



OXFORD

# THE FUTURE OF SECULARISM

EDITED BY  
**T.N. SRINIVASAN**

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## The Clash of Religio-Political Thought

*The Contest Between Radical-Conservative Islam and Progressive-Liberal Islam in Post-Soeharto Indonesia<sup>1</sup>*

M. SYAFI ANWAR

Indonesia is a predominantly Muslim country, but it is definitely not an Islamic state. Although Muslims are the majority of Indonesian populace, from the very beginning Indonesia is a pluralist society based on *Pancasila* (Five Principles) as a state ideology. The first principle of Pancasila is ‘*Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*’ (Belief in One Supreme God). In this regard, Indonesia’s founding fathers agreed that Indonesia is neither a secular nor theocratic state.<sup>2</sup> Indonesia’s Constitution (*Undang-Undang Dasar 1945*—The 1945 Constitution) is not to be based on shari’a. Moreover, history also shows that the agenda of imposing shari’a within the state constitution has failed since Indonesian independence in 1945 and the subsequent years.

Given the above historical and political facts, it is understandable that the strong demand for imposing shari’a voiced by the radical-conservative Islam groups in post-Soeharto era raised a big question and yet it adequately shaken many people. There is no doubt in arguing that such demand was related to the performance of political Islam and the spread of radical Islamic groups in post-Soeharto Indonesia. Scholars have discussed such political phenomena through various approach and analysis, but mostly they did not specifically focus on the shari’a issue.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, it is understandable that the Indonesian societies and foreign observers are still very curious concerning the ongoing political agenda of radical Islamic groups for imposing shari’a in a post-Soeharto era. Not only because this agenda is controversial, but also due to the fact that the radical Islamic groups define shari’a based on literal, strict, and exclusive interpretations which tend to develop anti-pluralism and anti-

democratic spirits. Furthermore, there is also strong evidence that the radical Islamic groups transform religio-political thoughts from the Middle East, especially ideology of radical *salafism*. This evidence can be observed from the ideology of radical salafi movements (RCI) such as *Majelis Mujahiddin Indonesia*, *Hizbut Tahrir*, *Lasykar Hizbullah*, *Lasykar Jundullah*, *Darul Islam*, *Lasykar Jihad*, *Ikhwanul Muslimin Hammas*, and the like.<sup>4</sup>

The problem lies in the fact that the shariaization agenda often manipulates religious sentiments or politicizes issues appealing for ordinary and public Muslims support. Most importantly, such a tendency tends to neglect the existing condition of Indonesia as a pluralist society. Although Muslims are the majority of the Indonesian populace, Indonesia is *de facto* a pluralist society, which contains religious, ethnic, custom and cultural diversities. Therefore, any laws and regulations should be based on the recognition of pluralism, human rights, democracy, and respect of 'the others' (non-Muslim groups). Furthermore, problem lies in the fact that such an agenda is imposed along with the Indonesia's ongoing economic turbulence, weak state, uncertain political condition, and lack of law enforcement. Indeed, most radical Islam groups believe that shari'a is the only solution in solving Indonesia's multi-dimensional crisis. In this regard, shari'a is perceived as a panacea that would be able to solve the ongoing economic and political crisis, but also creating a better and prosperous Indonesia in the future. Problems arise as they often carry out violence in demanding the implementation of shari'a, which sometimes creates victims either of their fellow Muslims or non-Muslims. As a result, this kind of agenda is not only upsetting the non-Muslim communities, but also worrying the majority of moderate Indonesian Muslims. There is also a tendency for the RCI to capitalize certain religio-political issues for the sake of their own interests.

Considering the fact that emergence of RCI groups and their actions has created serious problems to the Indonesian society, a group of young Muslim intellectuals established the so-called JIL (*Jaringan Islam Liberal*—The Liberal Islam Network) in early 2001. The reason of establishing JIL was not only due to the conservative ideas of RCI, but also related to the way the RCI groups carried out their radical actions using violence approach. Along with other proponents of progressive-liberal Islam groups, JIL have tried to



challenge the agenda of RCI. To a certain degree, they are able to stem the efforts of RCI in imposing shari'a. However, recent political development in Indonesia shows that the RCI have developed offensive strategies in implementing their agenda. In this regard, they capitalize edict of MUI (The Indonesian Ulema Council) to pressure and attack the other groups, Muslim and non-Muslim. This is really shocking and it is a serious and offensive action of radical Islam groups. While the MUI's edict itself is a controversial issue, the action of RCI groups is also a form of dangerous Islamic resurgence in a post-Soeharto era that needs to be taken into consideration.

This article attempts to map problems relating to the socio-historical background, political context and, more importantly, the clash of religio-political thought between RCI and PLI groups in post-Soeharto era. In this regard, it will also discuss the ideological and intellectual transmissions from the Middle East that influence both RCI and PLI. Furthermore, it will demonstrate the characteristic and agenda of RCI groups concerning the implementation of shari'a in Indonesia as a nation-state and pluralist society. Finally, in this paper will thrash out political developments relating to MUI's controversial edict and its implication to the Indonesian society.

#### LEGAL-EXCLUSIVE AND SUBSTANTIVE APPROACHES ON POLITICAL ISLAM

Before elaborating further about the contest between RCI and PLI in post-Soeharto era, it would be useful to discuss the theoretical framework related to political Islam. In general, I shall formulate two normative approaches on political Islam : (1) the legal-exclusive approach, and (2) the substantive-inclusive approach. The legal-exclusive approach to political Islam refers to the idea that Islam is not only a religion, but also a complete legal system, a universal ideology, and a perfect system of guidance that can provide solutions to all problems in life. Proponents of the legal-exclusive approach to political Islam strongly believe that Islam is an integrated totality of the three famous 'Ds': *din* (religion), *dunya* (life), and *dawla* (state). Consequently, as Nazih Ayubi suggests, this paradigm is designed for application to every aspect of life, reaching from the family over the economy to politics. In the political realm, this paradigm obliges

all Muslims to establish an Islamic state.<sup>5</sup> Obviously, the fundamental tenet of this paradigm lies in the interpretation of *shari'a* (Islamic law), which, as its proponents argue, should be the legal underpinning of the three integrated institutions mentioned above. Those who believe in this paradigm argue that the state and its functioning is part of Islamic teachings. *Shari'a* is interpreted as Divine Law, and has to form the basis of the state and its constitution, as the constitution formalizes all the processes of governing, including the political behaviour of the ruler.

This paradigm implies that political sovereignty is not vested in the people, but in the hands of God. There is no people's sovereignty, only God's sovereignty. Consequently, this exclusive paradigm results in the strict obligation for every Muslim to uphold the *shari'a* by whatever means available. Muslims who plead for the separation of religion and politics or for the suspension of the *shari'a* are judged to be against the spirit of Islam. Moreover, modern political concepts derived from Western sources are considered to be paradoxical to Islamic teachings. This paradigm appeals to Muslims to refer to the 'ideal state' established by the Prophet Muhammad and his four successor caliphates (*khulafa ar rasyidun*), and urges Muslims not to implement Western political systems. Therefore, Muslims are strongly recommended to join the political struggle to implement Islam as the basis of the state and *shari'a* as the basis of the constitution.<sup>6</sup> In the political realm, such a paradigm often encourages Muslims to strengthen their ideological and political identities as a form of protection against temporal ideological and political alternatives.

The substantive-inclusive approach to political Islam refers to the notion that Islam, as a religion does not stipulate any theoretical concepts related to politics. The proponents of this paradigm believe that the Qur'an contains information about aspects of ethical or moral guidance for human life, but does not provide details on every object in creation. They argue that there is no single text in the Qur'an that insists that Muslims establish an Islamic state. Rather, they argue that the Qur'an contains ethical or moral guidance for governing a polity, including how to achieve ethical justice, freedom, equality, democracy, and other injunctions. Islam is a religion that aspires to create the most refined and ethical civilization on earth.

A key assumption of this paradigm is that the mission of the Prophet Muhammad was not to establish a kingdom or a state. Rather,

it was similar to that of other prophets in that preaching Islamic values and its virtues was the main task of his mission. Thus, the mission of the Prophet Muhammad should not be understood in terms of establishing or ruling any worldly state. The Prophet Muhammad and his successors, however, governed in the spirit and ethical framework of Islam. This is not to deny that the historical circumstances imposed on the Prophet and his four successors necessitated that they act politically and assume political functions in a hitherto stateless society. However, as Husain Fawzi al Najjar argued, this does not mean that Islam as a religion is bound to the state. The concern of the Prophet Muhammad when he spread Islam was to achieve unity among followers of Islam (*al-wihda al-ijtimai*) rather than create a state. Furthermore, substantive-inclusive notions of Islam assert that the *shari'a* does not need to be bound to the state. The *shari'a* neither deals with any specific ideas related to government or political systems. Because Islam is seen as a religion and not a state order, *shari'a* should not fall under the domain of the state, but should remain in the realm of belief. More importantly, this paradigm refers to the idea that the main purpose of *shari'a* (*maqashid al sharia*) is to uphold justice. This kind of justice is in line with the teachings of God the Most Just, and it is clearly stated in the Qur'an that God would never do injustice.<sup>7</sup>

According to Al-Ashmawi, an Egyptian Muslim legal scholar, even the Qur'an itself stipulates that the *shari'a* is the source of ethical orientation and does not provide an underpinning for any sort of state.<sup>8</sup> The Qur'anic precepts on *shari'a* were always related to historical situations dealing with traditions and customs. Ashmawi points out that,

...the *shari'a* neither was revealed at once nor has existed as an abstract issue. It was always related to existing realities ...it drew on prevailing traditions and customs and derived its own rules from them. It also adjusted itself to further developments of those traditions and customs in keeping up with the change ...without taking into consideration these reality-related origins of the *shari'a* while (nonetheless) pleading that it be implemented, we will be dealing with theoretical and logical concerns contradictory to the spirit of Islam.<sup>9</sup>

Proponents of the substantive-inclusive paradigm argue that Islam provides opportunities and freedom to its adherents to set up or develop a political system based on their own choice. Any political

concepts and systems, regardless of where these are derived from, are basically welcomed as long as they are in accordance with the ethical spirit of Islam.

Noticeably, proponents of the two paradigms above have been exist in all Muslims world, including in Indonesia. To defend their ideas, the two groups have involved political debates, sometimes followed by tension and conflict. History shows that the proponents of those two paradigms involved in such debates prior to independence under Soeharto's New Order authoritarian regime (1966–98).

### TRANSMISSION OF IDEOLOGY AND RELIGIO-POLITICAL THOUGHTS FROM THE MIDDLE EAST

The emergence of RCI in post Soeharto Era has a correlation with the transmission of ideology and religio-political thoughts from the Middle East. In general, the victory of the Iranian Revolution in 1979 under the leadership of Ayatullah Khomeini contributed significant influence to the spread of Islamic radicalism and the New Order's political alertness. Many Indonesian Muslims, especially the young generation, were very proud of the success of the Iranian Revolution. To them, the Iranian Revolution had shown that Islamic people's power could win against a regime as hegemonic and despotic as the regime of Shah Reza Pahlevi. Following media coverage on the Iranian Revolution, many young Muslims were proud and respectful to Ayatullah Khomeini, and surprisingly even regarded Khomeini as a role model. Along with the victory of the Iranian Revolution, there was a general sense of a global Islamic resurgence. Most Muslims in the world, except certain Islamic countries in the Middle East, were welcoming the Iranian Revolution. In other words, the victory of the Iranian Revolution had, in certain circumstances, given a new spirit to the Muslims in the world. It also encouraged the rise of an Islamic resurgence in a way of building Muslim unity and self-confidence against Western hegemony in the world.<sup>10</sup>

It is clear that the Iranian Revolution became a driving factor to the rise of the global Islamic resurgence. It definitely encouraged Muslims to promote unity and self-confidence to challenge the hegemony of Western civilization. Although the form and substance of the Islamic resurgence varied from country to country, the main theme was always the same, namely the disenchantment from the

Western civilization. Furthermore, as John Esposito suggests, the Islamic resurgence appeared as a form of searching for an Islamic identity and greater authenticity. This led to the conviction that Islam provides a self-sufficient ideology for state and society, a valid alternative to secular nationalism, socialism and capitalism<sup>11</sup>

To some extent, the influence of the global Islamic resurgence in Indonesia seemed to feature similar characteristics. It emerged in the widespread campaigns of urban educated Muslims to revive the notion of Islamic 'piety', and 'authenticity', although it was manifested in a form of activism rather than intellectualism. Therefore, understandably, in the late 1970s and 1980s there were many activities expressing the 'back to Islamic identity' movement of religious revivalism. In a cultural form, for example, such activities appeared as an attempt to reinvigorate public conviction that wearing the *jilbab* (veil) should be mandatory for the Muslim women. Moreover, there was a series of religious lectures based on studying the basic values of Islam (*Nilai-Nilai Dasar Islam*) presented at various religious study clubs, which were very popular among university and high school students at general education institutions.<sup>12</sup>

Besides ideological transformation of the Iranian Revolution and global Islamic resurgence in the late 1970s and 1980s, there are also three important factors driving the transmission: (1) education, (2) publication, and (3) network. Education has a significant role in transforming ideology and religio-political thought of RCI to Indonesia. Mona Abaza suggests that based on her field research, she found that in 1970s and 1980, there was a shifting orientation of the Indonesian students who were studying at the Middle East universities. Abaza pointed out that during these two decades, the Indonesian students shifted their thinking orientation from liberal to fundamentalist tendency. At that time, they were interested in the militant Muslim thinkers' ideas such as Hassan Al Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Abul A'la Al Maududi, Ali Shariati, and Imam Khomeini. They were also interested in the writings of Egyptian thinkers such as Muhammad Al Bahi, Ahmad Salabi, and others. According to Abaza, this shifting orientation was different from the previous generation of Indonesian students who were more interested in the ideas of Western thinkers such as Albert Camus, Jean Paul Satre, and the ideas of Islamic renewal. Moreover, the Indonesian students in the Middle East universities were also able to have access and

interaction with activists of Ikhwanul Muslimin who were spreading in some Middle East countries. Thus, they were not only studying religio-political thoughts of Ikhwanul Muslimin leaders such as Al Banna and Qutb, but also developing network and relationship with activists of Ikhwanul Muslimin.<sup>13</sup>

Having studied Ikhwanul Muslimin ideas and developed relationship with the activists of this organization, the Indonesian students who had finished their study then involved in disseminating ideas of Ikhwanul Muslimin as they returned to Indonesia. They involved in social and dakwah activities such as teaching at schools and various universities, delivering sermons at the mosques, presenting speeches or lectures at the religious gatherings (*pengajian*), and others. Some of them also developed the dakwah method and strategy adopted from Ikhwanul Muslimin called as *usroh*.<sup>14</sup> However, the dissemination of Ikhwanul Muslimin in 1970s was still limited and not reaching a wider public. In early 1980s, the transmission of Ikhwanul Muslimin ideas and other revivalist Muslim movements took a political momentum along with the victory of the Iranian Revolution and global Islamic resurgence. During this period, the alumni of Middle East were very active in disseminating Ikhwanul Muslimin and revivalist Muslim movements ideas to Indonesia. This was the 'second phase' transmission of ideology and religio-political thought of Muslim revivalist groups into a more comprehensive blue print and strategic action. It is obvious that the second phase of transmission was marked the spread of leadership training models using *usroh* method and other sources promoting Islamic revivalism.<sup>15</sup>

The other transmission was through publication. Along with the educational transmission, there was a wide transmission process of ideology and religio-political thought of Ikhwanul Muslimin through publication. This can be seen from the translation and publication of books written by ideologues of Ikhwanul Muslimin and other revivalist Muslim thinkers. Radical mindset in Indonesia are much influenced by the spread of references from main doctrinal resources of radical groups, like Ibn Taimiyah's works (*Iqtidha Sirath al-Mustaqim*, *al-Jawab al-Bahir fi Maqabir*, *Majmu' Fatawa*), Ibnu al-Qayyim al-Jauziyah (*Miftah Dar al-Sa'adah*, *Zad al-Ma'ad*), and Muhammad Ibnu Abdil Wahhab (*Ma'a 'Aqidat al-Salafi Kitab al-Tauhid alladzi Huwa Haqullah 'ala al-'Abid*) which then influence radical mindset mainly in the scope of Muslim faith in Indonesia.

The position of these authors are very influential in explaining the state of Islamic faith and the need of change towards more Islamic system (*nizham al-Islam*), furthermore; they are also considered as the continuity and pioneer of Islamic contemporary radical movement since 20th century until now. Radical mindset in Indonesia meets its point through prominent figures of Contemporary Islamic movements in the middle east; *Ikhwanul Muslimin*, *Hizbut Tahrir*, *Salafi*, *Tarbiyah*, and other Islamic movement like Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Quthb, Taqiuddin al-Nabhani, Abul A'la al-Mawdudi, Hasan Turabi, and so forth. However, *Ikhwanul Muslimin* is firmly believed as an Islamic organization which has a big influence in propagating religious understanding through the spread of *Ikhwanul Muslimin's* organization in Muslim countries, including Indonesia.<sup>16</sup>

One of the books from prominent figures of *Ikhwanul Muslimin*, which are translated by the alumni of the Middle East, is *Ma'alim fi al-Thariq* (published in 1964) by Sayyid Quthb. It has become the guide of this movement. This book is 'the scripture' for activists of propagation's movement, even it is considered as the main obligatory book for alumni of *Latihan Mujahid Dakwah* (LMD) in the Salman Mosque, Bandung Institute of Technology. After that, a number of books from other prominent figures of *Ikhwanul Muslimin* are also translated, like *Fi Afaq al-Ta'lim* by Said Hawwa, which is then translated as *Membina Angkatan Mujahid* (Constructing *Mujahid's* Generation). The trilogy of Said Hawwa *Allah*, *Al-Rasul* and *Al-Islam* is also translated into Indonesian. These books are, then, considered as the character of *tarbawi's* propagation movement in Indonesia.<sup>17</sup> Besides, some books written by Hassan Al-Banna, Muhammad Quthb, Musthafa Masyhur, Muhammad Al-Ghazali, Yusuf Al-Qardlawi and so forth are also translated into Indonesian.

Some books of *Hizbut Tahrir* which spread in Indonesia are: *Nidzamul Islam* (Life's System in Islam), *Nidzamul Hukmi fil Islam* (The System of Government in Islam), *Nidzamul Iqtishadi fil Islam* (The System of Economy in Islam), *Nidzamul Ijtimaiy fil Islam* (The System of Social in Islam), *At-Takatul al-Hizbi* (The Formation of Political Party), *Mafahim Hizbut Tahrir* (Fundamental Thought of *Hizbut Tahrir*), *Daulatul Islamiyah* (Islamic State), *Al-Khilafah* (The System of *Khilafah*), *Syakhsiyyah Islamiyah* (The Establishment of Islamic Identity Volume I, II and III), *Mafahim Siyasa li Hizbut Tahrir* (The Political Fundamental Thought of *Hizbut Tahrir*), and

others. Many books from *Salafi* movement are also found in Indonesia, in particular the works of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (*Ma'a Aqidat al-Salafi Kitab al-Tauhid alladzi Huwa Haqullah 'ala al-'Abid*), Nashirudin al-Bani (*Tahdzirus Sajid, Sifat Shalat Nabi*, terj.) Syeikh Ali Hasan Abdul Hamid, (*Tashfiyah wa Tarbiyah*), Syeikh Zaid bin Hadi al-Madkhali, (*al-Irhab*), Syeikh Abul Hasan, (*Intima' ila Da'wat al-Salafiyah* dan *al-Hiwal ma'a al-jihadi*) in the field of *aqidah* and *ibadah*, hadits/hadits science and fiqh. Books from this *Salafi* movement are mainly from Saudi Arabian peninsula as the traffic of *Salafi* movement. These *Salafi* books are mainly brought by Indonesian university students studying at universities in Medina, like Ummul Qura.<sup>18</sup>

The other important path of the transmission of RCI is international networking. To strengthen educational and publication, the RCI also develop international networking with individual or institution in the Middle East. In this regard, the role of Indonesian students is quite significant, especially in developing network with the revivalist movement in the Middle East. Those Indonesian students were able to make such networking with their fellow activists of revivalist movement in some Middle East countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan, Irak, Tunisia, and others. Through this networking, they were able to join the activities of the revivalist movements such as seminars, discussions, trainings, and others. These activities were also transformed to their fellow junior Indonesian students who later became the new comers of academic community in the Middle East universities.

Abdurrahman Kasdi, a former chairman of The Association of Indonesian Students in Egypt who graduated in 2000 argued that the above transmission was effective in recruiting new members and developing networking. In so doing, the seniors even made intensive contacts with the student candidates prior to their coming to Egypt and other countries. The senior students also helped their juniors to look for accommodation, process campus administration, and direct worldview and ideological orientation when studying at universities. The senior students also directed their juniors for joining with the Ikhwanul Muslimin forums such as The Information Studies for Muslims Worlds, participating at the leadership training, as well as reading Ikhwanul Muslimin's publication. The junior students were also encouraged for not joining the secular and liberal groups and



communities.<sup>19</sup> By so doing, the Indonesian students in the Middle East and Indonesia were able to develop a solid network. This kind of network, however, contributed significant impact to the transmission of ideology and religio-political thoughts of Ikhwanul Muslimin and other revivalist movements in the Middle East.

Besides Ikhwanul Muslimin, another revivalist movement, which also related to the global political momentum in the 1980s, was Hizbut Tahrir. Like Ikhwanul Muslimin, the transmission of ideology and religio-political thought of Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia was mostly through education, publication, and network as well. Studies on the transmission of Hizbut Tahrir ideas and the establishment of this revivalist movement in Indonesia show that it began to spread in 1982-1983. It is said that two prominent figures were active in disseminating Hizbut Tahrir ideas in Indonesia : M. Mustafa and Abdurrahman Al-Baghdadi. Mustafa is an Indonesian student in Jordan who was interested in Taqiyuddin's ideas and then became an activist of Hizbut Tahrir in Jordan. Mustafa spread Hizbut Tahrir's ideas through some lectures and religious gatherings in Bogor, especially to the students of IPB (Bogor Agriculture Institute). Baghdadi is an activist of Hizbut Tahrir in Libanon who came to Indonesia in 1981 who served as lecturer at Pesantren Al-Ghazali and along with Mustafa introduced Hizbut Tahrir's ideas to the activists of Al-Ghifari mosque at IPB complex. Having succeeded in disseminating Hizbut Tahrir's ideas in Bogor, the two activists then established Hizbut Tahrir and developed network through some universities in Indonesia.<sup>20</sup>

It is also important to note that prior to the transmission process, there was also a new development of Islamic dakwah in Indonesia. Along with the strict political regulation of the New Order authoritarian regime, some Muslim activists tried to focus their concern by empowering dakwah activities. This was a strategy of securing Islam from government's political control. The result was tremendous because those activists were able to increase dakwah activities at the mosques, universities, and other public spheres. Through such activities, those activists had strengthened 'cultural Islam' as an alternative toward government's control over 'political Islam'. Thus, during the 1980s period, 'cultural Islam' dominated Muslims activities.<sup>21</sup>

## POLITICAL CONTEXT OF THE RISE OF RADICAL-CONSERVATIVE ISLAM

The rise of RCI in post-Soeharto era can not be separated from the previous political development in Indonesia. It began in mid-1960s until early 1970s in which Soeharto was widely regarded for his repressive approach on political Islam. Himself a Javanese Muslim, Soeharto considered that political Islam was a serious threat and hazardous to his power, both ideologically and politically. Consequently, Islam was seen as 'political enemy number two' (after Communism) and was often grouped as the '*ekstrim kanan*' (the right extreme). This was a deliberate ploy to equate Islam with Communism as '*ekstrim kiri*' (the left extreme). This situation led to mutual distrust and hostility between the Islamic group and the New Order regime. Although the Islamic group had contributed to the fight against communism and the establishment of the New Order regime, Soeharto then marginalized Islam in the political arena in his early administration. In the words of M. Natsir, former prime minister and former chairman of the modernist Muslims party, Masyumi, the New Order regime 'treated us like a cat with ringworm'.<sup>22</sup>

There is no doubt to state here that Soeharto's approach to Islam was too coercive in the early years of his administration. However, despite his coercive approach, Soeharto accommodated some Muslim religio-cultural aspirations in the late 1970s. This shift appeared to be part of a 'political balancing act' that aimed to increase his political image and support of Indonesian Muslims. This balancing act led to further shifts in the late 1980s, when Soeharto began to fully develop the politics of accommodation, beginning his embracement to political Islam. After cautiously starting with the accommodation of cultural Islam, Soeharto later also formally institutionalized political Islam. One of the most important forms of institutionalizing political Islam was the establishment of ICMI (*Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia*, The Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals), which was to play a significant role in the discourse on political Islam in the late New Order regime. Having succeeded in embodying political Islam into the state politics, Soeharto moved on to implement the politics of co-optation in the mid 1990s. Soeharto's politics of co-optation led to the conversion of a state-sponsored political Islam in

the late years of his regime. Consequently, the state was neither in favor with the spirit of legal-exclusive model nor substantive-inclusive model. Rather, it fully accommodated political Islam based on the logic of Soeharto's power interest and state hegemony.<sup>23</sup>

Nevertheless, the conversion to state-sponsored political Islam occurred due to the support and pragmatic alliance between the state and 'regimist' Muslim leaders, especially from the 'militant-scripturalist' of certain modernist Muslim leaders associated with KISDI (*Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam*, The Indonesian Committee for Muslims Word Solidarity), DDII (*Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia*, The Indonesian Council for Islamic Propagation), Muhammadiyah, ICMI, and others. Along with the worsening of economic crisis, bureaucratic corruption, state violence, and the withdrawal of critical Muslims support to the New Order authoritarian regime, Soeharto's administration was finally collapse on 21 May 1998.<sup>24</sup>

Under Habibie's presidency and the euphoria of *reformasi* (reform) movement, political Islam seemed to take momentum. Along with the wave of *reformasi* movement, Habibie's administration gave a greater freedom and political openness to the people. Many people utilize this opportunity to establish new political parties, associations, media companies, and the like. As a result, more than 100 political parties were established, more than 40 parties were grouped as Islamic parties. Given this political circumstance, certain groups took momentum by restoring the power of political Islam. Thus, they built newly associations, including hardliner or radical Islamic groups. Under the New Order authoritarian regime, it was impossible to do so. In addition, under Habibie's presidency press freedom and civil rights were remarkably growing up, contributing significant impact in strengthening civil society.<sup>25</sup> Unfortunately, Habibie's administration was unable to set up good governance and control the corrupt bureaucracy as the legacies of the New Order regime. Worse, even his administration was accused for its involvement in a corrupt bank scandal. As a result, Habibie failed to get a greater political legitimacy from the people. This situation led to uncertain political condition in which the state was so weak. On the other side, civil society was too strong, but it was not followed by a better law enforcement. Rather, it created a lawless society; a state of affairs in

which people prefer using rule of the jungle to solving problems using rule of the law.

Given the above socio-political crisis, some Islamic political parties used this momentum by campaigning 'Islamic solution' for solving what they called as 'Indonesia's multi-dimensional crisis'. What is meant by Islamic solution is to demand the inclusion of the Jakarta Charter into the state constitution and the implementation of shari'a (Islamic law) as an alternative to the existing law and state regulation. During the 1999 general election campaign and parliamentary session, several Islamic parties such as PPP (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*, The United Development Party), PBB (*Partai Bulan Bintang*, The Crescent and Star Party), PK (*Partai Keadilan*, Justice Party), and others actively campaigned the necessity to implement the shari'a, including the demand to re-inclusion of the Jakarta Charter. However, they were unable to gain a significant support from the people. Totally, all Islamic parties were only able to gain 17.8 per cent votes. They also failed to gain support when demanding the inclusion of Jakarta Charter during the General Assembly of MPR (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*, People's Consultative Assembly). The result of the 1999 general election shows that the power of political Islam was only a myth and lack of support from the majority Muslims populace.<sup>26</sup>

Despite the failure of Islamic parties in gaining public support and demanding the inclusion of the Jakarta Charter and implementation of shari'a, the RCI group still continued their struggle for these political agenda. They strictly demanded these political agenda, regardless rejection of the majority of Indonesian society. In so doing, they were often carrying out political rally, setting street demonstration, as well as disseminating propaganda and pamphlet toward the necessity to implement shari'a. Facing this reality, the Habibie's administration was nothing to do except gave the opportunity of RCI groups to be exist and let them to express their aspiration in all manners.

This situation changed when Abdurrahman Wahid was replacing Habibie as a president in late 1999. At the beginning of his presidency, the new hope for his leadership was rising. This was because Wahid as the first democratically elected president was expected to develop the new breeze of Indonesian politics. Wahid has been widely known

as a noted Muslim intellectual, charismatic leader, and had ever been called as the ‘guardian of the Indonesian civil society’. Before being a president, Wahid was an NGO activist who had tirelessly struggle for empowering civil society. Most importantly, many scholars have regarded Wahid as one of the most prominent Muslim intellectuals representing ‘liberal Islamic thought’, although his social base is traditionalist NU.<sup>27</sup>

Ironically, under Wahid’s presidency the radical conservative Islam movements increased their action and pressures addressed not only to the government, but also to the Indonesian public. Such a situation was worsened by religious and communal bloody conflicts in several Indonesian provinces, especially between Muslims and Christian, in the eastern area such as Ambon, Palu, Ternate, and others. Facing this reality, Wahid seemed to use moderate approach in solving the problem, meaning that he tried to focus on the efforts of ceasing conflicts by promoting peaceful dialogue between the two groups. In so doing, Wahid called to the two groups in order not to send paramilitary to the conflict area. Yet, in his statement, Wahid specifically condemned Lasykar Jihad as a troublesome for its policy to send thousands of paramilitary group to Ambon. Wahid judged that Lasykar Jihad had increased conflict escalation between the two groups. He seemed to neglect the action taken by Lasykar Kristus (The Jesus Troops), which was also operating their action in Ambon and killing against Muslims on the battlefield.<sup>28</sup>

Facing this situation, the RCI groups were united to oppose Wahid’s administration policies. The RCI considered that Wahid’s statements was unfair. Therefore, despite Wahid’s appeal for not sending paramilitary groups, Jaafar Umar Talib, leader of *Jamaah Ahlu Sunnah wal Jamaah* continuously sent Lasykar Jihad to fight against Christians in Ambon. Talib claimed that his action of sending Lasykar Jihad members to Ambon was due to the ineffective policies of Wahid’s administration in settle bloody conflict. Talib also strongly criticized Wahid for not having a clear policy to end the slaughtering of Muslims in Maluku.

Leaders of another RCI group such as Habib Rizieq of FPI and Habib Al Habsyi of Ikhwanul Muslimin also shared with Talib in opposing Wahid’s policies concerning Ambon conflict and other national issues. They considered that Wahid’s was unjust and took aside with the Christians rather than his fellow Muslim brothers

who became the victims. Moreover, these two leaders of RCI groups also declared that Wahid's policies were ineffective in solving multi-dimensional crisis of the Indonesian society. To these two leaders, the main cause of deepening the Indonesian crisis was due to the degradation of moral conduct. Facing this reality, the FPI did actions, which they claimed as 'cleaning the Indonesian society from the influences of *haram* environment'. The FPI declared that Indonesian society was poisoned by '*kehidupan yang haram dan penuh dengan kemaksiatan* (the forbidden life fully created by violating the God's law). Using such reasons, the FPI raided shops selling alcohol, attacking prostitution places and gambling houses, sweeping foreigners suspected as spreading of wickedness in hotels. By doing so, they portrayed themselves as a 'the army of God and moral police for the society'. The FPI also maintained street demonstration involving thousands of its followers to demand the implementation of shari'a and urged government and people to fight against immoral deeds.<sup>29</sup>

When Wahid was ending his presidency due to the impeachment of the parliament, Megawati became the strongest candidate to be elected as president. In response to this situation, the RCI groups were again united to oppose the candidacy of Megawati for being president. Their reason to oppose Megawati's candidacy for president was based on their legal-textual interpretation of Qur'an and shari'a that woman is not allowed to be a leader of the nation. They publicly campaigned this idea to the society, despite having a very limited support from the people. The fact was that their campaign totally failed because the general assembly of MPR elected her as president, replacing Wahid.

Nonetheless, the agenda to impose shari'ah law continued under the Megawati's presidency and yet it is still alive until present. It seems that such agenda is related to mindset or paradigm living the heart and mind of the leaders and activists of the RCI groups. In other words, reason behind the agenda of imposing shari'a is relating to the strong belief that the long and multi-dimensional crisis of the Indonesian society to uphold 'the law of God'. Indeed, the RCI groups can be defined as having 'shari'a minded' orientation due to their strong commitment to uphold shari'a either as ideological or practical solution for any problems of human being. Obviously, what they mean by shariah law is the interpretation on fiqh based on strict,

legal, and formal approaches. The problem lies in the facts that such approaches tend to neglect the nature and flexibility of fiqh itself. More importantly, such approaches tend to promote the notion that fiqh is a state law. As a result, they often invite manipulation of fiqh for the sake of political interest, hegemony of meaning, and monopoly of the religious truth.<sup>30</sup>

Interestingly enough, the spirit and demand of RCI groups in post-Soeharto era to return to Islamic *salafism* and upholding the sharia seemed to have genealogies with previous Islamic militant movements Indonesia. Moreover, they are also inspired by similar activities of militant Islamic groups in the Middle East.<sup>31</sup> There is a tendency that the radical-conservative Islam groups in Indonesia are associated themselves with the radical movements in the Middle East. More importantly, certain groups of radical Islam working with the underground and unidentified movements have also carried out violence similar with the Middle East phenomena. It includes actions such as sweeping foreigners, bombing churches, raiding shops selling alcohol as well as doing suicide bombing that killed many innocent people. Such horrible violence is taking place along with the incapability of the government to solve economic and political crisis in post Soeharto era. Yet some perpetrators claim that their actions are inspired by the spirit of *jihadist* movements in the Middle East, especially in fighting against the so-called 'conspiracies of Islamic enemies'. These include Israel, Jews, Christians, USA and its Western allies. It is obvious that previously violence action such as suicide bombings would have never taken place in Indonesia, considering that the face of Indonesian Islam has been widely regarded as Islam with a smiling face. However, since one year after the 11 September 2001 tragedy in Washington and New York, Indonesia has faced the new reality in which the terrorists carried out brutal actions and suicide bombing in Bali (October 2002). This atrocity killed more than 200 people, wounded hundreds of innocent people, mostly Western tourists (Australia). Yet, this was not the end of the story. In October 2003, the terrorists did suicide bombing again at Jakarta Marriot Hotel and killed several people. The last brutal bombing was done in August 2004 addressed to the Australian Embassy, but the victims were mostly ordinary Indonesian Muslims.

Based on the above phenomenon, observers and media often argued that Indonesia has become the seeds of Islamic radicalism

and a center of terrorist operation in Southeast Asia. It is also believed that the radical Islam movements in Indonesia have a strong network with international terrorist organizations such as Al Qaidah (AQ) and Jamaah Islamiyah (JI).<sup>32</sup> Nonetheless, most RCI groups in Indonesia denied such suspicion, claiming that their organizations did not have any linkages with neither AQ nor JI. Certain figures of RCI groups also publicly declared that they fully reject the way of Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda movement. However, they also state that such suspicion is only a part of US propaganda for destroying Islam, hiding under the banner of President Bush's global campaign on 'war against terrorism'.<sup>33</sup>

Indeed, the emergence of RCI groups in post Soeharto Indonesia and its political implications has raised questions relating to their social origin, intellectual roots, and religio-political agenda. The problem lies in the fact that certain RCI group also justifies the use of hostility in a way of forcing 'truth claim' based on their subjective interpretation, as also implement violence using physical action. It is also obvious that the member of RCI group is very limited. However, media sometimes tends to give a special coverage or even blow up their action. Accordingly, this kind of coverage led to create public image that the RCI groups are very big, vocal and well organized.

#### THE MAIN CHARACTERISTIC OF RADICAL-CONSERVATIVE ISLAM

Given the above discussion on socio-political context relating to the rise of RCI in post-Soeharto era, it is important to observe its political theology as well. By so doing, we would be able to observe their mindset and political agendas. In general, there are four main characteristics of RCI as described below:

Firstly, *the RCI is committed to 'shari'a mindset'*. A salient appeal voiced by Islamic radical movements is the so-called formalization of shari'a at the state level in all aspects of Muslim life. In an Indonesian context, such appeal finds justification in the democratization era that has given freedom of expression to the people after 32 years under Soeharto's authoritarian regime when Islamic movements were oppressed. It also gains momentum with the multi-dimensional crises that ruin all aspects of national life. Therefore, the search for an alternative solution using religious



symbols as well as the messianic image they bring, finds justification. Indeed, the appeal of Islamic radical movements for the formalization of shari'a is in fact a response to the multi-dimensional crises facing this nation. For them, the exclusion of religious ethics and the adoption of a secular system have led to chaos. As a solution, they appeal for a return to shari'a. To relieve their disappointment about national ruin due to the crises, they offer a solution by returning to religion. According to them, these severe crises can be solved only by a fundamental and integral solution. It needs a fundamental solution because all problems emerge from false ideology, secularism. It also needs an integral solution because the destruction has touched all aspects of human life. The hope for Messiah through the application of shari'a can be clearly seen from their slogan 'Islam is a solution', as expounded by the chairman of FPI (Front Pembela Islam/Islamic Defendant Front), Habib Rizieq Shihab. Islam, identified with the shari'a, is a solution to all problems.<sup>34</sup>

Elevating shari'a to the divine level has reverted the meaning of 'returning to Islam' as 'returning to shari'a'. Thus, the RCI argued that there is no Islam except shari'a. Furthermore, they interpret the concept of 'Islam as blessing for all creatures' as a concept that necessitates the enforcement of shari'a. Consequently, Islam as a blessing for all creatures will only materialize when shari'a is applied comprehensively. The myth of an all-encompassing shari'a is derived from their identification of Islam with shari'a. The call to enter Islam comprehensively as stated in the verse: 'Enter into Islam comprehensively' (*udkhulu fis al silmi kaffah*) is interpreted as a commandment to apply shari'a comprehensively. In fact, the basis of the appeal for shari'a enforcement is derived from *hakamiyah* theory. Based on the theory of *hakamiyah*, the enforcement of shari'a is regarded as a religious duty whose implications are not only solving all problems but also bestowing welfare. To the RCI, enforcement of shari'a is a duty to be carried out at all times and places particularly, in a time of chaos. It is based on the fact that human law does not side with justice and the interests of the majority. Thus, their understanding of shari'a is mostly based on a literal understanding. When a regulation has been prescribed in Qur'anic and Sunna texts, they classify it as fixed and immutable. FPI and MMI, for example, declares that the formal law of hand amputation for a thief is a regulation that cannot be changed, because it comes from Allah and

the Prophet. It must be applied. While the sentence to make the thief intimidated is still considered to be applied in matters which are not regulated by Allah and His Prophet.<sup>35</sup> It is further confirmed by the fact that the Prophet Muhammad is sent as the last prophet indicating that shari'a is already perfect, relevant for all times. Shari'a is regarded as sacral and immutable. They disagree with the contextual shari'a interpretation.

Secondly, *the RIG tends to develop an anti-pluralism agenda*. The RIG has a strong tendency to disrespect pluralism, considering that such an idea is offensive to Islam as the only truth, while others are regarded as untruthful and designed by groups of who have deviated from Islam or even infidels. The RCI also claims that God has made a clear distinction between 'Muslim' and 'kafir'. Based on their literal and textual interpretation of the Qur'an, the RCI also believes that God has declared that the Jews and Christians are judged as 'the accursed groups' and will always have agenda to proselytize Muslims to be their followers. This belief in a conspiracy was partly legitimised by literal and ideologically driven interpretations of certain verses of the Holy Qur'an, including the following:

Never will the Jews or Christians be satisfied with thee unless thou follow their form of religion. Say: 'The Guidance of God, that is the (only) Guidance'. Wert thou to follow their desires after the knowledge which hath reached thee, then wouldst thou find neither Protector nor Helper against God Q.S. II (*Al Baqarah*): 120).<sup>36</sup>

Muslims who use legal-exclusive and textual-scriptural interpretations of the above Qur'anic verse argue that Jews, Christians, and other non-Muslim groups have always employed strategies to proselytize to or compete with Muslims. As a result, they tend to bring about a serious distinction in defining who is friend and who is foe, making a very strict demarcation between 'us' (*minna*, in groups) and 'them' (*minhum*, out groups). The RCI also claims that there are certain hadists declaring that Jews and Christians will inhabit hell in the hereafter. Consequently, Muslims who are concerned with the idea of pluralism are considered to be against the spirit of the Qur'an and Sunna and therefore they can be categorized as *shirk*.<sup>37</sup>

The above tendency, however, brings about a serious issue in defining who is friend or who is enemy. This perception, then, results

in creating a gap with the other groups. People outside their group are considered as a different entity. Being considered different, they also treat other groups differently. Consequently, the view of RCI of other groups is not only related to their perceptions, but is also expressed as an attitude. This behavior defines how big the possibility is to make dialogue and cooperation with other groups.

Furthermore, they revitalize the binary concepts of '*muslim*' and '*kafir*', '*Dar al-Islam*' (house of Islam) and '*Dar al-Harb*' (house of enemy). This is due to their absolute truth claim that negates not only non-muslims but also Muslims who have different religious perceptions to theirs. In the extreme spectrum, their exclusion of others is usually parallel with their call for jihad to correct the latter. Adian Husaini, Secretary General of KISDI (The Indonesian Committee for Solidarity of Islamic World) argued that,

It becomes a true belief in the Muslim community that the path of truth and salvation is only through Islam. It means that any path outside path of Islam is a digression. Christians who believe in the Trinity concept claiming Isa as God of Son or Son of God are infidels (Al- Maidah : 72-75). It also includes the Jews, who reject the prophetic existence of Muhammad. They are also infidels. They are judged as infidels of the People of the Book (ahl al kitab). Other religions are also included as infidels.<sup>38</sup>

Having adopted with the above mindset, the proponents of RCI will not respect Jews and Christians, considering that God has declared that they are infidels and 'others'.

Thirdly, *the RCI has a different perception of the terminology of Jihad*. It is important to notice here that the above characteristics of RCI do not inevitably encourage violent actions in dealing with terrorism. Thus, it would be a serious mistake if one argued that the proponents of RCI are automatically in favour of violent actions that led to terrorism. Our research shows that despite their radical mindset, certain figures of RCI do not agree with violence or terrorist actions. To them, the violence and terrorist actions that led to killing innocent people are against the spirit of Islam. The issue of terrorism in Indonesia is related to a radical clandestine movement. In fact, the police and the authorities still face difficulties in demolishing the network of terrorists in Indonesia. However, it is clear that terrorist action is definitely related to misleading perceptions of jihad. In this context, the concept of jihad has been understood by terrorists

mainly as *qital* (killing) or war against non-Muslims (*kafir*) to maintain the religion of Allah (*li i'lai kalimatillah*). This means jihad is colored by violence.

The above mentioned definition of jihad as *qital*, war against enemies of Islam, gives a strong stimulus to perform violence on behalf of religion. In other words, if there is a reality, which they assume is an attack against Islam, or Islam has been the victim of cruelty and oppressive power. Combined with a strong belief in conspiracy theory based on imagined enemies, the clandestine movements have seen that on-Muslim ideology and power always competes against Islam. This perception that has great potential to cast non-Muslims as the enemy (who can threaten the existence of Muslims), so that Muslims must prepare themselves by performing jihad against them. The misleading perception of jihad like this will considerably influence the growth of terrorist actions in the name of Islam.<sup>39</sup>

In this regard, it is those who are influenced by this interpretation, such as radical. For them, the suicide bombing is seen as a sort of resistance of unjust treatment. Amrozi and his friends, for instance, claim that they have jihad against 'the enemies of Islam' performed. However, they realize that *jihad* in the sense of *qital* cannot be sporadically performed because the force of Islam is still much weaker than that of the enemies of Islam. Therefore, they practice the more effective way, namely by performing suicide bombings. Thus, the actions done by Iqbal (Bali Bombing), Asmar Latin Sani (Marriot Bombing), and Hery Golun (Kuningan Bombing) are related to the misleading perception of jihad.

In addition, Imam Samudra, the alleged mastermind of the 12 October Bali nightclub bombing, stated that his accomplice Iqbal had detonated one of the bombs while it was strapped to his back as an act of jihad or an act of Islamic martyrdom. According to Imam, Bali is a place of *ma'siya* (black immoral) and a site for non-Muslims (*kafir*), such as Americans and Australians. Moreover, he strongly believes that Americans and Australians are the enemy of Islam. Thus, he and his fellows conducted bombings as a holy war against what he imagined as enemies of Islam. Samudra then cited a verse from the Qur'an that Muslims should conduct war against *kafir* wherever they are.<sup>40</sup> In so doing, he realizes that innocent Muslims

could be the victims of his jihad action. However, he claims that as long as those innocent Muslims are sincere, God will reward them and let them occupy heaven.

For radical clandestine movements, suicide bombing is an absolutely effective means of communication in challenging the enemies of Islam such as the US and Israel due to Muslim weaknesses. That is the reason why suicide bombings performed in Muslim countries is nicely wrapped in theological terms as a means of justification. Suicide bombing is considered to be a sort of martyrdom (*shahada*) in maintaining the teachings of Islam. They call it suicide bombing because it is absolutely unlawful in Islam. They even name it 'martyr bombing' (*shahid*). Our research shows that several informants claim that the terrorist actions performed by Muslims are actually a revenge against despotism. This attitude will always happen anywhere while weak people are to some extent repressed. Some informants said that suicide bombing is an absolutely effective means of communication in challenging the enemies of Islam, such as the US and Israel due to Muslim weaknesses. That is the reason why suicide bombings performed in Muslim countries is nicely wrapped in theological terms in order to gain justification. The suicide bombing is considered as a sort of martyrdom (*shahada*) in maintaining the teachings of Islam. They even name it 'martyr bombing' (*shahid*).

Why does radical understanding of jihad appear? Islamic civilization, according to Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, is 'textual civilization' (*hadlrat al-nash*).<sup>41</sup> This textual-centered paradigm constructs. Text can be understood only as a text. Understanding a text merely as a text, not as a discourse, will discriminate the historical context and cultural background of the text.<sup>42</sup> Almost all radical activists interpret the Qur'an in this way which produces a rigid, literal, and intolerant attitude in their daily life towards others. When the word *jihad* is interpreted as a holy war (*al-harb al-muqaddasah*), the interpreter then gives another understanding that death in a holy war is martyrdom.<sup>43</sup> In the name of *jihad*, people could commit act of violence toward the others, individually or in groups or in certain clans and ethnic groups.<sup>44</sup>

Furthermore, as Khaled Abou El Fadl argued, some Islamic radical groups 'offer a set of textual references in support of their exclusivity and intolerant theological orientation... They read Qur'anic verses

literally and a-historically and therefore reach highly exclusive conclusions'.<sup>45</sup> They interpret the Qur'an without considering the sociological and historical context. Using this method, the interpreter often forgets what the Quran means beyond the text. This method also often means the interpreter cannot catch the real message of the text which is to give guidance to the moral or ethical values of human beings.<sup>46</sup>

Fourthly, *the RCI has a strong belief in conspiracy theory and Muslims are the victims*. It is obvious that most RCI strongly believe in conspiracy theory. In this context, the RCI deems that Christians and Jews have an agenda to crush Islam based on two perspectives. The first is based on their literal and subjective interpretation of Qur'anic verses. The second is based on their perception towards the West, which tends to develop power hegemony over the world, including the Muslim world. In this context, the RCI perceives the West as being inherited by the Judeo-Christian civilization. Such perception is worsened with the tendency of hegemonic power which led to Western imperialism in the Muslim world.

The spirit of anti-pluralism is also addressed to Muslim leaders who promote pluralism. According to the RCI, Muslim leaders who promote pluralism are agents of Christian missionaries and Zionism. Husaini, for instance, pointed out that Islamic leaders, intellectuals, ulamas, and activists of Islamic organizations who promote pluralism ideology can be categorized as dangerous figures and surely have an agenda to crush Islamic faith. 'They have crushed the fundamental tenets of Islamic faith by giving misleading perception of Qur'an,' he insisted.<sup>47</sup> To Husaini, such action is a part of a hidden agenda for destroying Islam and has been widely campaigned by Free Masonry Jews and Christian missionaries in Indonesia.

Husaini is not alone. There are some leading figures of RCI and even moderate figures who believe in conspiracy theory against Islam. Based on ICIP's field research all key informants agree that there is an international conspiracy to hamper and paralyze Muslim power in the world. None of the 30 key informants at the five research regions (Jakarta, Serang, Solo, Yogyakarta, and Surabaya) has a dissident opinion on it. Regardless of their radical or moderate background, those key informants have a common opinion: Islam is under threat. The evidence given by these key informants about such international conspiracy is the US foreign political behavior in

the past few years. The US and its allies invaded Afghanistan and Iraq, the Muslim sovereign countries. As an invasion, merciless killings against children, women and elderly cannot be avoided. As a consequence, these aroused feelings of hatred, humiliation, and deep revenge against the US among most Muslims. The US has blindly defended Israel for a long time, although Israel obviously conducts occupation, violence, terrorism, and killings of the Palestinians. The US always rejects the UN's attempts to pass on resolutions condemning Israel.

Why are the US and the West hostile to Islam? The key informants pointed out that the hostility against Islam has been Jewish in character, and the US and the West are identical with the Jews. Furthermore, the US and the West are regarded as having interests in ruling Muslim countries' economies and penetrating their cultural hegemony. According to an informant, the political policies of the US towards Muslims are still dominated by two big interests. The first is ideological interests because Islam is regarded as an obstacle to Western ideology, and the second is economic interests. In this context, the US is believed to have a mission to build Americanization of world order, including the Muslim world. The second is that they believe in Samuel Huntington's thesis, 'the clash of civilization' which argued that after the fall of the Soviet Union, Islam would be the West's next enemy.

## THE EMERGENCE OF PROGRESSIVE-LIBERAL ISLAM

### NURCHOLISH MADJID AND THE RENEWAL OF ISLAMIC THOUGHT MOVEMENT

At first glance, the establishment of JIL in 2001 was such a counter balance towards the spread of RCI ideas and movements, which tend to promote a strict legal-exclusive approach on Islamic underpinning. Contrary to RCI, the JIL is committed to develop liberal-inclusive approach on Islamic underpinning. In this context, the emergence of JIL should be considered as the revival of the new generation of Muslim intellectuals relating to Islamic renewal thinking in post 1970s decade. However, it would be a mistake if one judges that the emergence of PLI group is a new phenomenon. Rather, it is a continuity of liberal groups promoted by prominent Muslim intellectuals and activists in the 1960s and 1970s. In 1960s,

there was Limited Group in Yogyakarta that carried out discussion on Islamic theology using liberal approaches. As for the 1970s period, Indonesian Muslims were shocked with the ideas of GPPI (*Gerakan Pembaruan Pemikiran Islam*, The Renewal of Islamic Thought Movement) initiated by Nurcholish Madjid Cs. However, it should be noted here that JIL is more liberal, provocative, and well organized in disseminating their ideas to public compared to that of GPPI.<sup>48</sup>

Given the above phenomenon, it would be useful to discuss the similarities and differences between GPPI and JIL relating to the socio-historical background of those two progressive-liberal Islam. The emergence of GPPI was related to the Indonesian Muslim responses, especially the modernist groups, toward modernization in 1970s. At that time, the responses toward modernization issues can be divided into two broad categories. The first is the *kaum tua*, dominated by former Masyumi activists, who responded with apologetics, condemning modernization as the continuity of Western imperialism in the Muslim world. To this group, modernization was not only incompatible with Islam, but also synonymous with Westernisation, secularisation and Christianisation. This group responded by politicising Islam and presenting it as an alternative ideology to modernization. For example, Rasyidi, a leading figure of Muhammadiyah, argued that modernization is definitely related to 'the Western scenario and Christian missionary for weakening the Muslim faith.'<sup>49</sup> Rasyidi responds to the issue of modernization in terms of the expansion of Christianity in Indonesia. He pointed out that Christians deliberately capitalized modernization as a method of attracting people in order to sideline Islam. Another leading figure of Muhammadiyah, Hamka, also concurs with Rasyidi, suspecting modernization of being yet another strategy to discredit Islam. He implies that, 'the aim of implementing modernization is to remove Islamic influences from our hearts, so that we shall willingly join the tail-end of nations which are considered advanced.'<sup>50</sup> Hamka also argued that modernization was a big plan for removing Islam. By doing so, Muslims were forced to be dependent upon the advanced countries'. Obviously, the responses of both of these two modernist Muslim leaders to the issue of modernization seemed to be apologetic, and yet did not address the substance of the issue of modernization itself.



The second group of modernist Muslims—the *kaum muda*—responded to the issue of modernization in a rather rationalist and accommodative manner. They called for creativity and objectivity from Muslims, imploring them to face the imperatives and realities of real problems in a rapidly changing world. Rejecting the *kaum tua*'s apologia, this group considered modernization to be a modern imperative, a global phenomenon that could not be rejected by Muslims. Instead of seeing modernization as a threat, this group encouraged Muslims to respond creatively to what the modern world had to offer. They argued that modernization was not inherently contradictory to Islam, as Islam is religiously modern and allows for adaptability and change in light of new phenomena. Nurcholish Nurcholish and his colleagues such as Utomo Dananjaja, Usep Fathuddin, M. Dawam Rahardjo, Eky Syahrudin, as well as proponents of the GPPI (*Gerakan Pembaruan Pemikiran Islam*, The Renewal of Islamic Thought Movement) can be categorized in this group.

To the first group, Islam is not only a system of theological teaching that has to be obeyed by all Muslims in their worldly life, but it is also a complete ideology and doctrine, capable of guiding the happiness of human beings as well as giving solution to all problems related to daily life, the modern age, and the hereafter. It is clear that its approach on Islamic tenets is based on legal-exclusive paradigm. Therefore, it suggests that all Muslims follow absolutely the guidance provided by Islamic doctrines and teachings for the sake of their own happiness. It also implies that Muslims must protect their faith from the offensive raids of modernization and its negative implications. On the contrary, the second group encouraged Muslims to respond creatively, rather than remain stagnant, in the face of modernization. To do so, Nurcholish and the proponents of GPPI suggested a 'liberalization' of Islamic teachings through the 'secularisation' of Islamic teachings. By 'secularisation,' Nurcholish was not referring to the theological, Western sense of the word (that is, the separation of church and state), but rather, to a sociological sense of 'liberating development' of Islamic thinking. In his speech delivered to the four Islamic organizations HMI, PII, GPII, Persami on 2 January 1970, Nurcholish pointed out that:

Secularisation is not meant as the implementation of secularism, because secularism is the name for an ideology, a new closed worldview which

functions very much like a new religion. In this context, what is meant (by secularisation) is every form of liberating development. This process of liberation is needed because Muslims, as a consequence of their historical journey, are unable to differentiate between the Islamic injunctions and the worldly values, between transcendental and temporal values.<sup>51</sup>

Nurcholish argued that liberalization and secularization would enable Indonesian Muslims to focus on the substance of Islamic teachings through the use of scientific, rational and realistic approaches to changing circumstances in modern Indonesian society. He chided Muslims for sidelining themselves, arguing that Indonesian Muslims seemed to have lost their creativity, displaying defensive and apologetic tendencies in response to great and worldly ideas such as democracy, social justice, socialism, and others. Consequently, the initiative always belonged to other groups, who were then in a strategic position to develop and maintain ideas and thinking, while Muslims were excluded. Nurcholish apparently levelled indirect criticism at modernist Muslim leaders and politicians for focusing on rebuilding Islamic political power, and in doing so, neglected the real challenges that confronted the welfare of the *ummat*. To this end, he promoted his controversial 'Islam yes, Islamic Party No' slogan.

On the issue of an Islamic state, Nurcholish re-confirmed his religio-political thoughts about the deconstruction of the idea of an Islamic state. To Nurcholish, the idea of an Islamic state was an apologetic tendency based on the appreciation of Islam as a totalistic ideology. This apologetic tendency was rising due to the inferiority complex of Muslims facing Western cultural invasion and resulting modern ideologies such as capitalism, socialism, communism, democracy, and others. 'As a result, Muslims tended to use legalistic approaches in response to modern political developments ... the concept of the Islamic state is a distortion concerning the proportional relation between religion and the state.'<sup>52</sup> According to Nurcholish, the state is one of the profane aspects based on rational and collective dimension. On the other side, religion is based on the spiritual and personal dimension. Therefore, Nurcholish pointed out that one has to differentiate between those two concepts. Furthermore, Nurcholish emphasized that there was no terminology of an Islamic state in Islamic history. Thus, the idea of the state was not an integral part in Islamic teachings.<sup>53</sup> Nurcholish also encouraged

Muslims not to demand the establishment of either an Islamic state or an Islamic government. To Nurcholish, the most important thing was not the form but the substance of the state. The formal outlook of the state is useless if the content does not change. 'There is no problem with the form of the state and its claim (Islam or national state) ... the most important thing is how to implement Islamic injunctions based on God's will', Nurcholish insisted.<sup>54</sup>

Syafii Maarif shares with Nurcholish concerning the idea of Islamic state. He criticized Muslim leaders for their rigid approach in forcing through the idea of an Islamic state as a challenge to Pancasila in the Constituent Assembly in 1959. He argued that the notion of upholding an Islamic state for Indonesia was unrealistic and not to be based on a strong religio-intellectual foundation. 'If the idea of an Islamic state became a reality, Indonesia as a nation-state would be facing national disintegration,' he said.<sup>55</sup>

Maarif emphasized his support for Pancasila as a state ideology of Indonesia rather than Islam. He thanked God because Islamic leaders were failing in forcing an Islamic state into being. 'Especially if what they mean is that the concept of an Islamic state is related to the implementation of *shari'a* formulated by Muslim jurists in the medieval period. If such an idea is implemented in the twentieth century, it will face great difficulties to be achieved,' he opined.<sup>56</sup> According to Maarif, such a concept was actually derived from the *ijtihad* (personal examination) of those Muslim jurists prior to the fall of the Baghdad Empire in the medieval period of Islamic history. Therefore, it is not eligible to be achieved in this modern and complicated world. 'Pakistan is an example. Although it declared itself an Islamic Republic from the beginning of its independence, in fact it is still facing many difficulties in implementing *shari'a* in its national activities,' he said.<sup>57</sup> In short, Syafii rejected any ideas related to achieving either an Islamic state or *shari'a* law. .

Another noted modernist Muslim intellectual, M. Dawam Rahardjo also rejected the idea of an Islamic state which has often been formulated by using legal-exclusive approaches based on *fiqh* (Islamic law). Therefore, he strongly criticized Al Maududi's theory on the Islamic state as an ideal-type concept that is equally totalitarian and elitist. Rahardjo pointed out that Maududi's ideal concept on the Islamic state is likely to be driven by his dream to counter modern Western concepts on the state. 'In fact, he is precisely following the

modern Western concept of the state, but he uses a legitimacy based on Quranic verses and hadith. Qur'an definitely contains the idea of social emancipation, but not the idea of the elitist state,' he insisted.<sup>58</sup>

Like Nurcholish, Rahardjo also criticized the apologetic tendency of Indonesian Muslim leaders in adopting Maududi's concept of the Islamic state. He pointed out that the danger of an ideal-type construct of the Islamic state has the tendency that the rulers will be acting as the elites who have the authority to describe God's will. 'Consequently, those who are in power will be acting on behalf of God. Moreover, they will pretend to take over God's authority and they will use the power of the state to implement the role of *khilafah*,' he said.<sup>59</sup> To Rahardjo, Muslim society needs to have an objective attitude towards Indonesia as a nation-state. More importantly, Muslim leaders and intellectuals have to create concrete responses either through real actions or real concepts for the sake of the Muslim society's interest. For this aim, he was concerned with the implementation of transformation theology; a theology which he describes as an instrument of liberating Muslims from any oppressive system.<sup>60</sup>

The conceptual framework of transformation theology was then further developed by historian Kuntowidjoyo. However, Kunto seemed to avoid the terms of 'theology' in formulating his ideas. Rather, he preferred to speak of 'prophetic social sciences based on an Islamic paradigm'. It means that social sciences should be able to provide a social and ethical paradigm for transforming or liberating the human being based on the Islamic mission derived from a Qur'anic perspective. The key words of his concept are emancipation, liberation, and transcendence. In this respect, Kunto seemed to criticize the ideologisation of Islam. Kunto suggests that the ideologisation of Islam would limit the meaning of Islam as an open system. Consequently, Islam has to be an open system which is able to engage in a dialogue with both Western and Eastern civilizations using its ideas, and not only promoting its ideological aspect.<sup>61</sup> In terms of leadership, Kunto pointed to the need of a new type of Islamic leadership for Indonesian Muslims. Ideology is less important for this new type of Islamic leadership. Thus, Indonesian Muslims need Muslim leaders who are able to transform and disseminate their ideas and visions instead of promoting their Islamic ideology. From this point of view, it seems that Kunto supports intellectual

leadership rather than ideological leadership as often practiced by the old generation of modernist Muslim leaders.<sup>62</sup>

From the above discussion, it can be concluded that the new generation of modernist Muslims occupied a significant position within the Indonesian Muslim society. Accordingly, the new generation of modernist Muslim leaders had gradually replaced the position of the old generation. It is clear that their agenda of Islamic renewal thinking were mostly based on rationalization or liberalization of political Islam. Such approaches, however, were totally different with the old generation of modernist Muslim leaders who were mostly concerned with ideological leadership as well as the ideologisation of political Islam.

The ideas of new generation of modernist Muslim leaders were spreading into Indonesian society, especially among educated middle class Muslims. Figures such as Nurcholish Madjid, Syafii Maarif, Dawam Rahardjo, Kuntowidjojo, and others were widely known as 'public intellectuals' who were able to disseminate their thoughts in popular writings either in print media or books. Thus, their religio-political thoughts were widely read by educated middle class Muslims and especially in academic communities, among student activists and professional groups. As a result, the 1980s were marked by the spread of religious discourses in many campuses and mosques. This situation served as the driving force behind the intellectualization of Muslim communities. However, this intellectualization process was also caused by the regime's policy of pressuring student movements at the universities. As a result, the main forum for political discussions was no longer at campuses, but moved to mosques instead.

#### THE NEW GENERATION OF PROGRESSIVE-LIBERAL ISLAM GROUPS

Meanwhile, the establishment of JIL in 2001 was merely related to the spread of RCI groups and their tendency of using violence approach. Led by Ulil Abshar Abdalla, a young and noted Muslim intellectual, JIL is basically a loose intellectual forum discussing the ideas of Islamic liberalism and providing book publications, syndicated columns, and radio talk shows. The members of JIL are mostly young, urban, well-educated liberal Muslims who believe that the entire corpus of Islamic teachings needs to be contextually reinterpreted.<sup>63</sup> It is also important to note here that the JIL is not the only group, which develop liberal-progressive approach on religio-

political thoughts. There are some groups that have promoted Islamic liberalism such as Paramadina, LkiS (*Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Sosial*, Institute For Islamic and Social Studies), P3M (*Perhimpunan Pengembangan Pesantren dan Masyarakat*, Indonesian Society for Pesantren and Community Development), Lakpesdam, *Lembaga Kajian dan Pengembangan Sumberdaya Manusia*, Human Resource Development and Study Institute), JIMM (*Jaringan Intelektual Muda Muhammadiyah*, The Young Muhammadiyah Intellectuals Network), ICIP (International Center for Islam and Pluralism), and the like. Indeed, those are generally non-government organization (NGO) groups committed to the idea of strengthening civil society by promoting the compatibility of Islam with democracy, human rights, pluralism, and gender equality values. In this regard, they develop a collaboration with several funding agencies from the US and other Western countries.<sup>64</sup> Despite their different activities, they can be grouped as the proponents of progressive-liberal Islam (PLI). More importantly, most activists of PLI in post-Soeharto era are young generation and they are ideologically and personally associated with two leading Islamic organizations in Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah.

Interestingly enough, liberal Muslim scholars and activists in the Middle East have influenced the proponents of PLI, although they often use Western social sciences approaches in disseminating their ideas. Since its establishment in 1993, the LKiS has been very active in promoting Islamic liberalism, interfaith dialogue, and peaceful resolution to conflict. Interestingly, these new generation of young Muslim intellectuals, especially those who have background from the NU community, are mostly educated in pesantren and master in Arabic. As a result, they are familiar with references or sources of Arabic as well. Several of them are also graduated from universities in the Middle East countries such as Al-Azhar (Cairo), Jordan University, and others. This can be seen from book references, articles, and intellectual resources quoted by activists of liberal Islam. Accordingly, there is a process of intellectual transmission from the Middle East to Indonesia relating to the emergence and development of PLI in Indonesia.

On this last issue and others that have political significance, however, JIL stands as the most outspoken group. This aggressive stance of JIL activists has to be understood in the context of their

reasonable dissatisfaction, if not outrage, about the perceived domination of discourse about Islam by the RCI groups. In its manifesto, the JIL declares the necessity for implementing *ijtihad* (the rational thinking of Islamic texts) in the entire aspects of human life. JIL believes that *ijtihad* is the main tenet that enables Islam to hold out through any seasons. JIL is an endeavor of Islam's interpretation based on the ethical-religious spirit of the Qur'an and the Sunnah. Consequently, JIL reject interpretation of Islam based on the literal and textual of the text. By using the ethical-religious spirit based interpretation, JIL believes that Islam would live and grow creatively associated to the universal 'humanistic civilization'. JIL is based on the notion vis-à-vis 'truth' (in religious interpretation) as a *relative* thing, since an interpretation is 'human activity' which is shackled in a certain context; *open*, since each form of interpretation contain an erroneous possibility, instead of a correct one; *plural*, since each religious interpretation, in one and other way, is a reflection of any interpreter's need in an incessantly changes of time and places.<sup>65</sup>

From the above theological underpinning, the proponent of PLI group would like to promote the liberal perspective concerning current religio-political issues. One of most important issues raised by the RCI is to end the dualism of Muslims in response to religion and politics. In this regard, Luthfi Assyaukani pointed out that,

Since Muslims take in their independence from colonialism in the end of first half of 20 century, the problem of the relationship between religion and the state becomes unresolved puzzle. The liberal Islam, such as other renewal movement in Egypt and Turkey, try to solve the dualism attitude by socializing a theology for the basis of the modern state. This theology declares firmly concerning the existing separation between religion and politics. The liberal Islam is convinced that the state matter is merely a profane matter of human being. There is no specific regulation or obligation of Islamic teaching related to people's government.<sup>66</sup>

Such liberal perspective on the issue of religion and politics, however, is not something new in the arena of religious renewal movement in the Middle East. And Luthfi undoubtedly stated that his concern with the idea of Islamic liberalism is strongly inspired by his personal experience when studying in Jordan. He saw Muslim activities and performances as well as reading critically the works of ideologues such as Al Banna, Qutb, Said Hawwa, and others. He suggests that the ideas of Ikhwanul Muslimin and its ideologues are

utopian. 'It is easy to be heard, but it does not work in the reality,' he insisted.<sup>67</sup> From this experience, Luthfi then studied critically the ideas of Middle East Muslim thinkers such as Mahmud Thaha, Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, Mohammad Arkoun, and others. He is impressed with their ideas.

Contrary to the RCI groups which are much concerned with shari'a by promoting it expansively, proponents of PLI seriously maintain the agenda of deconstructing shari'a. To the proponents of PLI, the agenda of imposing shari'a is a form of Muslims weakness in facing problems that have wedged them and a failure in solving them using rational method. Ulil Abshar Abdalla, Coordinator of JIL strongly argued that proposing shar'ah as a mean of solving any worldly problems is a form of laziness of thinking and escape from the problem. Ulil pointed out that,

The view that shari'a is a 'complete package' and ready to use; a formula of God for solving problem in the all millennium, is a form of unknown and inability to understand sunnah of God itself. Proposing shari'a as a solution of all problems is a laziness of thinking, or more worse is a way of escape from the problems. It is a form of escapism using the law of God. Such escapism has become a source of Muslims backwardness everywhere. I cannot receive this kind of 'laziness', especially if it is covered by a reason that everything is to upholding the law of God. Don't forget: there is no the law of God. The fact is that there is only Sunnah of God and the universal values belonging to all human being.<sup>68</sup>

Interestingly, similar group in the Middle East counties also influences the liberal Islam activists. Such agenda is also influenced by the ideas of liberal Muslim thinkers from the Middle East countries. They also often refer to the ideas of liberal Muslim thinkers either the Middle East. In addition, they are also familiar with the ideas of liberal Muslim scholars who have been living in overseas, especially in Europe and the USA. Therefore, they are familiar with the ideas of liberal Muslim thinkers such as such as Ali Abdur Razik, Thaha Husin, Muhammad Said Al Asymawi, Muhammad Abid Al Jabiri, Hassan Hanafi, Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid, Mahmud Muhammad Thaha, Abdullahi Ahmed an Naim, Mohammad Arkoun, Bassam Tibi, and others. They are also familiar with the ideas of feminist Muslim such as Fatima Mernissi, Nawal Al-Saadawi, Amina Wadud, and others. It is also important to note that some works of these liberal Muslim thinkers have been translated into Indonesian language as well.<sup>69</sup>



Contrary to the RCI demand for upholding the shari'a, the proponents of PLI strongly advocate the necessity to deconstruct the shari'a based on historical study. This is to counter the perception that sharia text is immutable. Zuhairi Misrawi, an activist of P3M, a NU-based Muslims NGO and alumni of Al-Azhar University, Cairo, suggests that shari'a as a text is in fact a cultural product. It is historically constructed; hence, it cannot be entangled from its social-cultural backgrounds that construct its historical cognition and psychology. During its inception, sharia was attached with the character of early Islam that faced the political 'tauhid' culture. The first three centuries of Islam (VII – IX C) is a period of sharia formation. Therefore sharia construction is attached with its territorial, geographical, social-political culture. Thus there emerges an idea to deconstruct the historicity of sharia and to find the inclusive and plural dimensions of Islam.<sup>70</sup>

To support the above notion, Misrawi quotes Naim's argument concerning the distinction between Qur'anic verses revealed during Mecca and Medina periods. Naim argues that the first message of Islam in Mecca is more universal than the second message of Islam in Medina. During Mecca period the doctrines seemed to be egalitarian, pluralistic, and democratic. The prophet existed as a common person. Quranic verses addressed to 'all human beings', reflecting a universal view that does not differentiate religions, ethnics, and races. In contrast, during Medina period, the doctrines seem to be exclusive and homogeneous. The verses revealed addressed 'the believers' as distinguished from 'the non-believers'. Hence the text revealed during Medina period was discriminative, exclusive, and fundamentalistic. This period is often made as a basis to justify the concept of 'Islamic state'. Therefore the Medinan verses become the main target to deconstruct and treated as exclusive and ambiguous verses.<sup>71</sup>

In terms of Quranic knowledge, Misrawi supports Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid's views derived from his famous book, *Mahfum al-Nash, Dirasah fi Ulum al Qur'an*. Zaid argued that the causes of revelation of Quranic verses (*asbab al-nuzul*) justify the historical dimension of Quran. This proves that all religious products are attached with their cultural construction. Therefore Nasr Hamid proposes that the shari'a law depends on a special cause not on a general wording of the text (*al-'ibrah bi khusush al-sabab la bi 'umum al-lafzh*). This

is in contrast with majority of classical Islamic scholars who perceive that the wording of the text is a given message from the God, so, according to them, the wording of the text is immutable. The wording of the texts for Islamic fundamentalists is the sharia that has to be implemented comprehensively without any interpretations.<sup>72</sup>

In terms of respecting pluralism, Budhy Munawar Rahman of the Paramadina derives a liberal interpretation towards the Qur'anic verses. The notion of inter-religious tolerance and pluralism invokes the concept of 'equality of believers before Allah'. Rahman argued that,

The notion of inter-religious tolerance and pluralism invokes the concept of 'equality of believers before Allah'. Even though we have different religions, the faith before Allah is equal since that faith involves our full and total comprehension of Allah, something which is deeper than formal religious practice and which can be termed *spiritual intelligence*. What is needed currently is an understanding that inter-religious pluralism is a notion that everyone who believes in God is *equal* before Allah because our God is the One God. From the Islamic theological aspect, it should not matter for the Qur'an affirms that salvation in the hereafter *only* depends on whether someone believes in Allah, believes in the judgment day and performs good deeds. This is the core of the three 'great' religious teachings - Judaism, Christianity and Islam. It is conveyed in AlQur'an in surah al-Baqarah and surah al-Maidah (Q.S. 2:62 and 5:69).<sup>73</sup>

On the issue of gender equality, the proponent of PLI demonstrates that the gender relation concept as part of the objective of shari'a (*maqashid al-syari'ah*). Nasaruddin Umar, a proponent of liberal Islam pointed out that,

Islam introduces the gender relation concept as part of the objective of shari'a (*maqashid al-syari'ah*): that is in manifesting the justice and righteousness (Q.S. al-Nahl, 16:90), security and peace (Q.S.Q.S.al-Nisa', 4:58), and in the call to righteousness and the prevention of evil (Q.S.Ali 'Imran, 3:104). These verses can be used as a framework for analyzing gender relations in the Qur'an. Men and women have the equal rights and duties in performing the role as caliph and slave. Regarding the professional role of women, there are no Qur'anic verses or Hadits, which are forbidden for women. On the contrary, AlQur'an and Hadits mostly indicate that women are permitted to be professionals.<sup>74</sup>

Another young liberal Muslim intellectual and expert on gender issue, Syafiq Hasyim, urged Muslims in order to have a critical study of conservative fiqh (Islamic law). In his important work, *Hal-Hal*

*yang Terpikirkan tentang Isu-Isu Keperempuanan Dalam Islam* (The Unthought of Things about Women in Islam) Hasyim strongly criticizes the gender bias and patriarchal tendency of conventional fiqh. He offers a new analysis and methodology of fiqh related to women in Islamic perspective. Furthermore, Hasyim insists the necessity to deconstruct patriarchal fiqh related to polygamy, divorce, inheritance, and others. To Hasyim, the patriarchal fiqh formulated by traditional Muslim scholars is full with gender bias and unfair treatment to women, which are definitely against the spirit of Islam that promotes equality and justice. Thus, he promotes the necessity to deconstruct patriarchal fiqh and changes with alternative fiqh. Hasyim insists, that the aim of Islam is to uphold justice in the world. Equality and balancing as the principle of justice must be set up for developing a new fiqh using gender fairness perspective. What is meant gender fairness is to place an equal and steadiness the position of men and women, not to be based on the differences of natural law.<sup>75</sup>

From the above discussion, there is no doubt in arguing that the young proponents of PLI are much concerned with the agenda of deconstructing shari'a, arguing that the conventional interpretation of the shari'a is no longer applicable in response to the modern live and global phenomenon. In this regard, it is fair to argue that their liberal approaches on the shari'a and Islamic theological underpinning is controversial and sometimes shocking the majority of Muslims society. It is definitely against the mainstream opinion of ulama, Muslim scholars and leaders who are mostly concerned with conventional or moderate perspective.<sup>76</sup> In addition, those young activists of PLI are in certain level more brave and sharper in disseminating their liberal ideas compared to their seniors in 1970s. Therefore, the ideas of PLI often create polemics and debates which sometimes led to tension, especially with the RCI groups which tend to reach a greater support from the public. Interestingly enough, the proponents of PLI groups also use the roots of Islamic liberalism ideas from the Middle East as can be seen from their references and intellectual role model.

## METHODOLOGY OF PROGRESSIVE-LIBERAL ISLAM

Contrary to GPPI which focused on Islamic theological and political renewals, the proponents of PLI have developed such methodology

in developing their progressive and liberal thinking related to Islamic thoughts. In this regard, the main focus of PLI is to develop new methodology of *fiqh* (Islamic law) and new methodology in Qur'anic interpretation, if referred to tactfully, can serve as opportunities for the proponents of the PLI to promote a more moderate form of Islam.<sup>77</sup> Indeed, as would be discussed in the last part of this paper, this all should be articulated in language and approach that are acceptable for mainstream Muslims. A number of Islamic thinkers have evaluated some irrelevancies of the classical *fiqh* because it was made in different social and cultural imagination. Even it is often stated that the classical *fiqh* is not only irrelevant in its sources but also problematic in its methodology. For example, from its definition, the *fiqh* is always understood as 'knowing the practical *syara'* laws' drawn from *tafshili* sources that are al-Qur'an dan al-Sunnah (*al-ilmu bi al-ahkam al-syar'iyyah al-'amaliyyah al-muktasab min adillatiha al-tafshiliyyah*). Referring to this perspective, the proponents of PLI pointed out that truth of the *fiqh* becomes very normative, and is not seen from the extent to which it will give benefits to humanity but from its agreement with procedural and literal interpretation based on al-Qur'an dan al-Sunnah. Indeed, this classical methodology gets its strong support from Muslim fundamentalist-idealist camps. They always attempt to surrender reality under the dogmatic truth of *nash* by ignoring almost completely the concrete realities in society. It frequently happens that they have done *eisegese* actions, by bringing in their thoughts and ideologies into *nash*, then pulling it out and claiming it as God intentions. According to the proponents of PLI, this claim is very dangerous. This will only make Muslim *ummat* exclusive without having multi-religious and multi-cultural intersections with other communities. It has been proved that such claims do not give any positive influence whatsoever on efforts to build tolerance within a plural society and does not respect to the non-Muslim communities.<sup>78</sup>

The epistemological mistakes become the main debt for the literal interpretation. To end this failure, we need to build an alternative methodology (alternative *ushul fikih*) by considering the following principles: first, re-actualization of Islamic laws is very possible to happen because of social changes. Secondly, the current re-actualization of Islamic laws is limited only to *syura* which is only partial and substantial as result of thoughts and interpretations of *ulama* to Islamic *syari'ah*. The interpretation is certainly *insaniyyah*

and temporal and does not related to universal principles (*ushul al-kulliyat*). Thirdly, the re-actualization of Islamic laws is based on the principle 'to use the old that is still relevant but formulate and offer the new which is better'. Fourthly, the re-actualization of Islamic laws must be followed with critical attitudes towards classical *ulamas'* horizon without losing respects to them. Fifthly, the rationalization and re-actualization of Islamic laws means to rethink and reexamine all Islamic traditions including the interpretation toward al-Qur'an and al-Hadits, by looking at intellectual, contextual and moral aspects and not being tapped in its legal-formal, partial and local aspects. Sixthly, the re-actualization of Islamic laws should be based on the principle of *maqashid al-ahkam al-syar'iyyah* and for the benefit of people.<sup>79</sup>

The above six principles must be supported by systematic efforts to leave specific rules and replace them with general morality and ethic laws relevant to current situation which are in many respects different from the social realities during the Prophet times and during the classical *ulamas* time. This is not only because of the long time discrepancy but also because of changes and continual changes in social structures. A new thing requires a new law. However, if the new thing has some similarities with the previous cases, then the laws should refer to the previous laws. A such, changes in time and space have also significant influences in making law (*taghayyirul ahkam bi taghayyir al-azminah wa al-amkinah*). Law changes caused by changes in time and space have three aspects: (1) in the law itself, (2) in law object (*muta'allaq al-hukm*), and (3) in *mawdhu' al-hukm* (law subject).

Apart from considering the above principles and systematic efforts, another thing that needs to be considered in *istinbath al-ahkam* is the use of rationality. Rationality has a very important position in Islamic law because it is in the highest hierarchy within science system. The important position of rationality is also supported by *ushul fiqh* principle called, '*Kullu ma hakama al-aqlu bi husnihi aw qubhihi, hakama al-syari'u bi wujubihii aw hurmatihii*' (Indeed whatever things according to rationality principle are good or bad, and then the *syari'at* will give law status to them as *wajib* or *haram* (obligation or prohibition)).

By using the above approach, methodological foundation of *ushul fiqh* becomes dynamics, applicable and is able to answer emerging

contemporary problems. At this level, it can be stated that *syari'at* does not become a problem anymore, but it will convincingly become 'maslahah' in many times and places (*shalih-un li kulli zaman-in wa makan-in*).

The classical methodology of *ushul al-fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence) is often regarded as perfect by many Muslim scholars. Nonetheless, according to A. Muqsih Ghazali, there should be a new methodology in Qur'anic text reading, because classical methodology proves to be incapable in dealing with contemporary human problems. The classical methodology has little appreciation towards human powers in conceptualizing *maslahah* (public interests) even though it is for the sake of humanity, meaning that human beings are often treated as mere *mukallah* (object of law). Worse still, the sacralization of the text has forced the operation of *ijtihad* on text only, thus often neglecting the reality. The highest to the lowest, namely, *al-Qur'an*, *hadits*, *ijma'* (consensus) and *qiyas* (analogy), while other sources such as *maslahah mursalah*, *istihsan*, *syar'u man qablana*, 'urf, and the like are only secondary sources. However, A. Muqsih Ghazali argued that *maqashid al-Syari'ah* (the ideal purpose of the sharia) is the sources of all rules of law. He specifically said, *maqasid al-shariah* is the first and primary legal source in Islam, then followed by Qur'an and hadits in consecutive. *Maqasid al-sharia* is the core of the whole Islamic teachings. It has a higher position than specific rules in the Qur'an. It is a source of inspirations when the Qur'an would like to promulgate legal specific rules in practice. It is the source of all legal sources in Islam including the very Qur'an. Therefore, if there is a rule either in the Qur'an or hadits that substantially contradicts to the *maqasid al-syariah*, the rule must be deconstructed. The rule must be abrogated for the sake of the logic of the *maqasid al-sharia*. Ghazali strongly argued that,

I think the *maqasid al-sharia* is not only explored through a dialectical process between Muslims and the Qur'anic texts, but also resulted from dialogs between Muslims and their own inner hearts on one hand and interactions between Muslims and their own life realities on the other hand. Interacting with these realities, dialoguing with the sacred texts, and followed up by personal dialoguing with inner hearts continuously in every age will lead to a construction of universal *maqashid al-sharia*. *Maqasid al-sharia* has in fact ingrained in every heart of human being. Using their hearts, human can differentiate between bad and good. With regard to this matter, the Prophet PBUH has said: *istafti qalbak* (listen to your own heart). It is

further confirmed by the God's saying '*fa alhamaha fujuraha wa taqwaha*' (And its enlightenment as to its wrong and its right) (QS al-Syams: 8). This is an indicator that the *maqasid al-sharia* is not only in the voiceless sacred texts but also ingrained in the depth of inner human hearts.<sup>80</sup>

Ghazali also proposed alternative of some *ush al-fiqh* maxims: *al-'Ibrah bi al-maqashid la bi al-alfadz* (lesson drawn from *maqasid* not from the wording of the text), *Naskh al-Nushush bi al-Mashlahah* (abrogating text by *maslahah*) and *al-Nushush bi al-'Aql al-Mujtama'* (revision of text by public ratio). *Al-'Ibrah bi al-maqashid la bi al-alfadz* 'means that in extracting the rules from the Quran and hadith, a mujtahid must pay attention to the *maqasid* contained in the text instead of the literal meaning of the text. The moral ethic ideals rather than specific stipulations or literal formulation must become the axis. To understand the *maqasid*, a jurist has to understand the context. The context is not only particular-personal one but also universal-impersonal one. The understanding of the context beyond the *sabab al-nuzul* (occasion causing the revelation of a Qur'anic verse) in the classical term is a *conditio sine quanon* to invent the *maqasid al-sharia*.' *Naskh al-nushush bi al-mashlahah* means that 'it is not impossible that a matter perceived to bring *maslahah* in a certain place and time then turn to a *mafsadah* (harmfulness) in another place and time. If a *maslahah* can change due to the change of context, then it might be said that Allah commands to do something because it brings *maslahah* and then Allah prohibits it in another time because it is known in the practice that the rule does bring *maslahah* anymore. Ibn Rusyd in his book *Fashl al-Maqal fiy Taqrir Ma Bayna al-Syari'at wa al-Hikmah min al-Ittishal* said that *maslahah* is a sibling of the Sharia rules ordained by Allah.' *Tanqih al-Nushush bi al-'Aql al-Mujtama'* means that 'public ratio has an authority to amend and substitute some religious dogmatic rules pertaining public affairs, either in the Qur'an or Sunnah. So when a contradiction between public ratio and literal meaning of the text occurs, public ratio has an authority to edit, improve, and modify the rules. Such modification is urgently needed when we are facing some particular verses, such as '*uqubat* and *hudud* (such as mutilation, stoning to death, and the like), *qishas* (capital punishment), *mirats* (inheritance), and the like. Such verses in the present context, instead of solving humanitarian problems, can create another problem that needs another solution through the method of *tanqih* (revision),

namely *taqyid bi al-'aql* (limitation by ratio), *takhshish bi al-'aql* (specialization by ratio), and *tabyin bi al-'aql* (specification by ratio).<sup>81</sup>

## PROGRESSIVE-LIBERAL ISLAM IN ACTION

Since its independence in 1945, Indonesia has experienced democracy, albeit it has also plunged into authoritarianism in some junctions of its bloody history. The fall of the New Order regime in 1998 with its ensuing euphoric introduction to democracy has given fresh air to the debate of the compatibility of Islam and democracy in Indonesia.<sup>82</sup> The mushrooming of both national and religious parties has somehow surprised foreign observers that Indonesia, at least at the surface level, appeared to have been able to finely adjust itself to the dynamics of democracy.<sup>83</sup> This has also been significantly marked by the vibrant press freedom which saw how high-ranking officials have been painfully adjusting themselves to the new atmosphere where accountability is a buzzword.

Most importantly, though, the successful direct presidential election which led to the election of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has been regarded as the culmination of Indonesia's experiment in democratization. This election is internationally regarded as an enlightening example that should be intently followed by many other Muslim countries, particularly those in the Middle East, which are still deeply ingrained with religious authoritarianism.<sup>84</sup> While it is now the fact that Indonesia is the third largest democracy in the world and one may argue that Islam is compatible with democratic values, the prevailing experiment has nevertheless been marred by incidents which do not reflect democratic values. This arguably marks the rise of Islamic radicalism which poses serious challenges to Indonesia's fledgling democracy.

The euphoria of abrupt freedom after almost three decades of authoritarianism under the New Order saw tragic incidents in a form of sectarian and religious conflicts such as in Poso and Ambon, along with escalating independent struggles in Aceh and West Papua. Conflicts between Muslims and non-Muslims and among Muslims have come to the fore. Many fear that the growing intolerance of some sections within Muslim majority marks the rise of Islamic radicalism and poses challenges to Indonesia's new label as the third biggest democracy in the world after India and the United



States. Moreover, the international situation did not contribute to the democratic consolidation in Indonesia. The September 11 terrorist attack in the United States done by Muslim extremists of al-Qaeda appeared to have contributed to the escalating of religious tensions in Indonesia. While societal groups that advocate democracy and liberalism, such as JIL, have been steadily growing, groups that advocate hatred and intolerance, such as FPI and Laskar Jihad, have been fast burgeoning.<sup>85</sup>

It is because of this concern that the PLI groups, such as JIL and ICIP are committed to promoting the notion of democracy. JIL, for instance, has conducted radio talk show concerning religio-political issues that promote democratization. This program is to be broadcasted by hundred radios. Meanwhile, in collaboration with The Asia Foundation (TAF), ICIP has also conducted international seminars and researchs for promoting the compatibility between Islam and democracy as well as searching religious values that strengthen democratization process in Southeast Asian countries. Furthermore, in collaboration with the AusAID, ICIP has also conducted research in exploring the perception of members of *pesantren* communities towards the notion of democracy. Based on the interviews and observation, it can be generally concluded that while the spirit of conservatism, fundamentalism and anti-pluralism has been growing within the respondents, many of them prefer to pursue a pragmatic approach when dealing with political activities. This is despite the fact that according to them the Western-style democracy has its own fundamental flaw: the majority is not always holding the truth. Many believe, however, that the current political system—the Western-style democracy—should be effectively used in order to advance the *umma's* interests. Some also showed skepticism over the aspiration of *khilafah Islamiah* which has been rigorously endorsed by Hizbut Tahrir, indicating that their aspiration can be considered utopian.

Furthermore, many encouraged Muslims to actively participate in politics, both in voting and election contest. Nevertheless, some also warned that being too actively involved in politics might result in backlash against the interests of *pesantren*, such as being politically used by local politicians merely for their electoral interests. One kyai warned of religious abuse when politics is too intimately connected. However, one *pesantren*, such as Darussalam, showed its shrewdness

in using politics for the benefits of the *pesantren*. In regard with whether *pesantren* should provide 'political guidance' for voters, it was revealed that while *pesantren* should not openly direct their *santris* to choose certain political parties, it was also found that *pesantren* and *kyais* are expected to give general hints about the characters of political parties or candidates that Muslims should ideally aspire. In this case it would be almost certain that Islamic-oriented political parties and leaders with Islamic characters would be their choice.

One may be astounded with the paradoxes and contradictions prevailing in this research. On one hand, there is a growing fundamentalism; on the other hand, the respondents are keen to make use of democratic mechanism to pursue their agenda. In this case, pragmatism is perhaps the appropriate term to describe this trend.<sup>86</sup> In my view, this pragmatism paves the way for the PLI groups to do more to promote democracy.

#### PUBLISHING BOOK ON INTERFAITH THEOLOGY

In response to the PLI agenda of anti pluralism, in 2004 PLI proponents published a book on *Fiqh Lintas Agama : Membangun Masyarakat Inklusif-Pluralis* (The Interfaith *Fiqh*: Building A Pluralist-Inclusive Society). This book is published by The Paramadina Foundation in collaboration with The Asia Foundation. In general, this book is designed to radically change the old paradigm of *fiqh* (Islamic law) and promotes a new paradigm that enables Muslims to liberate themselves from the fetters of traditional *fiqh*.<sup>87</sup> Several controversial ideas are related to interfaith marriage, interfaith inheritance, the rights and position of the Jews and Christians, interfaith praying, and others. The most controversial idea of this book is related to interfaith marriage of which the Muslim women are justified to marry with the non-Muslim men. The authors argued that the prohibition for Muslim women to marry the non-Muslim men is related to *ijtihad* (the process of interpreting Islamic ideas based on the independent thought) committed to certain context. It is specifically linked to Islamic *dakwah* at the early period of Islam. According to the authors, at that time the number of Muslims population was small and not big compared to the present time. Therefore, interfaith marriage was prohibited. The authors consider that it is now the time to have a new *ijtihad* concerning this issue.

Thus, they suggest that, 'due to its position as a law based on *ijtihad*, it is possible to create a new opinion that Muslim women are allowed to marry with the non-Muslim men, or inter marriage is widely allowed whatever their religion and belief. This is derived from the spirit of Qur'an itself.<sup>88</sup>

According to the authors, the spirit of marriage is related to (1) the mission of Qur'an that recognizes religious plurality as *sunatullah* that can not be avoided, (2) the aim of marriage is to develop love (*al mawaddah*) and mercy (*al rahmah*), and (3) the spirit of Islam is liberation, not an oppression. The authors also suggest that the stages of what has been done by Qur'an began with its prohibition to marry with apostate people. Then it opens the path of marrying with *ahl al kitab* (people of the book) is opening a stage of evolutionary liberation. 'It is time for us to consider that other religious adherents are not to be regarded as second class as well as pressuring them as *ahl al dzimmah*. They have to be treated as citizens.'<sup>89</sup>

#### ISLAMIC COUNTER LEGAL DRAFTING

In 2004, *Tim Pengarusutamaan Gender* (The Gender Mainstreaming Team) of the Department of Religious Affairs, worked two years to draft a concept namely Counter Draft of Compilation of Islamic Law. Led by leading Muslim woman intellectual Dr. Musdah Mulia, the draft contains a new approach on Islamic law based on the spirit of gender equality, pluralism, human rights and democracy. Among the controversial issues raised in this draft is to forbid polygamy, and to allow interfaith marriage.<sup>90</sup> Musdah pointed out that there are some reasons of why reform is urgently needed. First, the compilation fundamentally contradicts the core message of the Qur'an that men and women are equal, while the compilation sends a strong message that men have more rights than women. Second, the compilation runs against the national policy of women empowerment which campaigns for zero tolerant policy of any form of discrimination and violence against women. As an example, in the current compilation, marriage is defined as *ibadah*—it is an obligation. Here Musdah said she would like to promote a new definition of marriage, that is a powerful bound, or *mitsaqan ghazila*, between men and women who enter into wise understanding for the purpose of creating a family based on the essence and the

agreement of the two parties. In terms on polygamy, for instance, this counter legal draft argued that is strictly prohibited. On the issue of interfaith marriage, including marriage between Muslim men and non-Muslim women, this draft pointed out that it is legitimate as long as to achieve the goal of marriage.<sup>91</sup>

PROGRAMS ON MULTICULTURALISM, DEMOCRACY, CIVIC EDUCATION, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER EQUALITY<sup>92</sup>

Following the research on the perception of *pesantren* communities towards liberalism, pluralism and secularism, ICIP has been doing training on strengthening multiculturalism among members of *pesantren* in West Java. Just recently ICIP has conducted the training in Pesantren Darul Mutaqqin in Parung, Bogor, West Java, participated by many delegates from *pesantren* in West Java. With earnest support of The Asia Foundation, other PLI groups have also conducted similar programs, such as Lakpesdam on crisis management program, P3M on *halqah pesantren*, Ma'arif on teaching civil society in schools, LKiS on human rights in Islam, Fatayat NU on gender equality within Islam and anti-violence campaign.<sup>93</sup> At regional and international level, networking has also been pursued by ICIP with the support of The Asia Foundation, such as through roundtable meetings on Islam and Democracy in Southeast Asia drawing participants from Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore as well as Western countries. The objective of this program is to disseminate the ideas of Indonesia's moderate and progressive Muslims to audience in both Indonesia and around the world and also to disseminate the ideas of international moderate and progressive Muslim thinkers to the Indonesian people. The program is also a vehicle for disseminating progressive Indonesian Muslim thinking outside of its usual realm and can be a way to deepen and amplify progressive Muslim thought within Indonesia by bringing together high-profile, like-minded thinkers from other parts of the Muslim, as well as Western world. The formation of a regional and international network of progressive Muslim thinkers is particularly important not only to provide support and solidarity for solitary fighters in the battle against militancy, but also to counter the strong linkages that already exist regionally and internationally among hard-liner Islamic organizations.

## TENSION AND CONFLICT

Since the last four years until present days, the contest between RCI and PLI has taken place. Such contest used to emerge as a religio-political discourse covered by print or electronic media either affiliated with the RCI and PLI or other public media. In this regard, the voice of RCI groups is usually published in *Sabili*, one of the most radical Islamic magazines and become such a mouthpiece of RCI groups. According to surveys conducted by AC Nielsen, *Sabili* has the second largest circulation in Indonesia, after the women's magazine, *Femina*. It reveals that *Sabili* publishes more than 100.000 copies of each edition. Another hardliner Islamic magazines but less radical than *Sabili* is *Hidayatullah* (50.000 copies), and Islamic women magazine *Ummi* (75.000 copies). However, IICIP's researchers who are conducting field research found that 3-4 readers read each exemplar of those magazines, especially *Sabili*, at least. *Sabili* is also often used as reference by *da'i* or *mubaligh* (preachers) for disseminating their sermons in mosques and religious gatherings. Beside those hardliners Islamic magazines, the RCI groups have been publishing and selling books with cheap price as well as distributing pamphlets or brochures to public. Of course such publications are addressed to widen their ideological underpinning and to counter the PLI. By so doing, the RCI groups want to get public support widely.<sup>94</sup>

Obviously, such discourse between the two conflicting groups is positive, provided that each group will be able to set up a healthy discourse that enable to enrich public knowledge on religio-political issues. The problem lies in the fact that the RCI groups often use provocative language, rudeness, blasphemy, and tend to have truth claim concerning their ideas and actions opposing the PLI groups. Consequently, people are often misunderstand or even get misleading perception towards the ideas of PLI. Worse still, the RCI often use threat and violation, which are dangerous for developing a healthy public discourse and freedom of thoughts and expressions. This happened last year when certain clerics of West Java, on behalf of the so-called FUUI (*Forum Ulama Ummat Indonesia*, The Indonesian Muslims Forum of Ulama) declared *death edict* to Ulil Abshor Abdalla, Coordinator of JIL. To critical Muslim intellectuals, such death edict will jeopardize democracy and human rights. Therefore, most moderate Muslims were contemptuous with the death edict

raised by FUUI. Although some of them might not be in favor with Ulil's ideas, they consider that such a death edict was unlikely and against freedom of expression. The moderate Muslim leader such as Syafi'i Maarif, Chairman of Muhammadiyah also strongly criticized that of the death edict. 'Muhammadiyah will never be stupid like those who declare the death edict'. Another Muslim intellectual, M. Dawam Rahardjo, shares with Maarif concerning the death edict addressed to Ulil. Dawam reminds that it was dangerous and could encourage someone to kill Ulil based on that misleading edict.<sup>95</sup>

The other case was the charge of MMI to JIL concerning advertisement of '*Islam Warna-Warni*' (The Multicolor Islam) broadcasted by two Indonesian leading televisions, RCTI (*Rajawali Citra Televisi Indonesia*) and SCTV (*Surya Citra Televisi*). This advertisement was related to a short message (one minute) informing that there are various sects and groups within Islam. These groups have been growing rapidly since Indonesian politics was more open. The advertisement is completed with some pictures showing pluralism of the Indonesian Muslims and yet there is no single Islam. The message is clear: calling towards the necessity to respect religious plurality on the basis of mutual admiration. Thus, tolerance attitude towards the other interpretation on Islam is likely to be honored. However, the MMI judged that that such an advertisement was totally wrong and dangerous to the ummah (Muslims community). The MMI claimed that Islam is the only single interpretation and yet plurality is only relating with the ummah, not linking with Islam itself as a religion. More importantly, the MMI also gave a strong pressure to RCTI and SCTV in order to withdraw the advertisement, threatening that if those two televisions did not stop it, they would be facing demonstration and to be charged. Facing this reality, the RCTI and SCTV decided to withdraw the 'multicolor Islam' advertisement.<sup>96</sup>

Furthermore, in terms of Counter Legal Drafting on Islamic Law, the RCI did not only protest it. Rather, they strongly pressured the Dept. of Religious Affairs to withdraw the draft. The RCI group judged the draft is misleading and harassing the shari'a. Opposing the draft, the RCI group published books, articles, and pamphlets condemning the initiators as well as carried out public campaign demanding the withdrawal of the draft.<sup>97</sup> Considering the worse implication, the Department of Religious Affairs finally declared to

withdraw the draft, saying that the draft is counter productive and not in accordance with the spirit of Indonesian Muslims. However, Musdah lamented that the support for this project was never adequately available, regrettably leading to its stall. Even the objection from conservative 'ulama was also very strong, pushing the minister to halt the process. She shared her experience of how members of radical groups of *FPI*, *Hizbut Tahrir* and *Majelis Mujahidin* visited her office and insisted that they meet the Minister of Religious Affairs, but the Minister instead asked Musdah to deal with them. The groups accused Dr. Musdah of being 'the agent of America'. In fact, the draft is now again being debated in many Islamic universities. Musdah said, 'the idea does not stop. No one can stop the idea.'<sup>98</sup>

From the above discussion, it is clear that the failure of RCI's effort to revive the Jakarta Charter does not end the agenda of formalizing the shari'a in another level and strategy. Instead of pressuring the government to implement the shari'a into the state constitution, they are now using the 'back door strategy'. This is a strategy of promoting the adoption of shariah into positive law through hidden efforts, but it is often shocking public. This back door strategy is mainly headed to the inclusion of shari'ah into the positive law or certain proposed regulations. Last year, there were two cases that should be taken into consideration. The first was the planning amendments to the criminal regulations drafted by the Department of Justice and Human Rights, which inserted the spirit of Islamic criminal law. The second was the regulations of inter-faith relations drafted by certain figures of the Research and Development Sector, Ministry of Religious Affairs. After raising public debate, these two agendas failed to get support from the public.<sup>99</sup>

In relation with the formalization of shari'a, it is important to note here that in certain Indonesian provinces, local administration has been implementing shari'a into their local district regulations. Currently, there are several regions and cities that have implemented certain aspect of shari'a : Pamekasan, Madura (East Java), Maros, Sinjai, and Gowa (South Sulawesi), Cianjur, Garut, and Indramayu (West Java), and Padang (West Sumatra). It seems that those local administrations utilize the decision of the central government in Jakarta which exempt them to have a greater regional autonomy (*Otonomi Daerah*). These local administrations seemed to consider that the autonomy means an opportunity to implement certain aspect

of Islamic law or shari'a. In addition, the central government has also given a greater autonomy since 2000 and it has officially administered Islamic jurisprudence.<sup>100</sup>

Notwithstanding the inclusion of shari'a within the local administrations are mainly related to the regulation concerning Muslims obligation to maintain their daily life such as wearing of Islamic dress, regulating collection and distribution of zakat, performing prayers and reciting Qur'an, allocating more time for religious education to be taught in schools. However, there are also certain strict regulations that limit women activities such as the obligation to use veil for Muslim women and prohibition for them to go outside after 9 pm without being accompanied by their *muhrim*. In fact, such regulation had caused several victims in Aceh and Padang after the local RCI groups raided several women considered as offenders of regulation. Although such regulations are not officially included by the local administrations, local conservative ulama and Muslim puritan activists tend to endorse or at least let those RCI to do their actions.

With regard to the above condition, it is clear that the RCI groups seemed to change their strategy. Previously they attempt to struggle for the imposing shari'a to the state constitution. Currently, they have maintained the agenda of 'creeping shari'aization' in Indonesia. It means that the agenda for the formalization of the shariah is to be done gradually, but it is maintained in more sophisticated ways. The problem lies in the fact that the shariaization agenda often manipulates religious sentiments or politicization of the issues for appealing ordinary and public Muslims support. Most importantly, such tendency tends to neglect the existing condition of Indonesia as a pluralist society. Although Muslims are the majority of the Indonesian populace, Indonesia is *de facto* a pluralist society, which contains religious, ethnic, custom and cultural diversities. Therefore, any laws and regulations should be based on the recognition on pluralism, human rights, democracy, and respect to 'the others', (non-Muslims).

Interestingly, in the arena of national politics the issue of shari'a seemed to decline. This can be seen from the issue in the legislative general election and the first stage of presidential race recently. It seems that the issue of shari'a, at least in national level, is not popular anymore. There was no response or support from the public to



Islamic parties campaigning sharia such as PPP and PBB. They did not get support and their vote declined significantly. In the 2004 general election, PPP gained only 8.2 per cent, PBB 2.6 per cent. The only Islamic party in which was able to increase its vote was PKS (Justice and Prosperous Party), gaining 7.2 per cent. Many observers were not only surprised with the performance of PKS, but also worrying PKS and its political agenda concerning 'shari'ahization'. However, one should note that the winning of PKS during the 2004 general election was totally not related to shari'a. During the 2004 general election campaign, the PKS never campaigned about shari'a. Rather, it campaigned about 'clean and concern' society such as promoting anti-corruption, good governance, and the necessity for concern with the needy people. All these issues were nothing to do with the 'shari'a and yet those were related to common and 'secular' issues. Furthermore, it is also important to note that during the second term of presidential election in July 2004, there was no single issue dealing with the shari'a. No single candidate for president and vice president raised issues on religion, let alone talked about the shari'a. Their campaigns were mostly related to recovering economy, maintaining political stability, upholding rule of law, and the like.<sup>101</sup> In this respect, the Indonesian Muslims seemed to be more realistic, considering that Susilo Bambang Yudhono-M. Jusuf Kalla team was more promising rather than the other candidates in dealing with these crucial problems. As a result, this team was able to gain more than 60 per cent votes in the presidential election in September 2004.

#### THE CASE OF MUI'S EDICT: PROMOTING ANTI PLURALISM, SECULARISM, AND LIBERALISM

One of the most important developments relating to Islam in Indonesia is the controversy of MUI's Edict. On 28 July 2005, the MUI (The Indonesian Ulama Council) issued 11 *fatwas* (edict). Among those 11 new edicts, there were edicts which became controversial and created dispute in Muslim communities. The first relates to the prohibition of Ahmadiyah, an Islamic sect. According to MUI's edict, the Ahmadiyah theology is against Islam due to its recognition of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a prophet. Islamic underpinning declares that Muhammad saw. is the last prophet, and there will be no prophet after Muhammad completed his mission.

Therefore anyone or group declaring that there is another prophet after Muhammad's mission will be decided as heretical and its followers judged as heretical (apostate). Based on certain interpretations of Islamic law, a *murtad* can be killed. As a matter of fact, the MUI already declared such an edict on Ahmadiyah in 1980. However, the Ahmadis have still continued their activities until present.<sup>102</sup>

The second controversial MUI's edict is to condemn pluralism, secularism, and liberalism. The MUI edict defined liberalism as acknowledging that reason is higher than the Qur'an and sunna. In terms of secularism, the MUI defined that it is a view of recognizing the separation between religion and worldly life. The most controversial edict is related to pluralism. The MUI defined that pluralism is a view that all religions are equal and the truth of each religion is relative. 'Muslims are strongly prohibited to follow those three *haram* concepts, because they can make trivialization Islamic faith,' said KH Ma'ruf Amin, chair of MUI's Edict Commission.<sup>103</sup>

It is important to note here that prior the MUI Congress, Islamic hardliners, using MUI's Edict in 1980, attacked the Ahmadiyah compound in Parung, Bogor on 15 July. Thousands of people, in the name of GUUI (*Gerakan Ummat Islam Indonesia*-The Indonesian Islamic Community Movement) staged a demonstration at the Al Mubarak campus. Led by Habib Abdurrahman Assegaf, the people of GUUI brought sticks and stones to attack the Al Mubarak, demanding the closure of that campus and the expulsion of the Ahmadis in order to leave immediately. During the attack, people of GUUI were yelling Allahu Akbar, raiding the campus and threatening the Ahmadis. What was shocking was that police and the authorities neither protected the Ahmadis nor stopped such criminal acts. Rather, they just let the attackers commit their actions and even indirectly 'guarded' them to expel the Ahmadis from their campus.

What was the reason for the police not to protect the Ahmadis? Having observed this incident, there was clear evidence that the authorities indirectly 'inspired' the attack. This was because since January 2005, there were a number of meetings attended by representatives from the police, intelligence, Department of Religious Affairs, and LPPI (*Lembaga Pengkajian dan Pengembangan – Islam*-Institute for the Study and Development of Islam). Tim Koordinasi Pakem (*Tim Koordinasi Pengawasan Aliran Kepercayaan Masyarakat*

– Supervisory Coordination Team for Streams of Society's Belief) organized these meetings at the Attorney General office. Having discussed several times, the meeting finally concluded that Ahmadiyah, both Qadian and Lahore groups, were creating social unrest due to its teachings. The small team was formed in May 2005 to make recommendations to the presidents in order to ban Ahmadiyah.

Furthermore, on 14 July 2005, the MUI Bogor chapter, along with the Regency of Bogor, the Head of Bogor Police, the Bogor District House of Parliament, and the local chapter of the Bogor Department of Religion issued a joint statement demanding the Mubarak campus be shut down due to cause Muslim restlessness. This series of meetings, however, had increased pressure on Ahmadiyah. One day later, the Al Mubarak campus was attacked by the GUUI.

In fact, the MUI congress then heightened the case by issuing a edict on Ahmadiyah, along with other edict against liberalism, secularism, and pluralism. Soon after the MUI declared its edict, the amount of violence in the name of religion has been increasing since early August 2005 until present. This is due to the fact that to certain extent, ordinary people still consider that edict is crucial and must be fully respected without necessarily being assessed critically. The problem also lies in the fact that certain noted ulama and Muslim leaders from various Islamic organizations are also associated with the MUI's board of committee. Moreover, the MUI also claims that its edict has been seriously discussed by respected ulama from various Islamic organizations and it was launched on the basis of '*membebaskan ummat Islam dari faham-faham yang meracuni akidah*' (to liberate Muslims from any thoughts which poison Islamic faith). As a result, the laymen Muslims also consider that such edict is religiously justified or at least condoned by representatives of Islamic organizations. Laymen Muslims also do not know about the position of edict within the context of Islamic law. Although a edict is issued by noted ulama and might be religiously justified, its position is merely a legal opinion. The position of edict is merely a legal opinion. It cannot be accepted or rejected, depending on how Muslims interpret and judge the edict. However, the radical Islamic groups mostly capitalize the MUI's Edict for the sake of their political interests. They have provoked laymen Muslims that MUI's Edict is

religiously justified and legally binding for Muslims when presenting sermons or speeches at mosques or places of religious gathering. This only created misleading information, but also encouraged violent actions.<sup>104</sup>

Due to the above condition, several Muslim leaders and NGO activists established *Aliansi Masyarakat Madani untuk Kebebasan Beragama* (Civil Society Alliance for Religious Freedom) in early August 2005. They strongly criticized the MUI's Edict and violent actions done by radical Islam. The alliance argued that the MUI's Edict was a form of religious authoritarianism and it was definitely against the Indonesian constitution, an abuse of human rights, as well as encouraging violence. Therefore, the alliance demanded the MUI to reconsider or revoke its edict. It also demanded the police and authorities pursue justice and arrest the perpetrators who raided the Ahmadiyah compound by using violence in a spirit of hatred towards others. However, the authorities seemed to look down on critics and protest from alliance. The Indonesian media was also silent and did not publish statements about the alliance, creating frustration amongst the proponents of the alliance. The situation changed a little bit when the alliance approached former president Abdurrahman Wahid to lead a press conference challenging the MUI's Edict at the NU's office. Hundreds of participants, including journalists, attended this press conference. Wahid's remark and the alliance statement were widely covered by the print and electronic media. This was becoming such an open contestation between the groups of pro and contra MUI's Edict.<sup>105</sup>

The reaction to this press conference was more serious. On Friday, 5 August 2005 hundreds of radical and conservative Moslems conducted a rally at the Al Azhar Mosque, Jakarta. Prior to the rally, a preacher gave a sermon to the Friday prayer congregation. In this rally, 15 conservative and radical Islamic groups declared their support of the MUI's Edict. During the rally, they insulted the opponents of the MUI's Edict as followers of *satan*, heresy, and apostate. The climax was when certain figures of FPI asked the audience to attack the JIL compound at Utan Kayu. Soon after this command, at least 250 members of FPI came to JIL's compound. However, they failed to attack it due to police protection, Banser (NU's paramilitary groups), and people surrounding the JIL compound.<sup>106</sup>

In fact, the agenda of imposing violence on the basis of MUI's Edict is still continuing and even getting worse right now. The attack on Ahmadiyah in Parung, Bogor, was followed by further assaults on other Ahmadiyah branches in Jakarta, Cirebon, Kuningan, Garut, Tasikmalaya, and Lombok. In Jakarta, the attackers occupied the Ahmadiyah compound at Jl. Balikpapan, central Jakarta, and prohibited the Ahmadis to conduct Friday prayer. In Garut, the attackers took the Ahmadis as hostages. They put the sword on the neck of the Ahmadis and forced them to sign a statement that those Ahmady repent and ask God for forgiveness, declaring formally to convert to Islam. Several days prior to the attack, the FPI conducted a *tablig akhbar* (religious rally) in Garut, and its chief, Habib Rizieq, presented a provocative speech demanding the closure of Ahmadiyah. In Tasikmalaya, thousands of people also raided the Ahmadiyah compound at dawn, destroying mosques and houses belonging to the Ahmadis. At least 6 mosques and 70 houses of Ahmadis were destroyed. The attackers also totally burned several houses and vehicles, inflicting a great loss upon the Ahmadis.

From the above cases, it is obvious that the attack on Ahmadiyah is just an entry point for radical Islam to attack other groups. The fact is that radical Islam always capitalized the MUI's Edict for the sake of their own political interests. For that purpose, they also committed violent actions against Ahmadiyah and other groups suspected of promoting pluralism, liberalism, and secularism in some places. In Padang, West Sumatra, a number of conservative and radical groups threatened a pluralist NGO, which led to the closure of its activities. It also occurred when radical Islamic groups conducted a second attack to JIL by provoking ordinary people based on that edict. This second attack was more dangerous because it involved ordinary people who did not understand the real problem, but who were provoked by misleading information.

In fact, MUI's edict regarding secularism, pluralism, and liberalism is the most severe backlash against JIL and other proponents of PLI since its inception several years ago. This is due to the fact that the edict was issued by a powerful and authoritative religious institution. It is hardly surprising that this edict has attracted various responses from different elements of Muslim community. While those people who oppose the edict choose non-violent acts to express their opinion, those RCI groups who support the edict mobilize their

supporters to both verbally and physically attack the opponents of the edict. The edict gave the RCI groups an impetus to make they deemed necessary acts against the proponent of PLI.

The question of why an edict could instigate violence is important to answer. According to Islamic jurisprudence, the edict or *edict* is a legal opinion issued by 'ulama regarding one particular issue. This edict is not binding—there is no obligation for Muslim to follow or implement it. However, many Muslims believe that this edict should be followed and implemented since it is issued by an authoritative institution. Another factor was perhaps during the multi-faceted crisis that have crippled this country—including leadership crisis—many Muslims believe that MUI is the only leadership institution with credible moral credentials to follow. MUI itself systematically disseminates the edict through Muslim preachers who become its supporters. Following this edict, Friday congregations are often filled up with high-spirited sermon to campaign for the implementation of the edict and condemnation of the perceived deviant thoughts.<sup>107</sup>

MUI, however, has not provided enough explanation about the function of the edict in Islamic legal system. Instead, it manipulates the feeling of rage of Muslims to act violence against Ahmadiyah and the proponents of PLI. Despite criticism from many sections of society, MUI did not call off the edict. Instead, MUI made use of its subordinate institutions to campaign for the implementation of the edict to the grass root level of Muslim communities. It is evident that the edict has split Muslim into two opposing groups, the proponent and the opponent. The Islamists and Muslim fundamentalists who support the edict argue that the presence of such edict is necessary to prevent ideas and notion which are against Islamic faith. Meanwhile, the moderates and liberal Muslims believe that the edict is a setback for the process of democratization in Indonesia. Analyzing this political situation, noted historian M.C. Ricklefs argued that, 'the conservatives and reactionaries figures have dominated MUI'...pluralism is a fact of life in Indonesia which MUI can not wish away. Liberalism is deeply embedded in the educational system and has strong cultural roots.<sup>108</sup>

According to Azyumardi Azra, one of the moderate Muslim intellectuals, MUI misunderstands the meaning of secularism, pluralism and liberalism. Pluralism understood by MUI is the principle that all religions are equally valid, while liberalism is the

principle of permissiveness (*ibahiyah*). Azra believes that MUI has no enough deep information and knowledge on these important issues. He further added that MUI should have hold discussion involving a number of experts before issuing such an important edict. It is, therefore, the edict is contra productive for the life of Muslim community as well as for the development of democracy in Indonesia.<sup>109</sup>

Ahmad Sahal, one of the important figures in JIL criticizes MUI edict as an anti-democratic edict. He asserted that if MUI rejects secularism, pluralism, and liberalism, it should also reject democracy. Democracy is a system of life where everyone regardless of their religious and ethnic background is equal before the law. Democracy thus necessitates pluralism, a set of principles which recognizes and accepts others. Meanwhile liberalism, Sahal believed, is a value which guarantees that everyone has freedom to express his or her opinion. It is civil liberties which are now enjoyed by Indonesian Muslims. Furthermore, Sahal explained that secularism is separation between private and public spheres. Religion is concerned with private and personal affairs of individuals, while public spheres are managed by consensus of all members of the community. If MUI is clever enough that the total sum of secularism, pluralism, and liberalism is democracy, this commission also has to issue the edict against democracy. But it does not, which indicates that MUI is not clever.<sup>110</sup>

Responding to the prevailing criticism, KH. Kholil Ridwan, one of the executive members of MUI, said that there is no discussion necessary for the edict. He further asserted that the necessary thing is how this edict can be disseminated to all members of Muslim communities. For those Muslims who oppose the edict, Ridwan accused them of being hypocrites, and hypocrites are more dangerous than infidel. In his press conference, he publicly declared that JIL is a deviant group that is against Islamic teaching. Deviant thoughts as shown by JIL, Ridwan believed, have no place in Islam and that the followers should return to the path of Islam. He also refers secularism, pluralism, and liberalism by the acronym 'sipilis' which is also the Indonesian word for the sexually transmitted disease 'syphilis'.<sup>111</sup>

To support his argument, Ridwan explained that pluralism and secularism are issues which have also been rejected by a number of Christian communities in the Western world, especially in the United States. In the last two decades the so-called revitalization of religion

has come to the fore in the US. The call of return to the sacred source of religion has been widespread. Ridwan assured Indonesian fellow Muslims that it is not necessary to waste time to discuss these issues because they have also been rejected by the Christians.

Ridwan was trying to impose his interpretation and definition regarding secularism, pluralism, and liberalism to be accepted by Muslim communities. In fact, the meaning of these issues has always been contested; there is no single definition of secularism, pluralism, and liberalism. The fact that MUI did not held participatory discussion on these issues makes some believe that MUI is now controlled by those figure who have no capability of solving the problems of Muslim communities. Since Din Syamsuddin, the chairman of Muhammadiyah, has assumed the Secretary General of MUI, MUI tends to be more conservative. A number of hard-line Muslim figures such as Umar Husein, leader of the Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Commission for Islamic Missionaries-DDII), and Kholil Ridwan were installed to assume membership of the edict (edict) commission of MUI.

## CONCLUSION

From the above discussion, it is save to argue that political Islam in post-Soeharto Indonesia is colored by the contest between the RCI and PLI in gaining people's support. It seems that the contest between the two will continue in the future, considering that the two groups have capacities to accomplish public sphere. It is obvious that the RCI highly capitalize the MUI's edict for the sake of their political interests. However, their political main agenda of RCI groups to impose the shari'a will be no prospect in the future. The majority of the Indonesian Muslims are moderate and more realistic in solving their problems and yet they seemed to disregard the shari'a imposed by the RCI groups. Contrary to the dream of RCI groups that the shari'a is a panacea, the Indonesian Muslims consider that the shari'a would not be able to overcome Indonesia's multi dimensional crisis. More importantly, the Indonesian Muslims admit that the extreme views of RCI groups have led to justify the use of violence.

Notwithstanding that one of the perceived weaknesses of the PLI is fundamentally related to the failure of its proponents in developing 'popular Islam' by using 'easy to understand' communicative



languages and approaches. For certain level of societies, particularly for the ordinary people or laymen Muslims, the languages and approaches of the proponents of the PLI are often considered as too sophisticated. As a result, the laymen Muslims often misunderstood the ideas of this critical-idealist group. For example, the ideas of progressive-liberal Islam on the deconstruction of shari'a, pluralism, gender equality and others are sometimes too academic for the laymen Muslims who aspire for a more pragmatic and simple way of thinking of Islam. As a result, only well-educated Muslims and intellectual communities responded positively to their ideas. On the other hand, ordinary Muslims used to deal with simple thinking and practical approaches toward Islamic faith and other socio-political issues. In other words, misunderstanding and intellectual gap between PLI proponents and ordinary Muslims persist. This situation inevitable led to a condition in which ordinary Muslims were seeking a simple approach and alternative groups regarded as more capable to accommodate their religious attitudes and concerns for contemporary socio-political issues.

As a participant observer, my main criticism towards the PLI proponents is that they are often over-confident about the power of their ideas while at the same time they tend to neglect the power of the masses. Indeed, this may have been a source of their strength; however, this is also their major weakness. In contrast to the intellectuals, RCI groups are able to develop social network with ordinary Muslims. Using a conventional theological approach, communicative language and better social network these groups are able to gather support from the ordinary Muslims.<sup>112</sup>

Therefore, it is important for the PLI to develop simpler and more communicative languages on most publications of PLI groups and approaches in disseminating their ideas to the ordinary Muslims. In my simple observation, most publications of PLI groups have used undue sophisticated and uncommunicative languages and approaches that are too difficult for laymen Muslims to understand. PLI groups should also get together to formulate effective agenda of promoting democracy, pluralism, and multiculturalism. I am of the opinion that it would certainly exert greater influence and would also result in a more positive outcome if more NGOs with support from other funding agencies can also conduct similar training so

that the programs can be pursued in a larger scale with a wider scope throughout the country.

The big question is whether Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono will be able to overcome Indonesia's ongoing multi-dimensional crisis during his presidency. If he fails to lead Indonesia to a just, democratic, and prosperous nation, the demand for the implementation of shari'a will be much more vocal and extremely dangerous in the future. History shows that social unjust, political uncertainty, and a lawless society are vulnerable to the rise of religious bigotry and militancy. The recent political development shows that the RCI and other hardliner Islam groups capitalize such a situation for the sake of their own political interests. This is a new development of Islamic resurgence in post-Soeharto Indonesia. However, I would suggest that such resurgence is dangerous for the future of Islam itself and Indonesia as a nation-state.

## NOTES

1. This paper is a revised version of my paper presented at the International Seminar on 'Southeast Asia and the Middle East: Islam, Movement, and the Longue Duree', organized by Asia Research Institute, Singapore, 17-18 August 2004. A part of this paper is derived from the report of ICIP's research project on 'Islam and Peace Building in Indonesia: The Analysis of Radical Movements and Their Implication for Security Development Prospects', funded by JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency). I thank to our researchers (Ahmad Najib Burhani, Kamami Zada, Noor Hidayah, Agus Muhammad, and Edy Sudarjat) for their assistance to provide valuable information and material related to this article. I also use a part of ICIP's research report on 'The Perception of Pesantren Communities in West Java towards Secularism, Pluralism and Liberalism: ICIP-AusAID, 2005. In this respect, I thank to ICIP's research team (Jajat, Jajang, Alpha, Fuada, and Nurani) for their valuable finding results. However, I alone shall bear the responsibility for any errors and imperfections of this article.
2. The state ideology Pancasila refers to the five principles, (1) Believe in One Supreme God, (2) Humanity, (3) Unity of Indonesia, (4) Democracy, and (5) Social Justice.
3. See Azyumardi Azra, 'Political Islam in Post Soeharto Indonesia' in Virginia Hooker and Amin Saikal (eds), *Islamic Perspective on the New Millennium*, Singapore: ISEAS, 2004, pp. 133-49; Martin van Bruinessen, 'Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia', *South Asia Research*, 10 (2), 2002; Suzaina Abdul Kadir, 'Indonesia's 'Democratization Dilemma': Political

- Islam and the Prospects for Democratic Consolidation', paper presented to the Conference on 'Consolidating Indonesia's Democracy', Ohio State University, 11–13 May 2002, pp. 15–18. See also, Jamhari, 'Mapping Radical Islam in Indonesia', *Studia Islamika*, vol. 10, no. 3, 2003, pp. 10–12, Rizal Sukma, 'Militant Islam and Indonesia's Frail Democracy', *Kultur*, vol. 3, no. 1, 2003, pp. 115–31.
4. Jamhari. op. cit.. See also Azyumardi Azra, 'Militant Islam Movements in Southeast Asia : Socio-Political and Historical Context', *Kultur*, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 17–27.
  5. See, Nazih Ayubi, *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World*, London and New York: Routledge, 199, pp. 63–4; Muslim scholars who are concerned with this first paradigm are Sayyid Qutb (Egypt), Abu A'la al-Maududi, (Pakistan), Abu Hasan Ali al-Nadvi (India). For a comparative study on this paradigm, see, James P. Piscatory, *Islam in a World of Nation States*, London: Cambridge University Press, 1986, John L. Esposito, *Voice of Resurgent Islam*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1983; Munawir Sjadzali, *Islam dan Tata Negara: Ajaran, Sejarah, dan Pemikiran* (Jakarta: UI Press, 1990).
  6. Muhammad Salim al'Awwa, *Fi al-nizam al siyasi li al-dawla al-Islamiyya*, Cairo: al-Maktab al-Misri al Hadith, 1983, p. 22, cited from Bassam Tibi, 'The Idea of an Islamic State and the Call for the Implementation of the Shari'a', partially republished by Middle East Information Center from *The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder*. Available at <http://middleeastinfo.org/article4480.html>, pp.1-16. Accessed on 6/9/2004.
  7. Husain Fawzi al-Najjar, *al-Islam wa al-Siyasa: Bahth fi Usul al-Nazariyya al-Siyasiyya wa Nizam al-hukm fi al-Islam*, Cairo: Dar al-Sha'b, 1977, p. 74, cited from Bassam Tibi, op. cit., p. 6. For a fuller concept of this paradigm, see, for instance, Qamaruddin Khan, *Political Concepts in the Qur'an*, Lahore: Islamic Book Foundation, 1982, pp. 75–6; Fazlur Rahman, *Islam*, New York, Chicago, San Francisco: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1966, p. 101; Mohammed Arkoun, 'The Concept of Authority in Islamic Thought,' in Klaus and Mehdi Mozaffari (eds.), *Islam: State and Society*, London: Curzon Press, 1988, pp. 70–1, M. Din Syamsuddin, 'Islamic Political Thought and Cultural Revival in Modern Indonesia', *Studia Islamika*, vol. 2, no. 4, 1995, pp. 51–68; see also Syafiq Hasyim, *Understanding Women in Islam, An Indonesian Perspective*, Jakarta: Solstice-ICIP-The Asia Foundation, 2006, pp. 187–8.
  8. Al-Ashmawi, *Usul al-Shari'a*, Cairo: Maktabat Madbuli, 1983, pp. 53 and 93, cited from Bassam Tibi, op. cit.
  9. Al-Ashmawi, *ibid*, p.89, cited from Bassam Tibi, op.cit., p. 8.
  10. M. Amien Rais, 'Gerakan-gerakan Islam International dan Pengaruhnya bagi Gerakan Islam di Indonesia', *Prisma*, no. Extra, Year XIII, 1984, pp. 23–39.
  11. See, John Esposito, *Islamic Revivalism*, Washington D.C.: American Institute for Islamic Affairs, School of International Service, The American University, 1985. p. 1.

12. Bahtiar Effendi, op. cit., pp. 162–3.
13. Mona Abaza, *Pendidikan Islam Dan Pergeseran Orientasi Studi Kasus Alumni Al-azhar*, translated by S. Harlinah, Jakarta: LP3ES, 1999, p. 97.
14. Usroh is a dakwah system derived from Ikhwanul Muslimin for improving faith, integrity, and total commitment of its cadres and members. The implementation of usroh was based on the decision released from the Congress of Ikhwanul Muslimin in 1943. The purpose of implementing usroh was to fulfil the need of system that would be able to response imtidad ufuqy (the horizontal development) and numuw tarbawy (educative development) of Ikhwanul Muslimin's members when facing political pressure.
15. The result of this second phase transmission was more effective as can be seen from the paradigm and activities of Muslim student activists in some universities. There was a strong tendency that the dakwah activities of Muslim students in some campuses were dominated by spirit and orientation in promoting Muslims unity and self-confidence to challenge the hegemony of Western civilization. Although the form and substance of spirit the Islamic resurgence varied from country to country, the main theme was always the same, namely the disenchantment with and rejection of Western civilization.
16. 'Islam, Radicalism, and Peace Building...', pp. 94–6.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Muhammad Imdadun, 'Transmisi Gerakan Revivalisme Islam Timur Tengah Ke Indonesia 1980-2002: Studi tentang Gerakan Tarbiyah dan Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia', Master Thesis, The University of Indonesia, 2003, p.115.
20. Ibid., pp. 115–18.
21. M. Syafi'i Anwar, *Pemikiran dan Aksi Islam Indonesia*, pp. 121–42.
22. See, Ruth McVey, 'Faith as the Outsider: Islam in Indonesian Politics,' in James Piscatori (ed.), *Islam in the Political Process*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, p.199.
23. M. Syafi'i Anwar, *Pemikiran dan Aksi Islam Indonesia: Studi tentang Cendekiawan Muslims Orde Baru, 1966-1993*, Jakarta: Paramadina, 1995. I have discussed political history of Soeharto's New Order Islamic Politics in my dissertation writing which was submitted to the University of Melbourne (December 2004) with the title, 'The State and Political Islam in Indonesia: A Study of the State Politics and Modernist Muslim Leaders' Political Behavior, 1966-1998'.
24. Ibid. For a useful account of 'regimists Islam', see Robert W. Hefner's thoughtful work, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia*, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000, pp.149–50.
25. See, Bahtiar Effendy, *Islam and the State in Indonesia*, Singapore:ISEAS , 2003, pp. 202–22; Arskal Salim, *Partai Islam dan Relasi Agama-Negara*, Jakarta: Pusat Penelitian IAIN Jakarta, 1999, pp. 7–12.
26. The total seats gained by Islamic parties in the 1999 general election include PPP (58 seats), PBB (13 seats), PK (7 seats), PNU (5 seats), PP (1

- seat), PPII Masyumi (1 seat), and PKU (1 seat). There are two parties often grouped by observers as 'Islamic parties' that gained significant vote such PKB (51 seats) and PAN (34 seats). If these two parties are included, the total seats gained by Islamic parties are 172 seats or 37.5 per cent. However, both PKB and PAN are very reluctant to be grouped as Islamic parties. Without PKB and PAN, Islamic parties gained only 87 seats or 17.8 per cent. See, Bahtiar Effendy, *op.cit.*, p. 214.
27. For a more detail account on Abdurrahman Wahid's thought, see Greg Baton, *Gagasan Islam Liberal di Indonesia: Pemikiran Neo-Modernisme Nurcholish Madjid, Djohan Effendi, Ahmad Wahib, dan Abdurahmabn Wahid*, Jakarta: Paramadina, 1999, especially pp. 325–429 and pp. 488–501.
  28. The best account on the conflict and religious violence in Ambon is discussed by Sukidi Mulyadi, 'Violence under the Banner of Religion: The Case of Laskar Jihad and Laskar Kristus', *Studia Islamika*, pp. 75–109.
  29. Suzaina Abdul Kadir, 'Indonesia's 'Democratization Dilemma': Political Islam and the Prospects for Democratic Consolidation', paper presented to the Conference on 'Consolidating Indonesia's Democracy', Ohio State University, 11–13 May, pp. 15–18. See also, Jamhari, 'Mapping Radical Islam in Indonesia', *Studia Islamika*, vol. 10, no. 3, 2003, pp. 10–12.
  30. See M. Syafi'i Anwar, 'Developing Social Fiqh : An Alternative to Counter 'Creeping Shariahization'?', *Words From The Editor, ICIP's Electronic Journal* ([www.icipglobal.org](http://www.icipglobal.org)), vol. 1. no. 1, January–April 2004.
  31. For a fuller account on the genealogies of radical Islam in Indonesia, see Martin van Bruinessen, 'Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia', *South Asia Research*, 10 (2), 2002.
  32. See, for instance, ICG Asia Briefing, *Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the 'Ngruki Network' in Indonesia*, 8 August 2002; ICG Asia Report, *Jamaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous*, 26 August 2003; Maria Ressa, *Seeds of Terror: An Eyewitness Account of Al Qaeda's Newest Center of Operations in Southeast Asia*, New York: Free Press, 2003; Greg Barton, *Indonesia's Struggle: Jamaah Islamiyah and the Soul of Islam*, Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2004.
  33. See, Abu Bakar Basyir, *Tempo Interaktif*, 17 April 2004; 'Diperiksa dalam Kasus Terorisme, Basyir Bungkam', *Kompas*, 29 April 2004; 'Ustadz Abu Bakar Ba'asyir : Kezhaliman Akan terus Saya Lawan', [www.hidayatullah.com](http://www.hidayatullah.com) 16 June, 2004; Fauzan Al-Anshari, 'Riba Politik', [www.majelis.mujahidin.or.id/kolom/siyasah/riba\\_politik](http://www.majelis.mujahidin.or.id/kolom/siyasah/riba_politik) 11 February 2004.
  34. Interview with Habib Rizieq Syihab, the chairman of FPI, Jakarta, 5 August 2004.
  35. Interview with Habib Rizieq Shihab, the chairman of FPI, Jakarta, 5 August 2004
  36. See, A. Yusuf Ali, *The Holy Qur'an: Translation and Commentary*, Durban: Islamic Propagation Center International, 1934, First Edition, pp. 50–1.
  37. See, 'Islam and Peace Building in Indonesia...', p. 36-44. Based on interview with Irfan S. Awwas (Chairman of MMI), Yogyakarta, 28 July 2004; Habib

- Rizieq (Chairman of FPI), Jakarta, 5 August 2004. See, also Hartono Ahmad Jaiz, *Bahaya Islam Liberal*, Jakarta: Pustaka Al Kaustar, 2002, pp. 82–6.
38. Adian Husaini and Nuim Hidayat, *Islam Liberal: Sejarah, Konsep, Penyimpangan dan Jawabannya*, Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 2002, pp. 82–3.
  39. Taufik Adnan Amal, 'Doktrin Jihad Banyak Disalahartikan,' published in Jaringan Islam Liberal <http://islamlib.com/id/page.php?page=article&id=296>, 1/12/2002. Accessed 20 September 2004.
  40. See 'Imam Samudra: "Kami Bertanggung Jawab Atas Bom Bali"' headline news of Kompas daily, 16 July 2003.
  41. Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, *Maḥmūd al-Nash Dirasat fi Ulum al-Qur'an*, (Kairo: al-Hai'ah al-Misriyyah al-'Ammah li al-Kitab, 1993), p. 11.
  42. Abdul Jawab Yasin, *al-Sulḥah fi al-Islam: al-'Aql al-Fiqhī al-Salafī baina al-Nash wa al-Tarikh*, Beirut: al-Markaz al-Tsaqafī al-'Arabi, tt), p. 13.
  43. Shireen T. Hunter, *Politik Islam di Era Kebangkitan*, Yogyakarta: Tiara Wacana, 2001, p. 115
  44. Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1994, p. 153
  45. Khaled Abou El Fadl, *The Place of Tolerance in Islam*, (Boston: Beacon Press, 2002), p. 11
  46. Bahtiar Effendy, 'Agama dan Politik: Mencari Keterkaitan yang Memungkinkan antara Doktrin dan Kenyataan Empirik', in M. Din Syamsuddin, *Islam dan Politik Era Orde Baru*, (Jakarta: Logos Wacana Ilmu, 2001), p. xvii.
  47. Adian Husaini, op. cit, pp. 96–106.
  48. See, Ahmad Gaus, 'How Liberal Can You Go?', Kompas, 13 Desember 2002, republished in Dzulmanni (ed.), *Islam Liberal dan Fundamental: Sebuah Pertarungan Wacana*, Yogyakarta: Elsaq Press, pp. 79-84. For a comparison, see M. Kamal Hassan, *Muslims Intellectual Responses to 'New Order' Modernization in Indonesia*, Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1980.
  49. M. Rasyidi, 'Usaha Mengkristenkan Indonesia dan Dunia', *Suara Muhammadiyah*, no. 1–2, January 1968, cited in M. Kamal Hassan, *Muslim Intellectual Responses to 'New Order' Modernization in Indonesia* (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1980), pp.13.
  50. Hamka, *Panji Masyarakat*, No.29, April 1968, p.6, cited by Hasan, *ibid.*, pp. 16–17.
  51. Nurcholish Nurcholish, 'Keharusan Pembaruan Pemikiran Islam', pp. 3–4.
  52. *Ibid.*, pp. 253–6., See also, *Tempo*, 29 December 1984.
  53. 'Khilafah dan Perkembangannya', An Interview with Nurcholish Madjid, *Nuansa*, December 1984, p.28, see also *Tempo*, 29 December 1984.
  54. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
  55. See, A. Syafii Maarif, *Islam dan Masalah Kenegaraan: Studi tentang Percaturan Dalam Dalam Konstituante*, Jakarta: LP3ES, 1985, pp. 153–4. *Ibid.*, p. 159.

56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. See, M. Dawam Rahardjo, 'Mencari Bentuk Negara yang Emansipatoris', *Nuansa*, December 1984, pp. 75–7.
59. Ibid., p. 77.
60. M. Dawam Rahardjo, 'Teologi Emansipatoris', op. cit.
61. See, Kuntowijoyo, *Dinamika Ummat Islam Indonesia*: Yogyakarta: Shalahuddin Pres, 1985, pp. 92–3.
62. Ibid.
63. Ihsan Ali Fauzi, 'Political Islam and Democracy in Indonesia: A Closer Look at Liberal Islam', *ICIP's Electronic Journal* ([www.icipglobal.org](http://www.icipglobal.org)), vol. 1, no. 2 August–December 2004, pp. 2–3. Among the leading figures of JIL are Ulil Abshar Abdalla, Luthfi Assyauckanie, Hamid Basyaib, Ahmad Sahal, and others.
64. Most NGOs associated with the PLI groups receive partial or significant financial support from funding institutions such as The Asia Foundation, The Ford Foundaton, European Commission, UNDP (United Nation Development Program), Frederick Ebert Stiftung, Konrad Afdeare Stiftung, and others.
65. See, website of Liberal Islam Network, 'About Us', [www.islamlib.com/en/aboutus.php](http://www.islamlib.com/en/aboutus.php)
66. Luthfi Assyauckanie, 'Islam Liberal: Pandangan Partisipan', in Luthfi Assyauckanie (ed.), *Wajah Liberal Islam di Indonesia*, Jakarta: Jaringan Islam Liberal, 2001, p. xxv.
67. Ibid., p. xxiii.
68. Ulil Abshar Abdalla, 'Menyegarkan Kembali Pemahaman Islam', *Kompas*, 18 November 2002. This earticle had created a long polemics and public debates between proponents and opponents of Liberal Islam ideas. It was republished into a book entitled *Islam Liberal and Fundamental: Sebuah Pertarungan Wacana*, Yogyakarta: Elsaq Press, 2003, (p. 7) edited by Dzulmanni. Former President Wahid wrote an epilog of this book with the title, 'Ulil Abshar Abdalla dengan Liberalismenya', pp. 257–62.
69. The works those liberal Muslim scholars have been translated and published by LkiS, Paramadina, Lakpesdam, JIL, ICIP, and other PLI groups. The readers of liberal Islam books are mostly students and young Muslim generation. However, the sum of liberal Islam books published by PLI groups are still few compared to the huge amount of radical Islam books published by RCI groups.
70. Zuhairi Misrawi, 'Dekonstruksi Syariat: Jalan Menuju Desakralisasi, Reinterpretasi, dan Depolitisasi', *Tashwirul Afkar*, Edition No.12, 2002, pp. 15–17.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid.
73. See Budhy Munawar-Rahman, 'The Theological Basis of Inter-Religious Brotherhood', Liberal Islam Network, English Edition Web ([www.islamlib.com](http://www.islamlib.com)), 19 August 2001.

74. Nasaruddin Umar, 'Women's Liberation Theology', Liberal Islam Network, English Edition Web ([www.islamlib.com](http://www.islamlib.com)), 29 July 2001.
75. For Syafiq Hasyim's fuller account on the deconstruction of patriarchal fiqh related to women's rights, see his *Hal-hal Yang Terpikirkan tentang Perempuan dalam Islam*, Bandung: Mizan, 2001. This book received award from its publisher (Mizan). ICIP has translated this book into English and published it with the title, *Understanding Women in Islam: An Indonesian Perspective*, Jakarta: ICIP, 2005.
76. For a serious critical account of Ulil deas, see Haidar Bagir, 'Beberapa Pertanyaan untuk Ulil Abshar Abdalla', *Kompas*, 5 December 2002. See also, Interview with Din Syamsuddin, 'Ulil Melakukan Dekonstruksi Tanpa Merekonstruksi', *Panjimas*, 26 December 2002–8 January 2003, pp. 36–7.
77. I have discussed the issue of methodology and current action of PLI in my preliminary paper on 'The Development of Progressive-Liberal Islam in Indonesia: Challenges and Opportunities', paper presented at International Conference on 'Progressive Muslims and the State in Contemporary Muslim Societies', organized by Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies (IDSS), Singapore, 7–8 March 2006.
78. See, Mun'im A. Sirri, ed, *Interfaith Theology: Responses of Progressive Indonesian Muslims*, Jakarta: ICIP, 2006. pp. 81–121; Abd. Moqsith Ghazali, 'Progressive Islamic Interpretation on Interfaith Marriage', paper presented at Study Tour Program 'From South Asian Muslim Leaders to Southeast Asia', organized by ICIP, 26 January–1 February 2005, pp. 1–11.
79. Abd. Moqsith Ghazali, *Ibid.*
80. A. Muqsith Ghazali, *ibid.*, p. 4.
81. *Ibid.*, pp. 5–10.
82. For example, Jimmy Carter, the 39th president of the United States who personally witnessed Indonesia's 2004 election, admitted that the election in this biggest Muslim country is an internationally significant leap in the spread of democratization. *International Herald Tribune*. 15 July 2004.
83. Karl Schoenberger, *Asia's vibrant new democracies were built from within*, unlike Iraq. *Mercury News*, posted on Sun, July 2004.
84. For example, Freedom Institute in its 2003 survey reported that political freedom in most of Muslim countries in the Middle East is deeply deplorable. *Harmoni Islam dan demokrasi (The harmony between Islam and democracy)*. *Gatra* No. 1–2 Year XI, 17 November 2004.
85. *Ibid.* See also Farish A. Noor, *After the attacks in Bali, can we still live with our modern myths?* *The Jakarta Post*, October 14, 2005. Originally, radical groups like Laskar Jihad emerged in the 1990s with their hot-headed members being sent to fight a holy war against the Christians in Ambon in the Moluccan island. See also Herry Mohammad and Sujoko, *Syariat tak pernah padam (Shari'a would never die down)*, *Gatra*, No. 1–2 Year XI, November 27, 2005, who quoted Ja'far Umar Thalib, 'As long as the government is unable to protect the umma, we are obliged to take that role.' He defended his organization's decision to send around its 700 militias to Poso, but he said it was mainly for social purposes.



86. See, 'The Perception of Pesantren Communities in West Java towards Secularism, Pluralism and Liberalism: Research Report' ICIP, 2005.
87. Mun'im A. Sirry (ed.), *Fiqh Lintas Agama: Membangun Masyarakat Inklusif-Pluralis*, Jakarta: Yayasan Wakaf Paramadina, 2004. The writers of this book are : Nurcholish Madjid, Kautsar Azhari Noer, Komaruddin Hidayat, Masdar F. Mas'udi, Zainul Kamal, Zuhairi Misrawi, Budhy Munawar Rahman, Ahmad Gaus, and Mun'im A. Sirry. These Muslim intellectuals are widely regarded as the proponent of PLI. This book was first printed in October 2003. The publisher stated that in June 2004, it was re-printed to fifth edition. ICIP has translated this book into English and published it with the title, *Interfaith Theology: Responses of Progressive Indonesian Muslims*, Jakarta: ICIP, January 2006.
88. *Ibid.*, pp. 164
89. *Ibid.*, pp. 164–5.
90. Tim Pengkajian Kompilasi Hukum Islam, Pokja Pengarus Utamaan Gender Departemen Agama, 'Usulan Naskah Revisi Kompilasi Hukum Islam' First Draft. No date. Dr Musdah Mulia is a lecturer of UIN (State Islamic University) and senior researcher of Research and Development Division, Department of Religious Affairs. Currently, Musdah is Secretary General of ICRP (Indonesian Conference on Religion and Peace).
91. See Musdah Mulia, 'Revision of Islamic Law Book', unpublished paper, 2004, pp. 1–4; Musdah Mulia, et. al. 'Counter Legal Drafting Islamic Law Compilation (ILC): A Pluralism and Gender Perspective', Positioning paper, Islamic Law Compilation Group Analysis Gender Mainstreaming Working Group Department of Religious Affairs, pp. 22–4.
92. M. Syafi'i Anwar, 'The Development of Progressive-Liberal Islam in Indonesia: Challenges and Opportunities', preliminary paper presented at International Conference on 'Progressive Muslims and the State in Contemporary Muslim Societies', organized by Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies (IDSS), Singapore, 7–8 March 2006.
93. See, Robin Bush, 'Islam and Civil Society in Indonesia: a Look and the Building Blocks.' Paper presented at forum of 'Study Tour from South Asian Muslim Leaders to Southeast Asia', Jakarta, 1 February 2005.
94. Agus Muhammad, 'Jihad Lewat Tulisan: Kisah Sukses Majalah Sabili dengan Berbagai Iron', *Jurnal Pantau*, Yer II, No.015, July 2001. See, [www.pantau.ir.id/txt/15/06.html](http://www.pantau.ir.id/txt/15/06.html). See also, Kamala Chandrakirana and Yuniyanti Chuzairah, *op. cit.*, p.16.
95. See, Gatra, 21 December 2002; see also, 'Tokoh Baru, Pemain Baru', Main Report of Panjimas magazine on JIL and the death edict, Panjimas, 26 December 2002–8 January 2003, pp. 22–7.
96. Ulil Abshar Abdalla, 'Islam Warna Warni', [www.islamlib.com](http://www.islamlib.com), published 11 August 202.
97. For RCI's strong protest and condemnation the draft, see, 'Pikiran Sesat Kuasai Departemen Agama', *Sabili*, 5 November 2004, pp. 16–36.
98. See, 'Conference Report. Second Roundtable Discussion: Islam and Democratization in southeast Asia: Challenges and Opportunities, Jakarta, 5–7 December 2005,' ICIP, Jakarta, 2006.

99. M. Syafi'i Anwar, 'Developing Social Fiqh . . .' op. cit.
100. See, 'Syari'at Islam yang Bagaimana', Panji Masyarakat, 27 November–12 December 2002, cited by . Bahtiar Effendy in 'Islam and The State . . .', p. 221.
101. M. Syafi'i Anwar, 'The 2004 General Election and Presidential Race : Towards the Future of Indonesian Politics', notes for a roundtable seminar on 'The 2004 General Election in Indonesia', organized by Indonesian Studies Group, National University of Singapore, 28 April 2004.
102. See, 'Imam Mahdi dan Kekerasan Atas Nama Agama', Forum Keadilan, no. 14, 31 July, pp. 12–16. For a critical account on MUI's Edict and hardliner Islam action, see Merle Ricklefs, 'Hardline Islam Thrives in Indonesia', The Jakarta Post, 1 September 2005.
103. See, 'Tapal Batas Tafsir Bebas', Gatra, 6 August 2005, pp. 75–9; 'Gonjang-Ganjing Edict Ulama', Tempo, 14 August 2005, pp. 110–13.
104. See 'M. Syafi'i Anwar: Pluralisme Dalam Bahaya', Perspektif Baru 491, 6 August 2005. It is a popular radio talk show hosted by former president Wahid's spokesman Wimar Witoelar. It was broadcasted by more than 100 radios and to be published in 11 national and local newspaper.
105. See, 'Tapal Batas Tafsir Bebas', Gatra, 6 August 2005, pp. 75–9. Among the proponents of Aliansi Masyarakat Madani untuk Kebebasan Beragama are KH Abdurrahman Wahid (former president), M. Dawam Rahardjo, Adnan Buyung Nasution, Ulil Abshar Abdalla, M. Syafi'i Anwar, Djohan Effendi, and others.
106. All proponent of Civil Society Alliance for Religious Freedom along with progressive young Muslim activists joint a solidarity for defending JIL's compound from the planned attack of FPI on 5 August 2005. Fortunately, the FPI declined its agenda to attack JIL. See also 'Ulama Dihina: Tumpas Gerombolan Liberal', Sabili, No.3, 25 August 2005, pp. 49–58.
107. Based on ICIP's field observation and ICIP's report on 'The Perception of Pesantren Communities in West Java towards Secularism, Pluralism and Liberalism: Research Report.' ICIP-AusAID, 2005.
108. For a fuller account on this issue, see M.C. Ricklefs, 'Hardline Islam on the March in Indonesia', Straits Times, 20 August 2005.
109. Azyumardi Azra, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta, September, 2005.
110. Ahmad Sahal, 'MUI dan Edict Antidemokrasi, (MUI and its Anti-Democracy Edict)' Kompas, 25 September 2005.
111. ICIP's report on 'The Perception of Pesantren Communities in West Java towards Secularism, Pluralism and Liberalism: Research Report.' ICIP, 2005.
112. Those groups are able to develop popular dakwah activities such as giving sermons in mosques, publishing books, magazines, bulletins and pamphlets, setting up training for the young Muslims generations and organizing rallies or religious public gathering (pengajian). However, another new interesting phenomenon that might need further research is that more and more people tend to listen to popular or 'celebrity' preachers who are fond of preaching how to tackle problems of day-to-day life such as Abdullah Gymnastiar and Jefri al-Buchory.