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TIME SERIES APPROACHES TO TESTING INCOME CONVERGENCE IN MENA COUNTRIES

HALUK ERLAT

Department of Economics Middle East Technical University 06531 Ankara, Turkey Fax: 90-312-2107964 Email: <u>herlat@metu.edu.tr</u>

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1. Introduction

Our objective is to test for income convergence in the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries using time series techniques. Income convergence for these countries was tested, previously and quite extensively, by Guetat and Serranito (2004), using panel root tests. Underlying this approach is the assumption that the per capita income of countries approach or diverge from a target level which may either be the average of the per capita income of the group of countries being considered (which is what Guetat and Serranito use) or the per capita income of an advanced country. Pesaran (2006), however, argues that the choice of such a target level may be arbitrary and that, following Bernard and Durlauf (1995), the pair-wise convergence of all countries involved should be investigated.

Pesaran (2006) shows that, to overcome the dimensional limitations of the cointegration approach used by Bernard and Durlauf (1995), the stationarity of the pair-wise logarithmic differences between the per capita incomes may be tested. If *N* is the number of countries, then one has to carry out N(N-1)/2 unit root tests, which may be quite a large number if *N* is large, even moderately so. In fact, Pesaran (2006) has applied his approach to the per capita incomes of various groups of countries (including the MENA countries), the largest of which consisted of 101 series and this implied that 5050 unit root tests were performed. Of course, the number of countries to be considered in our case, as we shall explain below, is only nine which implies 36 pairs of countries but we, nevertheless, decided to use a screening procedure due to Webber and White (2004) where, roughly speaking, for a given period, the per capita income difference between two countries at the end of the period is compared, in ratio terms, to the income difference at the beginning of the period and countries are said to be converging if this ratio lies between zero and unity. Pesaran's procedure was applied to those countries that satisfied this requirement.

The plan of our paper will, then, be as follows. In the following section, an account of the empirical methods will be given. In Section 3 the data will be described and the empirical results will be presented in Section 4. The final section will contain our conclusions.

2. Methodology

We shall investigate convergence in two stages. We shall first use a descriptive method due to Webber and White (2004), by which we shall reduce the number of pair wise tests of convergence that we shall conduct. We shall then perform pair-wise unit root tests.

Let y_{it} and y_{jt} denote the per capita incomes of countries *i* and *j* at time *t* respectively. The descriptive method is based on investigating the behaviour of y_{it} vis-à-vis y_{jt} by looking at their differences in two points in time, namely, $y_{it} - y_{jt}$ versus $y_{i,t+h} - y_{j,t+h}$. If $y_{it} - y_{jt} > y_{i,t+h} - y_{j,t+h}$ then one may take this as evidence of convergence since it implies that country *i* grows slower than country *j*. Similarly, one may compare y_{it}/y_{jt} with $y_{i,t+k}/y_{j,t+k}$ or $\ln y_{it} - \ln y_{jt}$ with $\ln y_{i,t+h} - \ln y_{j,t+h}$, which is the same thing. We may then state that

- If the observations converge in both ratios *and* differences, we have *strong* convergence
- If the observations converge in ratios or differences, we have weak convergence.

It is also possible that $y_{it} > y_{jt}$ but $y_{i,t+h} < y_{j,t+h}$, i.e., the countries may switch positions. The procedure described below takes switching also account.

We shall assume, throughout, that $y_{it} > y_{jt}$. Hence, for convergence in *ratio* we shall calculate

(1)
$$X_{i,j} = \frac{\ln y_{i,t+k} - \ln y_{j,t+k}}{\ln y_{it} - \ln y_{it}}$$

and conclude that if,

- $X_{ii} > 1$, countries *i* and *j* diverge in ratio without switching.
- $0 < X_{ij} < 1$, countries *i* and *j* converge in ratio without switching.
- $-1 < X_{ij} < 0$, countries *i* and *j* converge in ratio with switching.
- $X_{ij} < -1$, countries *i* and *j* diverge in ratio with switching.

For convergence in *difference*, we first apply a normalizing transformation on y_{it} as

(2)
$$c_{it} = \frac{y_{it} - \overline{y}_t}{\overline{y}_t}$$

where $\overline{y}_t = \sum_{i=1}^{N} y_{it} / N$, so that any bias that may result from ignoring the growth of the *N* countries as a group is avoided. We then calculate

(3)
$$Y_{ij} = \frac{c_{i,t+k} - c_{j,t+k}}{c_{it} - c_{jt}}$$

and conclude that if

- $Y_{ij} > 1$, countries *i* and *j* diverge in ratio without switching.
- $0 < Y_{ii} < 1$, countries *i* and *j* converge in ratio without switching.
- $-1 < Y_{ij} < 0$, countries *i* and *j* converge in ratio with switching.
- $Y_{ij} < -1$, countries *i* and *j* diverge in ratio with switching.

Thus,

- $0 < X_{ij} < 1$ and $0 < Y_{ij} < 1$ would imply strong convergence without switching.
- $0 < X_{ij} < 1$ or $0 < Y_{ij} < 1$ would imply weak convergence without switching.
- $-1 < X_{ij} < 0$ and $-1 < Y_{ij} < 0$ would imply strong convergence with switching.
- $-1 < X_{ij} < 0$ or $-1 < Y_{ij} < 0$ would imply weak convergence with switching.

After having classified the pairs of countries, we shall choose those that exhibit strong convergence with or without switching and apply pair wise tests of convergence. The investigation of convergence using a pair wise approach is based on the definition of convergence for two countries provided by Bernard and Durlauf (1995):

(4)
$$\lim_{k \to \infty} E(w_{i,t+k} - w_{i,t-k} | I_t) = 0 \text{ at any fixed time } t$$

where $w_{it} = \ln y_{it}$ and I_t is the information set at time *t*, containing the current and past values for $w_{i,t-k}$ for i = 1,...,N and k = 0, 1, 2, ...,. From this definition, it is concluded that in order for countries *i* and *j* to converge, their per capita outputs should be cointegrated with cointegrating vector (1,-1).

Pesaran (2006) offers an alternative definition based on the probability of the output gap $w_{it} - w_{jt}$ falling outside a predetermined interval; i.e., that the probability of

 $|w_{i,t+k} - w_{j,t+k}|$ being larger than some finite positive constant *g* should be smaller than some preassigned small probability, ξ , for all horizons, *k*. Using this definition avoids the pretesting for unit roots in w_{it} and w_{jt} that the cointegration approach, advocated by Bernard and Durlauf (1995), requires. $w_{it} - w_{jt}$ may now be tested, first, for the presence of a unit root in an autoregression that contains a linear trend and, if no unit root is found, for the presence of a linear deterministic trend.

When there are more than two countries to consider, Pesaran (2006) offers a definition which, basically, requires that the definition of convergence given for a pair of countries should hold for all N(N-1)/2 pairs of countries being considered. Hence, unit root tests are applied to all the pairs chosen in the first stage of our investigation and to conclude that there is convergence in the group, all pairs must converge..

We initially followed Pesaran (2006) and implemented the ADF test, where the null hypothesis is divergence, and the KPSS (Kwiatowski et al, 1992) test where the null hypothesis is convergence. Let $z_{it} = w_{it} - w_{jt}$. Then the ADF test was obtained by estimating

(5)
$$\Delta z_{ijt} = d'_{tr}\beta_r + \alpha z_{ijt} + \sum_{i=1}^{P} \gamma_i \Delta z_{ijt} + \varepsilon_{ijt}, \quad r = 0, 1$$

where $d_{tr} = 1$ and $\beta_r = \beta_0$ for r = 0 and $d_{tr} = (1,t)$ and $\beta_r = (\beta_0, \beta_1)'$ for r = 1, and the tratio of α was used as the statistic to test for a unit root. In the case of r = 1, $\beta_1 = 0$ was tested for those cases where the null hypothesis of $\alpha = 0$ were rejected.

The KPSS test, on the other hand, is based on assuming that the z_{ijt} are stationary so that they are generated by

(6)
$$z_{ijt} = \eta_0 + \mathcal{E}_{ijt}$$

Under the alternative hypothesis of nonstationarity, it is assumed that $\eta_{0t} = \eta_0 + u_t$, i.e., a random walk, with $E(u_t) = 0$ and $E(u_t^2) = \sigma_u^2 > 0$. Hence, the null hypothesis of stationarity becomes $H_o: \sigma_u^2 = 0$ vs $H_1: \sigma_u^2 > 0$. The test statistic for this hypothesis is based on the Lagrange Multiplier approach and is obtained as

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(7)
$$KPSS_{ij} = \frac{T^{-2} \sum_{t=1}^{I} S_{ijt}}{\hat{\sigma}_{\varepsilon}^{2}}$$

where $S_{ijt} = \sum_{\tau=1}^{t} \widehat{\varepsilon}_{ij\tau}$, $\widehat{\sigma}_{\varepsilon} = T^{-1} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \widehat{\varepsilon}_{ijt}^{2} + 2T^{-1} \sum_{\ell=1}^{m} w(m/\ell) \left(\sum_{t=\ell+1}^{T} \widehat{\varepsilon}_{ijt} \widehat{\varepsilon}_{ij,t-\ell} \right)$, $w(m/\ell) = 1 - (\ell/(m+1))$ and the $\widehat{\varepsilon}_{ijt}$ are obtained from the OLS estimation of (6). The choice of *m* was made using a data dependent procedure due the Newey and West (1994).

The results of our descriptive approach and the plots of the pair-wise differences led to the expectation that structural shifts in the level of the output gaps, i.e., the intercept term in (5), needed to be taken into account when testing for unit roots. We did this by following the approach developed by Perron and Vogelsang (1992) and Perron (1997) where the shift in β_0 is taken to be endogeneous. Such tests are sequential tests. For the single shift case that we shall consider, we start at a shift point $t = h_0$, where $h_0 = [T\lambda]$ and λ is an appropriately chosen trimming fraction, and estimate (5) sequentially as this shift point is moved towards $t = T - h_0$. This may be done by using the dummy variables

(8)

$$DU_{t}(h) = 0 \quad for \quad t = 1, \dots, h$$

$$= 1 \quad for \quad t = h + 1, \dots, T$$

$$D_{t}(h) = 1 \quad for \quad t = 1, \dots, h$$

$$= 0 \quad otherwise$$

where $h_0 \le h \le T - h_0$. We would then be estimating

(9)
$$\Delta z_{ijt} = d'_{tr}\beta + \delta DU_t(h) + \varphi D_t(h) + \alpha y_{t-1} + \sum_{s=1}^p \gamma_s \Delta z_{ij,t-s} + \varepsilon_{ijt}$$

The test statistics is simply the minimum value of the sequentially obtained ADF statistics (min ADF) and the shift point, \hat{h} will be the date corresponding to this minimized value.¹

¹ Perron and Vogelsang (1992) and Perron (1997) call this the innovational outlier model, implying that the shift in the intercept term is gradual.

3. The Data

The data were obtained from the Penn World Tables Version 6.1 (Heston, Summers and Aken, 2002). They consist of annual Purchasing Power adjusted per capita real GDP series constructed in international dollars at 1996 prices. Even though the series are constructed to cover the 1951-2000 period only four MENA countries have data for this period; Israel, Egypt, Morocco and Turkey. We, thus, used the 1961-2000 period for which data exist for nine countries; Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. The same data have also been utilized by Guitat and Serranito (2004) and Pesaran (2006).

4. Empirical Results

We first consider the results of the descriptive procedure used in the first stage. We considered four base years, 1961, 1970, 1980 and 1990. We then calculated the X_{ij} and Y_{ij} values using equations (1) and (3). The results are given in Table 1 and in Tables A1-A3 in the Appendix.

To see how we may use these results, let us consider the 1961-based figures for Algeria as presented in Table 1. We find that Algeria strongly converges with Egypt for the 1961-1990 and 1961-2000 periods (both *X* and *Y* are between 0 and 1), strongly diverges from Iran for all four periods (with switching in 1961-1980 and 1961-1990), converges weakly with Israel in 1961-1980 (*X* lies between 0 and 1 but *Y* is greater than unity), converges strongly without switching with Morocco in all periods except 1961-1980 when convergence is weak; converges strongly, without switching, with Syria in 1961-1990 and 1961-2000, weakly in 1961-1980 and diverges strongly in 1961-1970; converges strongly, without switching, in 1961-1970 and 1961-2000; and, finally, converges strongly, without switching 1961-2000; and, finally, converges strongly, without switching, in 1961-1970, diverges strongly, with switching, in 1961-1970, and 1961-2000.

									Table 1								
							,	and Y	values: E	lase 196	1						
					X		1	anu i	values. I		1			Y			
	alg-egy	alg-iran	alg-isr		alg-mor	alg-syr	alg-tun	alg-tur		alg-egy	alg-iran	alg-isr		alg-mor	alg-syr	alg-tun	alg-ti
61-1970	1.18	_	1.05	-18.62	0.87	1.46	1.39	0.52		1.14	5.71	1.09	-15.07	0.90	1.33	1.35	0.5
51-1980	1.43	-1.91	0.97	-6.99	0.96	0.93	0.42	-1.07		1.41	-1.81	1.03	-6.87	1.05	1.01	0.48	-1.0
51-1990	0.90	-2.79	1.12	-15.57	0.70	0.93	0.03	1.42		0.92	-2.36	1.19	-12.87	0.74	0.94	0.03	1.4
1-2000	0.33	2.30	1.38	-9.85	0.57	0.36	-1.56	3.27		0.31	1.94	1.35	-6.94	0.50	0.33	-1.63	2.
		egy-iran	egy-isr	egy-ior	egy-mor	egy-syr	egy-fun	egy-tur		1	egy-iran	egy-isr	egy.ior	egy-mor	egy-syr	egy-tun	egy-t
51-1970	1	1.74	1.10	0.25	-13.83	5.78	1.01	1.06			2.04	1.10	0.19	-13.82	4.98	0.93	1.0
51-1980		0.91	1.13	1.04	-21.22	-6.74	2.23	0.99			0.77	1.10	0.92	-20.85	-6.69	2.33	0.
1-1990		0.32	1.05	0.13	-9.06	1.31	1.59	0.99			0.27	1.14	0.11	-9.94	1.36	1.80	1.0
51-2000		0.64	1.02	-0.14	11.89	0.70	1.83	0.85			0.63	1.14	-0.12	12.30	0.77	2.24	0.8
	•																
1 1070	1			ÿ		iran-syr							0	iran-mor	ĩ		
51-1970 51-1980			0.65	13.14 -0.09	1.47 0.52	1.95 0.50	2.40 -0.27	-26.43			-	0.78 1.23	12.83	1.84 0.49	2.16 0.48	2.79 -0.27	-30.
51-1980 51-1990				-0.09 1.78	0.52	0.30	-0.27				ŀ	1.23	-0.08 1.24	0.49	0.48	-0.27	24.4
51-1990 51-2000			1.55	6.65	0.16	0.57	-0.81	28.14 9.41			ŀ	1.43	4.98	0.14	0.52	-0.76	24.4
1-2000	I	I	1.20	0.05	0.04	0.05	-0.41	9.41			L	1.51	4.90	0.70	0.05	-0.45	0.
	_			isr-jor	isr-mor	isr-syr	isr-tun	isr-tur					isr-jor	isr-mor	isr-syr	isr-tun	isr-t
1-1970				1.57	0.99	1.20	1.12	1.12					1.36	1.05	1.14	1.12	1.1
1-1980				1.18	0.97	0.96	0.87	1.24					1.16	1.04	1.03	0.97	1.2
51-1990				1.57	0.97	1.05	0.92	1.09					1.43	1.10	1.14	1.06	1.1
51-2000	l			1.68	1.10	1.01	0.83	1.14					1.49	1.17	1.13	1.01	1.2
				Γ	jor-mor	jor-syr	jor-tun	jor-tur						jor-mor	jor-syr	jor-tun	jor-ti
61-1970	1			ľ	0.52	1.10	0.57	2.67						-0.02	0.41	-0.47	4.8
51-1980				Ē	0.60	0.58	-0.32	0.67						0.59	0.57	-0.33	0.5
61-1990				ľ	-0.05	0.20	-1.54	6.43						-0.05	0.17	-1.40	5.4
51-2000]			[0.09	-0.09	-2.39	7.13						0.07	-0.08	-2.22	5.7
							4									4	
61-1970	1					mor-syr 15.00	1110F-tull 0.47	0.81							13.97	mor-tun 0.47	nor-u 0.8
51-1970						0.07	1.38	0.61							0.08	1.59	0.6
51-1990						6.19	1.30	0.82							6.77	1.43	0.9
61-2000						-4.57	2.19	1.04							-4.75	2.56	1.0
	1						,										
						[syr-tun									syr-tun	syr-tu
61-1970						_	1.51	1.30								1.31	1.1
51-1980						-	1.28	0.59								1.50	0.5
51-1990						ŀ	1.56	1.01								1.76	1.0
1-2000	1					L	1.71	0.85							ļ	2.11	0.8
								tun-tur								Γ	tun-tu
61-1970								1.11								ľ	1.0
61-1980								-0.07								ľ	-0.0
61-1990								0.49									0.5
61-2000	l							0.03								[0.0
								~									

	Table 2													
Nu	Numbers and Percentages of Strongly Diverging and													
	Converging Pairs													
	Strongly Diverging Pairs													
	<u> 1970 1980 1990 2000</u>													
1961	23 (63.9%)	14 (38.9%)	20 (55.6%)	21 (58.3%)										
1970		13 (36.1%)	11 (30.6%)	14 (38.9%)										
1980			20 (55.6%)	18 (50.0%)										
1990				19 (52.8%)										
	Str	ongly Conver	ging Pairs											
	1970	1980	1990	2000										
1961	6 (16.7%)	16 (44.4%)	13 (36.1%)	14 (38.9%)										
1970		21 (58.3%)	20 (55.6%)	21 (58.3%)										
1980			14 (38.9%)	11 (30.6%)										
1990				17 (47.2%)										

An overall picture of convergence may be obtained from Table 2 where the numbers and percentages of strongly diverging and converging pairs are given for each period. We note that, for the 1961 based calculations, the number of strongly diverging pairs are higher than the number of strongly converging pairs except in 1961-1980. It is difficult to see a distinct pattern here except that the number of strongly diverging pairs is much higher than the number of strongly converging pairs in 1961-1970 but this difference diminishes in later periods. On the other hand, we find a reverse picture when 1970 is taken as the base; the number of converging pairs is higher than the number of diverging pairs in all three periods. This picture, however, does not continue for the 1980 and 1990 based calculations; the number of strongly divergent pairs is dominant in these cases.

The overall picture that we obtain from Table 2 does not lead us to a clear cut conclusion as to whether convergence or divergence is the dominant trend for the nine countries that we have considered for the MENA region. We shall take this a step further and first choose those pairs that this analysis suggests to be exhibiting strong convergence behaviour and then subject them to unit root tests so that statistically stronger results may be obtained.

The choice of the pairs in question was first made by tabulating, for each country, the countries with which strong convergence evidence was found. These are given in Table 3 and

in Tables A4 to A7 in the Appendix. For each country we counted the number of times it was paired with another country in its

	A	LGERIA					EGYPT		
	With	out Switch	ing			With	out Switcl	ning	
Base Year					Base Year				
	1970	1980	1990	2000		1970	1980	1990	2000
1961	Morocco	Tunisia	Egypt	Egypt	1961	Jordan	Iran	Algeria	Algeria
	Turkey		Morocco	Morocco			Turkey	Iran	Iran
			Syria	Syria				Jordan	Syria
			Tunisia						Turkey
1970		Israel	Egypt	Egypt	1970		Iran	Algeria	Algeria
		Jordan	Jordan	Iran			Turkey	Iran	Iran
		Syria	Morocco	Jordan				Jordan	Syria
		Tunisia	Syria	Morocco				Morocco	Turkey
			Tunisia	Syria				Syria	
1980			Egypt	Egypt	1980			Algeria	Algeria
			Morocco	Morocco				Iran	Iran
			Tunisia	Syria				Jordan	Tunisia
1990				Egypt				Morocco	
				Jordan				Tunisia	
				Morocco	1990				Algeria
				Syria					Syria
	Wit	th Switchir	ıg						Israe
1961									Turkey
1970		Iran	Iran			Wi	th Switchi	ng	
1980					1961		Jordan	-	Jordan
1990				Iran	1970				Jordan
									Morocco
					1980				Jordan
									Morocco

 Table 3

 Strongly Converging Pairs for Algeria and Egyp

Table and chose those pairs that occurred four or more times. For example, if we again consider Algeria, as given in Table 3, we find that it has been paired with Morocco 8 times, with Egypt and Syria 7 times with Tunisia 5 times and with Jordan and Iran 4 times. Hence, the pairs we shall consider from this Table are Algeria-Morocco, Algeria-Egypt, Algeria-Syria, Algeria -Tunisia, Algeria-Jordan and Algeria-Iran.

1990

In Table 3 we also have Egypt and we find that it is paired with Jordan and Iran 8 times, with Algeria 7 times, with Syria 6 times, with Turkey 5 times and with Morocco 4 times. The additional pairs we shall consider from Table 3 then become Egypt-Jordan, Egypt-

Iran, Egypt-Syria, Egypt-Turkey, and Egypt-Morocco. Egypt-Algeria has, of course, been left out to avoid double-counting. Proceeding this way we find that Table A4 yields the pairs Iran-Morocco, Iran-Tunisia, Iran-Syria, Iran-Algeria, Iran-Jordan, Israel-Syria and Israel-Tunisia; Table A5, the pairs Jordan-Morocco, Jordan-Syria, Morocco-Syria and Morocco-Turkey; Table A6, the pairs Syria-Turkey and Tunisia-Turkey. Since all countries that pair with Turkey have been accounted for we obtain no additional pairs from Table A7.

		Table 4							
		ADF Test Results							
		Intercept	Int	ercept and Trend					
	р	ADF	р	ADF					
Algeria-Egypt	0	-0.5662 (0.8666)	1	-1.9470 (0.6105)					
Algeria-Morocco	9	-2.6781 (0.0896)*	1	-2.3424 (0.4022)					
Algeria-Syria	0	-2.7006 (0.0830)*	0	-3.2068 (0.0980)*					
Algeria-Tunisia	8	2.0903 (0.9998)	9	-0.5220 (0.9768)					
Algeria-Jordan	3	-2.1913 (0.2127)	3	-2.1218 (0.5168)					
Algeria-Iran	3	-1.5842 (0.4801)	3	-1.8162 (0.6759)					
Egypt-Iran	0	-0.7893 (0.8110)	3	-2.9673 (0.1550)					
Egypt-Turkey	1	-1.8465 (0.3531)	3	-3.0654 (0.1297)					
Egypt-Jordan	0	-0.7962 (0.8091)	7	-2.5131 (0.3201)					
Egypt-Syria	0	-3.0141 (0.0423)**	0	-3.0955 (0.1215)					
Egypt-Morocco	0	-1.2095 (0.6607)	0	-2.5441 (0.3066)					
Iran-Morocco	3	-1.5387 (0.5029)	0	-1.1657 (0.9037)					
Iran-Syria	0	-1.4863 (0.5299)	0	-1.9524 (0.6082)					
Iran-Tunisia	0	-1.7194 (0.8300)	8	-2.3361 (0.4035)					
Iran-Jordan	3	-2.5185 (0.1196)	3	-2.7349 (0.2312)					
Israel-Syria	8	-3.4311 (0.0174)**	8	-3.8312 (0.0281)**					
Israel-Tunisia	1	-1.2688 (0.6340)	9	-3.1175 (0.1206)					
Jordan-Morocco	3	-2.3111 (0.1741)	3	-2.4125 (0.3673)					
Jordan-Syria	0	-2.2700 (0.1864)	8	-2.2458 (0.4493)					
Morocco-Turkey	1	-2.0281 (0.2741)	1	-2.5181 (0.3182)					
Morocco-Syria	0	-3.0688 (0.0374)**	0	-3.4067 (0.0651)**					
Syria-Turkey	0	-3.2492 (0.0245)**	0	-3.2350 (0.0926)*					
Tunisia-Turkey	0	-0.9835 (0.7497)	0	-1.8505 (0.6606)					
<u>Notes:</u> 1. The figures in parentheses are p-values. They are based on MacKinnon (1996). 2. * Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5%									
level									

The ADF test results for those chosen pairs are given in Table 4. When there is both an intercept and a trend term in (5); i.e., when r = 1, we find that the per capita incomes of Algeria and Syria, Israel and Syria, Morocco and Syria, and Syria and Turkey converge. The tests of the trend term for these pairs are given in Table 5 from which we note that the trend term is not significant for any of these pairs. This, of course, implies that these pairs do not contain a common deterministic trend term. We then turn to the results for the model with

Table 5										
Testing the Significance of the Trend Term										
in Models with Intercept and Trend where										
the Unit Root Hypothesis has been Rejected										
•	Trend									
Algeria-Syria	-0.0033									
(-1.6629)										
	(0.1050)									
Israel-Syria	-0.0028									
	(-1.4907)									
	(0.1517)									
Morocco-Syria	-0.0023									
	(-1.4410)									
	(0.1582)									
Syria-Turkey	-0.0007									
	(-0.4156)									
(0.6801)										
Notes: The first parenthesis under the coefficient										
estimates is the t-ratio while the second is its p-										
value based on the	standard normal distribution.									

only an intercept term (i.e., r = 0) and find that the same four pairs also converge in this case. In addition, we also find that the pairs Algeria-Morocco and Egypt-Syria also converge. The evidence, in the case of Algeria-Morocco, is not very strong, however, the significance level being only 10%.

Turning to the KPSS results in Table 6, we now find the number of converging pairs to be 11. Pesaran (2006) provides similar figures based on testing for all 36 pairs. Evidence regarding the four converging pairs based on the ADF test is also obtained in this case if we regard the 10% percent significance of the KPSS statistic for Algeria-Syria as indicating convergence because it is below the 5% level. However, in addition to these four pairs, we have Algeria-Morocco (that also converged in the ADF case), Algeria-Jordan, Algeria-Iran, Egypt-Turkey, Egypt-Syria (that also converged in the ADF case), Iran-Jordan, Jordan-Morocco and Morocco-Turkey.

However, when we plot the z_{ijt} 's for some of the nonconverging pairs, as given in Figure 1, we note that they show structural shifts in their levels. This is quite clear, for example, in the case of Algeria-Egypt, Egypt-Iran and Egypt-Syria. Thus, we applied the sequential unit root testing procedure described in Section 2, which involved sequentially estimating equation (9). The results are given in Table 7.




Table 6										
KPS	S Test Re	esults								
	m	KPSS								
Algeria-Egypt	5	0.3637*								
Algeria-Morocco	4	0.2543								
Algeria-Syria	4	0.3752^{*}								
Algeria-Tunisia	5	0.6020^{**}								
Algeria-Jordan	4	0.1593								
Algeria-Iran	5	0.2921								
Egypt-Iran	5	0.4772^{**}								
Egypt-Turkey	4	0.3160								
Egypt-Jordan	5	0.3776*								
Egypt-Syria	4	0.1499								
Egypt-Morocco	5	0.3873*								
Iran-Morocco	5	0.4201*								
Iran-Syria	5	0.4372^{*}								
Iran-Tunisia	5	0.6077^{**}								
Iran-Jordan	5	0.1657								
Israel-Syria	4	0.0742								
Israel-Tunisia	5	0.5458^{**}								
Jordan-Morocco	5	0.1881								
Jordan-Syria	4	0.4755**								
Morocco-Turkey	4	0.2499								
Morocco-Syria	4	0.2430								
Syria-Turkey	4	0.1282								
Tunisia-Turkey	5	0.5771**								
Notes: 1. The critical	values for	the KPSS test are								
from Table 1 of Kwia	towski et a	1 (1992):								
10%	5%	1%								
0.347	0.463	$\frac{1\%}{0.739}$								
2. * Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level+										

We note, in the intercept and trend case, that there are five converging pairs; Algeria-Egypt, Egypt-Morocco, Iran-Syria, Israel-Syria, Morocco-Turkey and Syria-Turkey. Only two of these are the same pairs that had converged according to the ADF results of Table 4. When we test if the trend terms for these pairs are significant, we find, from Table 8, that only for Iran-Syria and Israel-Syria is it not significant. For the other five pairs, we have to conclude that convergence takes place in the presence of a common deterministic trend. We also note that the structural shifts, as represented by the estimates associated with the dummy variables, are all significant.

When we turn to the results of the intercept case, we find that there are only three pairs converging; Iran-Syria, Morocco-Syria and Syria-Turkey. We already have evidence on the convergence of Syria-Turkey from the ADF results. One can, probably, also claim convergence for Israel-Syria as the value of min ADF is extremely close to the critical value at the 10% level.

Table 7											
	Ι	Min ADF Te	st Resul	lts							
		Intercept		Ir	ntercept and T	rend					
	р	min ADF	\hat{h}	р	min ADF	\hat{h}					
Algeria-Egypt	1	-3.7601	1989	1	-5.4318***	1971					
Algeria-Morocco	1	-3.8300	1987	1	-4.7269	1987					
Algeria-Syria	3	-3.1968	1990	3	-3.2256	1990					
Algeria-Tunisia	5	-3.8245	1987	4	-3.1696	1978					
Algeria-Jordan	3	-2.3463	1977	3	-2.5987	1977					
Algeria-Iran	3	-2.9582	1976	3	-3.7269	1978					
Egypt-Iran	5	-4.1202	1979	5	-3.8822	1979					
Egypt-Turkey	1	-2.7619	1978	3	-4.8321**	1973					
Egypt-Jordan	5	-2.5360	1988	5	-3.5617	1977					
Egypt-Syria	1	-2.5802	1982	4	-3.8982	1973					
Egypt-Morocco	1	-2.1767	1989	4	-5.3762***	1973					
Iran-Morocco	3	-3.6217	1978	3	-3.5664	1978					
Iran-Syria	3	-5.4829***	1979	4	-5.7118***	1979					
Iran-Tunisia	3	-4.0439	1978	3	-4.2788	1978					
Iran-Jordan	3	-3.3946	1977	3	-4.1079	1977					
Israel-Syria	5	-4.1847	1977	3	-4.5963*	1977					
Israel-Tunisia	0	-3.8898	1974	1	-3.6736	1974					
Jordan-Morocco	3 -2.9261		1987	3	-3.6221	1977					
Jordan-Syria	1	-2.9595	1987	3	-3.9672	1975					
Morocco-Turkey	1	-3.0051	1990	0	-7.4049***	1978					
Morocco-Syria	5	-4.5957**	1977	5	-4.4968	1977					
Syria-Turkey	5	-4.8638**	1977	5	-5.6185***	1979					
Tunisia-Turkey	0	-3.1454	1970	1	-3.5463	1986					
<u>Notes</u> : 1. The asympto an intercept have been are given as											
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$											
2. The asymptotic critical values for the min ADF test in the case of an intercept and a trend term have been obtained from Perron (1997), Table 1 and are given as											
	. <u>10</u> .58										
3. * Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, ** Significant at the 1% level											

In sum, of these test results the most favourable ones are those obtained from the KPPS tests. An exercise as to whether convergence clubs may be obtained from these results seems to indicate the following groupings: Algeria-Morocco-Syria, Algeria-Jordan-Iran, Syria-Egypt-Turkey. These groups overlap, so it is difficult to call them convergence clubs.

Table 8										
Testing the Signifi	cance of the T	rend Term in	Models with							
Intercept and Tre	nd with Shift	in the Interce	pt and where							
the Unit R	oot Hypothesi	<u>s has been Re</u>	jected							
	Trend	$\mathrm{DU}(\hat{h})$	$D(\hat{h})$							
Algeria-Egypt	-0.0103	0.1515	-0.2616							
	(-7.2750)	(4.7608)	(-5.5676)							
	$(0.0000)^{***}$	$(0.0000)^{***}$	$(0.0000)^{***}$							
Egypt-Morocco	0.0141	-0.2430	0.1453							
	(5.7236)	(-4.9533)	(2.6540)							
	$(0.0000)^{***}$	$(0.0000)^{***}$	$(0.0134)^{**}$							
Egypt-Turkey	0.0079	-0.1455	0.0798							
	(4.0838)	(-3.3557)	(1.4236)							
	$(0.0003)^{***}$	$(0.0023)^{***}$	(0.1656)							
Iran-Syria	0.0037	-0.5722	0.3676							
	(1.0818)	(-4.9849)	(2.5645)							
	(0.2893)	$(0.0000)^{***}$	$(0.0165)^{**}$							
Israel-Syria	0.0039	-0.1066	0.3850							
	(1.6971)	(-2.0087)	(4.5808)							
	(0.1008)	$(0.0543)^*$	$(0.0001)^{***}$							
Morocco-Turkey	-0.0089	0.1789	-0.0976							
	(-5.7679)	(5.1377)	(-1.9907)							
	$(0.0000)^{***}$	(0.0000)***	$(0.0546)^{*}$							
Syria-Turkey	-0.0110	0.3927	-0.2562							
-	(-3.5254)	(4.6281)	(-2.1493)							
$(0.0017)^{***}$ $(0.0001)^{***}$ $(0.0419)^{**}$										
<u>Notes</u> : 1. The first parenthesis under the coefficient estimates is the t-ratio while the second is its p-value based on the standard normal distribution. 2. * Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, ** Significant at the 1% level										

The converging pairs based on the other tests are so few in number that such an exercise does not seem possible.

5. Conclusions

In investigating the per capita income convergence of the MENA countires, we used a pair-wise testing approach as opposed to the panel unit root approach implemented by Guetat and Serranita (2004), where the convergence of countries to a target variable was sought after. We first subjected the nine countries, for which a complete data set was available, to a descriptive procedure due to Webber and White (2004) and then applied unit root tests that both excluded and included structural shifts in the levels of the variables in question. Our conclusions are as follows:

- 1. The descriptive procedure yielded results that differed depending upon the base year and the length of the period for which comparisons of per capita income between two countries were made. When 1961, 1980 and 1990 were chosen as the base year, the number of converging pairs was usually less than the diverging ones but this number appeard to increase as the period became longer. For 1970 as the base year, however, the number of converging pairs exceeded the number of diverging pairs.
- 2. We chose 23 pairs that we subjected to unit root tests. The ADF results yielded four converging pairs while the KPSS results gave us eleven such pairs. When we took the possibility of shifts in the intercept term into account, we obtained seven converging pairs but, as opposed to the previous ADF results, five of these pairs appeared to have common deterministic trends.
- 3. An exercise to see if we may identify convergence clubs based on the KPSS results was not fruitful.
- 4. Hence, we may state that convergence among the nine countries under consideration is not a dominant phenomenon. Whether, as Guetat and Serranito (2004) seem to have found, different groupings of these countries based on exogeneous criteria may lead us to revise this conclusion is a point we intend to look into.

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									Table A	1							
								X and Y	values: l	Base 197	70						
					Х									Y			
	alg-egy	alg-iran	alg-isr	alg-jor	alg-mor	alg-syr	alg-tun	0		alg-egy	alg-iran	0	alg-jor	alg-mor	alg-syr	alg-tun	alg-tur
1970-1980	1.22	-0.40	0.92	0.38	1.11	0.63	0.30	-2.08		1.23	-0.32	0.95	0.46	1.16	0.76	0.36	-2.05
1970-1990	0.77	-0.59	1.07	0.84	0.80	0.63	0.02	2.76		0.80	-0.41	1.10	0.85	0.82	0.71	0.02	2.86
1970-2000	0.28	0.48	1.31	0.53	0.66	0.24	-1.12	6.34		0.27	0.34	1.24	0.46	0.56	0.25	-1.21	5.79
		egy-iran	ogy_ier	ogy_ior	ogy_mor	egy-syr	egy-tun	egy-tur			egy-iran	egy-isr	ogy_ior	egy-mor	egy-syr	egy-tun	egy-tur
1970-1980		0.52	1.03	4.16	1.53	-1.17	2.21	0.93			0.38	1.01	4.84	1.51	-1.34	2.49	0.86
1970-1980		0.32	0.96	0.52	0.65	0.23	1.58	0.93			0.33	1.01	0.57	0.72	0.27	1.93	1.03
1970-2000		0.37	0.93	-0.58	-0.86	0.12	1.80	0.81			0.31	1.03	-0.62	-0.89	0.15	2.40	0.89
						••==											
		ſ	iran-isr	iran-jor	iran-mor	iran-syr	iran-tun	iran-tur				iran-isr	iran-jor	iran-mor	iran-syr	iran-tun	iran-tur
1970-1980		ľ	1.98	-0.01	0.35	0.26	-0.11	-0.16			Ĩ	1.58	-0.01	0.27	0.22	-0.10	-0.12
1970-1990			2.39	0.14	0.11	0.19	-0.34	-1.06				1.84	0.10	0.08	0.15	-0.27	-0.79
1970-2000			1.98	0.51	0.57	0.33	-0.17	-0.36				1.68	0.39	0.43	0.29	-0.16	-0.29
													-				
				isr-jor		isr-syr	isr-tun						isr-jor		isr-syr	isr-tun	isr-tur
1970-1980				0.75	0.98	0.80	0.78	1.10					0.86	0.99	0.90	0.87	1.05
1970-1990				1.00	0.99	0.88	0.82	0.97					1.05	1.05	1.00	0.95	1.03
1970-2000				1.07	1.11	0.85	0.74	1.02					1.10	1.12	0.99	0.90	1.08
					jor-mor	jor-syr	jor-tun	jor-tur						jor-mor	jor-syr	jor-tun	jor-tur
1970-1980					-21.04	1.00	0.52	Jor-tur 0.11						-25.22	1.40	Jor-tun 0.71	0.12
1970-1980					-21.04	0.35	2.50	1.04						1.93	0.40	2.97	1.12
1970-2000					-3.26	-0.16	3.90	1.16						-3.06	-0.19	4.70	1.12
1970 2000					5.20	0.10	5.70	1.10						5.00	0.17	1.70	1.17
						mor-syr	mor-tun	mor-tur							mor-syr	mor-tun	mor-tur
1970-1980						0.00	2.95	0.76							0.00	0.83	0.77
1970-1990						0.41	2.58	1.02							0.48	3.08	1.10
1970-2000						-0.30	4.70	1.29							-0.34	5.51	1.27
							syr-tun	v								syr-tun	syr-tur
1970-1980							0.85	0.45								1.15	0.50
1970-1990							1.03	0.78								1.35	0.91
1970-2000						L	1.13	0.65							l	1.61	0.77
							i	tum tum								I	trun tur-
1070 1000								tun-tur -0.06									tun-tur
1970-1980 1970-1990								-0.06 0.44									-0.07 0.52
1970-1990								0.44									0.52
1770-2000								0.02									0.03
								1	8								

									Table A2								
							Х	and Y	values: B	ase 198	0						
		1		X		_	-	_					_	Y		_	_
1000 1000	alg-egy	alg-iran	alg-isr	00	alg-mor	alg-syr	alg-tun	alg-tur		alg-egy	alg-iran	Ų	alg-jor	alg-mor	alg-syr	alg-tun	alg-tur
1980-1990 1980-2000	0.63	1.47 -1.21	1.15 1.42	2.23 1.41	0.72 0.59	1.00 0.38	0.06 -3.69	-1.33 -3.05		0.65	1.31 -1.07	1.15 1.30	1.87 1.01	0.71 0.48	0.93	0.06 -3.37	-1.39 -2.83
1980-2000	0.23	-1.21	1.42	1.41	0.39	0.30	-3.09	-3.05		0.22	-1.07	1.50	1.01	0.40	0.55	-5.57	-2.05
]	egy-iran	egy-isr	egy-jor	egy-mor	egy-syr	egy-tun	egy-tur			egy-iran	egy-isr	egy-jor	egy-mor	egy-syr	egy-tun	egy-tur
1980-1990		0.35	0.93	0.12	0.43	-0.19	0.71	1.01			0.35	1.02	0.12	0.48	-0.20	0.78	1.20
1980-2000		0.71	0.90	-0.14	-0.56	-0.10	0.82	0.87			0.81	1.02	-0.13	-0.59	-0.11	0.96	1.03
														-			
1000 1000	l			Ū.	iran-mor	v							9		,	iran-tun	
1980-1990 1980-2000			1.20	-20.32	0.30	0.74 1.28	3.01	6.67				1.17 1.07	-16.37	0.28 1.59	0.66 1.32	2.80 1.68	6.79 2.48
1980-2000		l	1.00	-76.03	1.61	1.28	1.53	2.23				1.07	-66.02	1.59	1.32	1.08	2.48
			Ĩ	isr-jor	isr-mor	isr-syr	isr-tun	isr-tur				ſ	isr-jor	isr-mor	isr-syr	isr-tun	isr-tur
1980-1990				1.32	1.00	1.10	1.05	0.88					1.22	1.06	1.11	1.09	0.98
1980-2000				1.42	1.13	1.06	0.95	0.92					1.28	1.13	1.10	1.04	1.02
			-									_					
					jor-mor	jor-syr	jor-tun	-						jor-mor	jor-syr	jor-tun	jor-tur
1980-1990				ļ	-0.09	0.35	4.79	9.56						-0.08	0.29	4.20	9.19
1980-2000				L	0.15	-0.16	7.46	10.61					l	0.12	-0.14	6.65	9.61
					Г	mor-svr	mor-tun	mor-tur							mor-syr	mor-tun	mor-tur
1980-1990						88.72	0.88	1.35							87.64	0.90	1.52
1980-2000						-65.43	1.59	1.71							-61.49	1.61	1.76
					L												
							syr-tun	syr-tur								syr-tun	
1980-1990							1.22	1.71							Ĩ	1.18	1.82
1980-2000							1.33	1.44								1.41	1.54
								tun-tur									tun-tur
1980-1990								-7.08									-7.76
1980-2000								-0.39									-0.44
	I																I

								Table A.	3							
							X and Y	values:	Base 19	90						
				X									Y			
alg-egy	alg-iran	alg-isr	alg-jor	alg-mor	alg-syr	alg-tun	alg-tur		alg-egy	alg-iran	alg-isr	alg-jor	alg-mor	alg-syr	alg-tun	alg-tur
0.37	-0.82	1.23	0.63	0.82	0.38	-57.18	2.30		0.34	-0.82	1.13	0.54	0.68	0.35	-54.21	2.03
	egy-iran	egy-isr	egy-jor		egy-syr	egy-tun	egy-tur			egy-iran	egy-isr	egy-jor	egy-mor	egy-syr	egy-tun	
	2.00	0.97	-1.12	-1.31	0.53	1.15	0.86			2.30	1.00	-1.09	-1.24	0.56	1.24	0.86
	1	-														
1			v		,							Ű		Ţ		
		0.83	3.74	5.36	1.73	0.51	0.33				0.91	4.03	5.58	2.01	0.60	0.37
					· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·											
l			v		,						ļ	-		-		isr-tur
			1.07	1.13	0.96	0.90	1.05				L	1.04	1.07	0.99	0.95	1.04
					•	•	•								• • •	
l				J	ů,	J	J						0	<u> </u>	0	jor-tur
				-1.80	-0.47	1.56	1.11					l	-1.58	-0.47	1.58	1.04
													r			
1					v									2		
					-0.74	1.82	1.27						ļ	-0.70	1.79	1.15
					1									r		
						U	v								ĩ	syr-tur
						1.09	0.84								1.19	0.85
							tun-tur								Ì	tun-tur
																0.06
		0.37 -0.82 egy-iran 2.00	0.37 -0.82 1.23 egy-iran egy-isr 2.00 0.97	0.37 -0.82 1.23 0.63 egy-iran egy-isr egy-jor 2.00 0.97 -1.12 iran-isr iran-jor	alg-egy alg-iran alg-isr alg-jor alg-mor 0.37 -0.82 1.23 0.63 0.82 egy-iran egy-isr egy-jor egy-mor 2.00 0.97 -1.12 -1.31 iran-isr iran-jor iran-mor 0.83 3.74 5.36	alg-egy alg-iran alg-isr alg-jor alg-mor alg-syr 0.37 -0.82 1.23 0.63 0.82 0.38 egy-iran egy-isr egy-jor egy-mor egy-syr 2.00 0.97 -1.12 -1.31 0.53 iran-isr iran-jor iran-mor iran-syr 0.83 3.74 5.36 1.73 isr-jor isr-mor isr-syr 1.07 1.13 0.96 jor-mor jor-syr -1.80 -0.47	X alg-egy alg-iran alg-isr alg-jor alg-mor alg-syr alg-tum 0.37 -0.82 1.23 0.63 0.82 0.38 -57.18 egy-iran egy-isr egy-jor egy-mor egy-syr egy-tun 2.00 0.97 -1.12 -1.31 0.53 1.15 iran-isr iran-jor iran-mor iran-syr iran-tun 0.83 3.74 5.36 1.73 0.51 isr-jor isr-mor isr-syr isr-tun 1.07 1.13 0.96 0.90 jor-mor jor-syr jor-tun -1.80 -0.47 1.56	X alg-egy alg-iran alg-isr alg-jor alg-mor alg-syr alg-tun alg-tur 0.37 -0.82 1.23 0.63 0.82 0.38 -57.18 2.30 egy-iran egy-isr egy-jor egy-mor egy-syr egy-tun egy-tur 2.00 0.97 -1.12 -1.31 0.53 1.15 0.86 iran-isr iran-jor iran-mor iran-syr iran-tun iran-tur 0.83 3.74 5.36 1.73 0.51 0.33 isr-jor isr-mor isr-syr isr-tun isr-tur 1.07 1.13 0.96 0.90 1.05 jor-mor jor-syr jor-tun jor-tur -1.80 -0.47 1.56 1.11 mor-syr mor-tun mor-tur -0.74 1.82 1.27	X and Y values: 1 alg-egy alg-iran alg-isr alg-jor alg-mor alg-syr alg-tun alg-tur 0.37 -0.82 1.23 0.63 0.82 0.38 -57.18 2.30 egy-iran egy-isr egy-jor egy-mor egy-syr egy-tun egy-tur 2.00 0.97 -1.12 -1.31 0.53 1.15 0.86 iran-isr iran-jor iran-mor iran-syr iran-tun iran-tur 0.83 3.74 5.36 1.73 0.51 0.33 isr-jor isr-mor isr-syr isr-tur isr-tur 1.07 1.13 0.96 0.90 1.05 jor-mor jor-syr jor-tun jor-tur -1.80 -0.47 1.56 1.11 mor-syr mor-tur o.34 o.34 -0.74 1.82 1.27	Image: Second	X and Y values: Base 1990 x x alg-egy alg-isr alg-jor alg-mor alg-syr alg-tun alg-tur alg-egy alg-egy	X and Y values: Base 1990 x alg-egy alg-iran alg-jor alg-mor alg-syr alg-tun alg-tur 0.37 -0.82 1.23 0.63 0.82 0.38 -57.18 2.30 0.34 -0.82 1.13 egy-iran egy-isr egy-ior egy-mor egy-syr egy-tur egy-tur 0.34 -0.82 1.13 2.00 0.97 -1.12 -1.31 0.53 1.15 0.86 2.30 1.00 iran-isr/iran-jor iran-mor iran-syr iran-tun iran-tur 2.30 1.00 isr-jor isr-mor isr-syr isr-tur isr-tur 0.33 0.91 0.91 10.7 1.13 0.96 0.90 1.05 0.91 0.91 0.91 isr-jor isr-mor jor-syr jor-tur isr-tur isr-tur isr-tur 1.07 1.13 0.96 0.90 1.05 1.11 isr-tur isr-tur isr-jor isr-syr isr-tur isr-tur isr-tur isr-tur	X and Y values: Base 1990 x alg-egy alg-iran alg-isr alg-isr	X and V values: Base 1990 x y alg-egy alg-isr alg-isr	X and Y values: Base 1990 X Y alg-egy alg-iran alg-jor alg-mor alg-syr alg-tun alg-tur alg-egy alg-iran i	X and Y values: Base 1990 Y alg-egy alg-iran alg-isr alg-ior alg-mor alg-syr alg-tun alg-tur 0.37 -0.82 1.23 0.63 0.82 0.38 -57.18 2.30 0.34 -0.82 1.13 0.54 0.68 0.35 -54.21 egy-iran egy-isr egy-jor egy-mor egy-syr egy-tun 2.00 egy-ior egy-mor egy-syr egy-tun egy-tur egy-iran egy-isr egy-jor egy-mor egy-syr egy-tun egy-tur egy-iran egy-isr egy-jor egy-mor egy-syr egy-tun egy-tur 2.00 0.97 -1.12 -1.31 0.53 1.15 0.86 0.33 1.00 -1.09 -1.24 0.56 1.24 iran-isr iran-jor iran-mor iran-syr iran-tun iran-tur 0.33 3.74 5.36 1.73 0.51 0.33 isr-jor isr-mor isr-syr isr-tun isr-tur ior-mor jor-syr jor-tun jor-tur ior-mor jor-syr jor-tun isr-syr isr-tun isr-tur 1.07 1.13 0.96 0.90 1.05 ior-mor jor-syr jor-tun isr-syr isr-tun isr-tur 1.07 1.18 0.96 0.90 1.05 ior-mor jor-syr jor-tun isr-syr isr-tun isr-tur -1.58 -0.47 1.58 ior-mor jor-syr mor-tun mor-tur ior-mor isr-syr isr-t

		IRAN	Strong	ly Converg
	Witl	hout Switch	ning	
Base Year				
	1970	1980	1990	2000
1961	Israel	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt
		Morocco	Morocco	Morocco
		Syria	Syria	Syria
1970		Egypt	Egypt	Algeria
		Morocco	Jordan	Egypt
		Syria	Morocco	Jordan
			Syria	Morocco
				Syria
1980			Egypt	Egypt
			Morocco	
			Syria	
1990				Tunisia
				Israel
				Turkey
	Wi	ith Switchiı	ng	
1961		Jordan	Tunisia	Tunisia
		Tunisia		
1970		Algeria	Algeria	Tunisia
		Jordan	Tunisia	Turkey
		Tunisia		
		Turkey		
1980				
1990				Algeria

Table A4 Strongly Converging Pairs for Iran and Israel

		ISRAEL			
	Without Switching				
Base Year					
	1970	1980	1990	2000	
1961	Iran				
	Morocco				
1970		Algeria	Syria	Syria	
		Jordan	Tunisia	Tunisia	
		Morocco			
		Syria			
		Tunisia			
1980			Turkey		
1990				Egypt	
				Iran	
				Syria	
				Tunisia	
	Wi	ith Switchin	g		
1961					
1970					
1980					
1990	ĺ				

Table A5 Strongly Converging Pairs for Jordan and Morocco

		JORDAN			
Without Switching					
Base Year					
	1970	1980	1990	2000	
1961	Egypt	Morocco	Egypt	Morocco	
		Syria	Syria		
		Turkey			
1970		Algeria	Algeria	Algeria	
		Israel	Egypt	Iran	
		Tunisia	Iran	Jordan	
		Turkey	Syria	Morocco	
1980			Egypt	Morocco	
			Syria		
1990				Algeria	
	W	ith Switchi	ng		
1961		Egypt	Morocco	Egypt	
		Iran		Syria	
		Tunisia			
1970		Iran		Egypt	
				Syria	
1980			Morocco	Egypt	
				Syria	
1990				Syria	

	Μ	IOROCCO)		
	With	nout Switch	ning		
Base Year					
	1970	1980	1990	2000	
1961	Algeria	Iran	Algeria	Algeria	
	Israel	Jordan	Iran	Iran	
	Tunisia	Syria	Turkey	Jordan	
	Turkey	Turkey			
1970		Iran	Algeria	Algeria	
		Israel	Egypt	Iran	
		Turkey	Iran		
			Syria		
1980			Algeria	Algeria	
			Egypt	Iran	
			Iran		
			Tunisia		
1990				Algeria	
	Wi	th Switchi	ng		
1961			Jordan		
1970				Egypt	
				Syria	
1980				Jordan	
				Egypt	
1990				Syria	

		SYRIA	2010-1 9 -1	Convergin	
	Witł	nout Switch	ing		
Base Year					
	1970	1980	1990	2000	
1961		Jordan	Algeria	Algeria	
		Morocco	Jordan	Egypt	
		Turkey	Iran	Iran	
				Turkey	
1970		Algeria	Algeria	Algeria	
		Iran	Egypt	Egypt	
		Israel	Iran	Iran	
		Turkey	Israel	Israel	
			Jordan	Turkey	
			Morocco		
			Turkey		
1980			Iran	Algeria	
			Jordan		
1990				Algeria	
				Egypt	
				Israel	
				Turkey	
	Wi	th Switchin	ng		
1961				Jordan	
1970				Jordan	
				Morocco	
1980			Egypt	Egypt	
				Jordan	
1990				Jordan	
				Morocco	

Table A6 Strongly Converging Pairs for Syria and Tunisia

]	ΓUNISIA			
	With	out Switch	ning		
Base Year					
	1970	1980	1990	2000	
1961	Morocco	Algeria	Algeria	Turkey	
		Israel	Turkey		
1970		Algeria	Algeria	Israel	
		Israel	Israel	Turkey	
		Jordan	Turkey		
1980			Algeria	Egypt	
			Egypt	Iran	
[Morocco		
1990				Iran	
				Israel	
				Turkey	
	Wit	th Switchi	ng		
1961		Jordan	Iran	Iran	
		Turkey			
1970		Iran	Iran	Iran	
		Turkey			
1980				Turkey	
1990					

50	01	TURKEY	rs for Turke	J		
Without Switching						
Base Year						
	1970	1980	1990	2000		
1961	Morocco	Egypt	Morocco	Egypt		
		Jordan	Tunisia	Syria		
		Morocco		Tunisia		
		Syria				
1970		Egypt	Syria	Egypt		
		Jordan	Tunisia	Syria		
		Morocco		Tunisia		
		Syria				
1980			Israel			
1990				Egypt		
				Iran		
-				Syria		
				Tunisia		
	W	ith Switchi	ng			
1961		Tunisia				
1970		Iran		Iran		
		Tunisia				
1980				Tunisia		
1990						

 Table A7

 Strongly Converging Pairs for Turkey