Gunes Murat Tezcur

Research

BOOK

Muslim Reformers in Iran and Turkey: The Paradox of Moderation

(University of Texas Press Modern Middle East Series Spring 2010)

Moderation theory describes the process through which radical political actors develop commitments to electoral competition, political pluralism, human rights, and rule of law and come to prefer negotiation, reconciliation, and electoral politics over provocation, confrontation, and contentious action. Revisiting this theory through an examination of two of the most prominent moderate Islamic political forces in recent history, Muslim Reformers in Iran and Turkey analyzes the gains made and methods implemented by the Reform Front in the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Justice and Development Party in Turkey.

Both of these groups represent Muslim reformers who came into continual conflict with unelected adversaries who attempted to block their reformist agendas. Based on extensive field research in both locales, Muslim Reformers in Iran and Turkey argues that behavioral moderation as practiced by these groups may actually inhibit democratic progress. Political scientist Gunes Murat Tezcur observes that the ability to implement conciliatory tactics, organize electoral parties, and make political compromises impeded democracy when pursued by the Reform Front and the Justice and Development Party. Challenging conventional wisdom, Tezcur's findings have broad implications for the dynamics of democratic progress.

SCHOLARLY ARTICLES

"When Democratization Radicalizes: The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in Turkey," Journal of Peace Research (forthcoming) (Prepublication PDF file.)

This article addresses a historical puzzle: Why did the insurgent PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan), which was militarily defeated, which renounced the goal of secession, and whose leader was under the custody of the Turkish state, remobilize its armed forces in a time when opportunities for the peaceful solution of the Kurdish question were unprecedented in Turkey? The PKK′s radicalization at a period of EU-induced democratization in Turkey counters the conventional argument that fostering democracy would reduce the problems of ethnic conflict. Explanations based on resource mobilization, political opportunity structures, and cognitive framing fail to provide a satisfactory answer. The article argues that democratization will not necessarily facilitate the end of violent conflict as long as it introduces competition that challenges the political hegemony of the insurgent organization over its ethnic constituency. Under the dynamics of competition, the survival of the organization necessitates radicalization rather than moderation. As long as the insurgent organization successfully recruits new militants, democratization is not a panacea to violent conflict. The findings indicate that research on the micro-level dynamics of insurgency recruitment will contribute to a better understanding of ethnic conflict management. The data comes from multiple sources including ethnographic fieldwork, statistical analyses of quantitative data (i.e., spatial autocorrelation and ecological inference), and systematic reading of original documents.

"Kurdish Nationalism and Identity in Turkey: A Conceptual Reinterpretation," European Journal of Turkish Studies

This article argues that the evolution of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey is more ambivalent and nuanced than is usually acknowledged. This claim is based on three interpretive approaches: 1) the primary actors in national politics are conceptualized as organizations, rather than as ethnic groups; 2) a boundary-making approach to ethnic identities is more promising than an insistence on an ethnic versus civic nationalism dichotomy; and 3) the relationship of state and society relations is better understood in terms of a series of interactions among state actors and social actors than an insistence on a global dichotomy of state and society. These three approaches may help develop answers to important questions regarding political identity in Turkey. First, why do so many Kurdish-speaking citizens fail to articulate their identity in the terms demanded by the Kurdish nationalist movement? Second, why are the electoral returns in those areas of Turkey with large numbers of Kurdish-speakers not more closely correlated with the ethnic distribution of the population? Finally, why does the Kurdistan Workers′ Party (PKK) often act in ways that are inconsistent with its declared goals of defending and expanding the political and civil rights of the Kurds?

"Judicial Activism in Perilous Times: The Turkish Case," Law and Society Review 43, 2 (June 2009): 305-336.

Under what circumstances do courts act in ways that challenge the political hegemony of the military in countries with weak democratic institutions? This article addresses this question by focusing on a critical case of judicial activism in Turkey. It argues that lower courts unexpectedly can be centers of judicial activism that contributes to expansion of civil liberties and restrictions on arbitrary state power when the high judiciary supports the political status quo. This is because lower courts provide greater access to legal mobilization pursued by civil society actors. At the same time, judicial activism at lower courts is sustainable only when political power is distributed among elites with conflicting interests, and the civilian government offers support and protection to activist members of the judiciary.

Available at http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/122398979/abstract

"The Moderation Theory Revisited: The Case of Islamic Political Actors," Party Politics

An influential political science literature argues that the integration of radical political parties into the political system leads to their moderation. These parties trade off their ideological platforms for electoral viability and political legality. Radicals become moderates as a result of strategic interests. This paper revisits this thesis and applies it to the Islamic political actors in Iran and Turkey by employing the comparative method of agreement. It reaches three conclusions. First, moderation thesis provides strong tools in explaining the evolution of Islamists into Muslim democrats. Second, moderation is a double-edged sword especially in regimes with strong undemocratic characteristics. Moderation of radicals may result in their domestication that does not contribute to democratic transition or consolidation. Finally, change in the ideologies of political elites is central in understanding behavioral change. The data sources include ethnographic work, primary language sources, and historical narratives.

Available at http://ppq.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/1354068809339536v1

"Religiosity and the Islamic Rule in Iran," Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 47, 2 (June 2008): 211-224. (PDF file.)

This article investigates the relationship between religiosity and support for Islamic rule in the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI). Are high levels of religiosity associated with an ideology characterized by clerical rule, supremacy of Islamic law, and state enforcement of Islam? The data come from a random sampling survey conducted in Tehran in August 2003. It covers a range of questions on religiosity, social, and political attitudes, and has a sample of 412 respondents. The analyses show that religiosity is closely affiliated with an ideological understanding of Islam in Tehran. Interestingly, political dissatisfaction does not negatively affect this association. Shiism in Iran has evolved from a "world-shaking" force into a "world-legitimating" force.

"Intra-Elite Struggles in Iranian Elections," in Political Participation in the Middle East and North Africa Ellen Lust-Okar and Saloua Zerhouni edited (Boulders, CO: Lynne Reinner, 2008), pp. 51-74. (PDF file.)

This chapter offers an analytical survey of the elections in the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) with a focus on two interrelated questions: 1) what are the major characteristics of, and the nature of political participation within, the elections in the Islamic Republic? 2) how do elections affect the evolution of factional politics? A main argument of this chapter is that elections primarily serve to perpetuate pluralist authoritarianism in the IRI. Rather than being catalyst for democratization or simply solidifying the regime's control over society, elections manage inter-factional conflict and introduce an element of uncertainty and dynamism to Iranian politics unparalleled in many other authoritarian regimes. The chapter is based on the author's participant observant study of the 2005 presidential elections, systematic analysis of electoral data, and compilation of printed and electronic news in Persian especially during the electoral periods. Fieldwork in 2005 involved observing campaigns of the presidential candidates, interviewing campaign managers, workers, journalists and voters.

"Constitutionalism, Judiciary and Democracy in Islamic Societies," Polity 39, 4 (October 2007): 479-501. (PDF file.)

This article reconsiders the relationship between secularism, liberalism, and democracy in non-secularized societies by focusing on judicial activism. The goal is to identify the forms of constitutionalism and judicial review that are necessary for the sustainability of democracy in societies where exclusive and holistic interpretations of religion remain pervasive. How is it possible to prevent majority rule from decaying into the tyranny of the majority in such societies? Neither the guardianship regimes embodied by the Iranian and Turkish republics nor Islamic democracy provide viable models that overcome the tension between constitutionalism and democracy. However, a conflict between these two principles in Islamic societies is avoidable. Judicial review, sanctioned by democratically written liberal constitutions and not guarded by non-elected institutions such as military, would be a guardian of individual and minority rights in Islamic societies.

"Religious Participation among Muslims: Iranian Exceptionalism," Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies 15, 3 (Fall 2006): 217-232. (PDF file.)

Recent research has suggested that secularization, understood either as the decline of religious beliefs or the marginalization of religion in public life, has not occurred in most parts of the world. Islam especially has remained a vibrant force that affects how people make sense of social relations and politics. However, the indicators of religiosity in predominantly Muslim countries have not been studied extensively. Although these societies are assumed to be characterized by high levels of religious belief, research has demonstrated significant variance in mosque attendance rates. In particular, mosque attendance rates in Iran are surprisingly low. This article aims to specify the reasons for the low rates of mosque attendance among Iranians. The data for the article comes from the World Values Survey conducted in Muslim countries and a survey conducted in Tehran by the authors. Survey evidence indicates a strong correlation between frequency of mosque attendance and positive evaluations of political governance. Paradoxically, levels of subjective religiosity are negatively associated with attendance in Friday congregational prayers.

CURRENT RESEARCH PROJECTS

Religious Political Parties in Electoral Competition: A Comparative Study of Indonesia and Turkey (with Mirjam Kunkler)

Ongoing research project funded by the United States Institute of Peace

Support for Democracy in the Islamic Republic of Iran

Working paper

Political Geography of Turkish Elections: An Electoral Inference Analysis

Working paper

Muslims NGOs and Democracy Promotion

Working paper

Women, Islam, and Political Candidacy: An Experimental Study in Turkey (with Richard Matland)

Working paper based on an experimental survey of 303 university students in Turkey

DATA SETS

Tehran Surveys (August 2003 and December 2007): Multi-stage area probability surveys on religious values and political attitudes with a sample of 412 and 580 respectively.

Iranian elections: Complete results from the 2005 and 2009 presidential and 2008 parliamentary elections at province level.

Turkish parliamentary elections: Complete results from the 1991, 1995, 1999, 2002 and 2007 elections at province and district level, and at neighborhood level for selected provinces.

A database of PKK militants: Demographic information about around 2,800 militants.