matland)
Working
paper based on an experimental survey of 303 university students in Turkey
DATA SETS
Tehran Surveys (August
2003 and December 2007): Multi-stage area probability surveys on religious
values and political attitudes with a sample of 412 and 580 respectively.
Iranian
elections: Complete results from the 2005 and 2009 presidential and 2008
parliamentary elections at province level.
Turkish
parliamentary elections: Complete results from the 1991, 1995, 1999, 2002 and
2007 elections at province and district level, and at neighborhood level for
selected provinces.
A database of PKK
militants: Demographic information about around 2,800 militants.
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