Out of the Ruins of the Ottoman Empire: Reflections on the Ottoman Legacy in South-eastern Europe

EDIN HAJDARPAŠIĆ

The Ottoman past remains one of the most controversial historical subjects across much of the Balkans. Amid the violent state-building projects that emerged in Yugoslavia after the 1980s, for example, images of the Ottoman legacy steadily gained more visibility not only in the newly-produced history textbooks, but also in political debates, on television screens, and literally on the streets of towns and villages where different constituencies aggressively contested places associated with the Ottoman past. In the city of Banja Luka during the 1992–95 war, the Bosnian Serb paramilitaries went about the work of destroying most of the Ottoman-era urban structures like clock-towers, cemeteries, and especially mosques, including the renowned sixteenth-century Ferhadija mosque that was blown up over the course of a single night in May 1993. Years after the war, the city sanitation service ‘Cleanliness’ (Čistoča) continued to remove gravestones, trees, and other remaining ruins until the Ferhadija site was completely levelled. When reconstruction was proposed in 1998, the Serb mayor of Banja Luka reacted indignantly, warning the international community officials that the mosque was ‘a monument of the cruel Turkish occupation’ and any plans for its rebuilding ‘would be perceived by the Serbian people as the blackest humiliation’. As the reconstruction plans nonetheless proceeded to the point of organizing a small symbolic ceremony in May 2001, a massive organized protest blocked this event; thousands of Serb demonstrators marched around the empty Ferhadija site, many pelting the delegation of Bosnian Muslims and international community officials with stones, burning the nearby buses and cars, and shouting ‘This is Serbia’ and ‘Kill the Turks’. Dozens were seriously hurt and one person died from injuries sustained during the stoning.

A similar smaller protest against reconstruction also occurred in the town of Stolac in Herzegovina in December 2001, once again at the location of a destroyed Ottoman mosque that provoked the anger of Croatian nationalists. About a year earlier, in October 2000, the Croatian Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina aired a campaign ad that depicted a ruthless raid led by turbaned horsemen brandishing large swords. In the short clip, one of the attackers grabs a frightened child and rides away with the kidnapped boy as the harrowing sight dissolves into darkness and the slogan ‘Self-Determination or Extermination’ finally

flashes on the television screen. This nationalist stunt clearly relies on the familiar images of ‘the Turkish yoke’ – especially on the image of the brutal Ottoman practice of child-levying (or *devşirme*) – to mobilize the Bosnian Croat voters in the face of what is portrayed as an imminent resurgence of the Ottoman Empire in the twenty-first century.

At about the same time, a number of Bosnian Muslim academics were busy organizing a symposium aimed at extolling the virtues of Ottoman rule in Bosnia. The conference, which took place in Sarajevo in October 2003, set its sights on ‘the culture of human rights and foundational freedoms’ as reflected in the Ottoman charter granted by Sultan Mehmed Fatih to the Bosnian Franciscans in 1463. This brief document clearly specified that the sultan, by his ‘good graces’, forbade any abuse of the Franciscan order in Bosnia. According to the conference’s widely circulated press release, however, it represented much more than a display of imperial mercy; this Ottoman charter was ‘the oldest document about respect for human rights and freedoms in history, 326 years before the French Revolution’.

Portrayed in such anachronistic and distorted terms, the Ottoman period appeared to many Bosnian Muslims in the audience as a glorious, inspiring age. It is no wonder, then, that an influential Bosnian Muslim magnate recently praised the Ottoman conquest of the medieval Balkans as a time when ‘Turkey’ ‘stopped the feudal Europeans, hungry for expansion and enrichment, in their subjugation of Asia and Africa’ while bringing ‘a much higher civilizational level, standard and quality of life’ to every province in the Ottoman Empire.

Bosnia is not the only place where images of the Ottoman past elicit such intense reactions. As the recent controversy over reinterpretations of the 1876 Batak massacre in Bulgaria demonstrates, historiographic discussions of Ottoman rule have the potential to ignite bitter and far-reaching public debates about the character of national identity and historical memory in most countries in the Balkans. Framed more broadly, the legacy of the Ottoman Empire in Europe has become a part of the pervasive ‘Muslim question’ that continues to dominate discourses about values like tolerance, diversity, and freedom of speech across the European continent. This ‘question’ concerns not only the present position of communities often identified as ‘Turks’, ‘Muslims’ or simply ‘immigrants’ in states like Germany, France, or the Netherlands, but also the reinterpretation of the much longer historical legacies of the Ottoman and other Islamic empires in Europe, such as the centuries of Muslim rule and influence in Spain.

With this context in mind, I turn to south-eastern Europe in order to provide a historically grounded critique of the now-dominant discourse that continues to legitimate and reproduce a stark and allegedly insurmountable divide between the ‘foreign Muslim Turks’ and the ‘native Christian nations’ of the Balkans. Because perceptions of the Ottoman legacy have varied so widely over time and from region to region, it would be impossible to survey each Balkan area or period in this brief article. Rather, I take the historical phenomena that proved to be particularly problematic and controversial, such as the above examples from Bosnia, as departure points for reflections on different political interpretations of the Ottoman legacy across south-eastern Europe. In the first section, I explore the origins and the persistence of the dominant ‘Muslim vs. Christian’ dichotomy before suggesting ways of unravelling some of its foundational premises. In sections two and three,
I point to several approaches that have challenged this prevalent viewpoint and thus enabled other visions, counter-perceptions, and alternative perspectives on the Ottoman legacy to emerge in opposition to the constraints of the dominant ideological frameworks. Above all, what this article hopes to convey is a sense of open-ended possibilities for reinterpretations of the Ottoman past in Europe, a past that has all too often been confined to the role of an inassimilable pre-modern background against which the proper development of modern nation-states progressively unfolded in the Balkans. I hope that the issues sketched below will help identify new venues for engaging what Mark Mazower called ‘the basic historiographical challenge [which] is how to fit the centuries of Ottoman rule into the story of the [European] continent as a whole’. I have tried to sustain, especially in the last section, what Raymond Williams called the ‘subjunctive mode’ of narration, an approach that attempts to go beyond indicating ‘what had happened’ in order to press against the limits of our current frames of reference. Such modes of argument may help make us more acutely aware of our position not at the privileged end of history, but rather, as Hannah Arendt put it, in the present interval ‘between past and future’.

Religious divisions form one of the defining features of the recent depictions of Ottoman legacy in the Balkans. The debates and clashes over certain aspects of the Ottoman past, whether in Banja Luka, Batak, or Prizren, appeared to pit ‘Slavs’ and ‘Turks’, ‘Christians’ and ‘Muslims’ against each other. Since the 1990s, escalating tensions across Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia and Kosovo invariably combined images of ‘alien Turks’, ‘Muslims’, and ‘Ottomans’ as synonymous categories that stood in contrast to the ‘Serb’, ‘Croat’, and other apparently ‘native’ Christian Balkan nations.

The conflation of these terms is by no means a new phenomenon. Indeed, as Maria Todorova points out in her seminal study *Imagining the Balkans*, making Ottoman ‘synonymous with Islamic or Turkish (and to a lesser extent Arabic and Persian) influences’ is a defining hallmark of the nineteenth-century Balkan nationalist projects that perceived the Ottoman Empire as ‘a religiously, socially, and institutionally alien imposition on autochthonous Christian medieval societies. . . . The central element of this interpretation is the belief in the incompatibility between Christianity and Islam, between the essentially nomadic civilization of the newcomers and the . . . settled agrarian civilizations of the Balkans and the Middle East’. The actual and deeply entrenched political inequalities that disadvantaged various non-Muslim communities and explicitly privileged Sunni Islam as the ruling religion of the Ottoman Empire reinforced the later nationalist view of basic irreconcilability between the unequal and supposedly self-contained worlds of Muslims and Christians. The nation-building projects that emerged in the nineteenth century thus constructed the new Balkan states on ‘the existing double boundary of language and religion’ that separated the mostly Orthodox Christian (e.g., Serb, Bulgarian, Greek) communities from the Muslim, usually Turkish-speaking Ottoman authorities. These dividing lines, compounded by the Ottoman policies that discriminated against non-Muslims, overtaxed many Balkan communities, and often exposed them to the abuse of local Muslim notables, provided ample grounds for the
mobilization of uprisings and nationalist grievances against the Ottoman misrule throughout the nineteenth century.

However, Todorova convincingly demonstrates that the nationalist movements sought ‘not only complete and radical breaks with the [Ottoman] past, but its negation’ as well. In other words, the construction of new Balkan nation-states out of the Ottoman context also entailed a corollary process of ‘de-Ottomanization’, or sustained efforts ‘to achieve the…opposite of being Ottoman (or Oriental), namely, steady Europeanization, Westernization, or modernization of society’. A crucial implication of this process must be spelled out here. What Dominic Lieven called ‘the historical stigma of empire’ marked not only ‘Turkey’ as the inheritor of the Ottoman state and its legacy. The long-standing conflation of ‘Turk’, ‘Mohammedan’, and ‘Muslim’ labels also enabled this political stigma to pervade a rather diffuse cluster of associations with ‘Islam’ as a religion, social formation and a generalized set of cultural characteristics and practices. Mosques, ‘Oriental-type’ architecture, arts, music, certain styles of headdress, particular symbols, Arabic- and Turkish-influenced vocabulary and personal names, many other attributes – and, most importantly, the sheer spectre of Muslims living across south-east Europe – all became linked to the ignominy of ‘Ottoman oppression’. In the regions that emerged as independent states by the end of the nineteenth century (especially Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria and Montenegro), the association of the Ottoman rule with Islam thus exposed the various Muslim communities, most of which had first established their local presence hundreds of years earlier, as problematic remnants of ‘the alien Turkish yoke’.

In that sense, it is not surprising that areas of Christian – Muslim encounter became highly charged contact points in historical narratives, social interactions, political policies, and even cityscapes of the new Balkan nation-states. In his study of Serbian attitudes toward the conversion of Christians to Islam during the Ottoman period, Bojan Aleksov found that influential public figures in modern Serbia helped reproduce images of converts to Islam as traitors, ‘renegades, dissidents, and cowards, with all the detrimental consequences that followed’ such stereotyping, particularly in regard to the two major Muslim populations in the neighbouring regions, the Albanians and the Bosnian Muslims. Concrete political actions also followed the break with the Ottoman past. In most towns in Serbia, the native Muslim population was forced to leave in several waves that culminated in the 1860s and 1870s with the expulsion of nearly all ‘Turks’ and the destruction of most mosques and other sites associated with Islam or the Ottomans. Similar but less drastic events took place in Bulgaria in the late nineteenth century when many mosques were dismantled as Muslims were compelled to renegotiate their precarious position within the new nation-state. The disintegration of the Ottoman Empire appeared to signal a new age, one where, as a New York Times editorial put it in 1854, ‘a new power…is only to be constructed from the present Christian population of European Turkey, and must be founded upon the ruins of the Ottoman Empire’.

It may be tempting to see these nation-building efforts as variations on the struggles of all new political regimes to define themselves in contrast to the old structures, but such a simplification overlooks the revolutionary novelty of the
political drive toward national domination and purity that characterized Balkan nationalisms in the post-Ottoman period. While it is true that new states usually seek to supplant the symbols of the previous system – one only needs to think of all the churches that the Ottomans plundered or converted to mosques during their conquests – the policy of planning and creating ethnically homogeneous territories on a mass scale nonetheless had no comparable precedent on the Balkan peninsula. The years that followed the collapse of the Habsburg, the Romanov, and the Ottoman empires after the First World War witnessed a radical ‘un-mixing’ of populations in the former imperial realms. International treaties and national policies made diverse local communities into separate Greek, Turkish, Bulgarian, and Albanian nationals who were forced to relocate to new ‘homelands’ (as was the case with the Bulgarian – Greek – Turkish population exchanges in the 1920s). Yet even as they entered into major wars against each other in the early twentieth century, the new Balkan nations still defined themselves against the Ottoman background and retained the common perception of the Ottoman past as one of alien conquest that oppressed the native nations. As Todorova rightly notes, ‘probably the most striking feature of the dominant discourses in the different Balkan countries is the remarkable similarity between them and the amazing continuity over time’.  

The reiteration of the ‘native Christian vs. alien Muslim’ tropes by authoritative writers and recognized scholars also helped extend the dominance of this narrative. The Turks, ‘an Asiatic military people,…shackled the life of the spirit and the mind in Bosnia’, wrote Ivo Andrić in 1924, then an aspiring Yugoslav writer who later went on to win Nobel Prize in Literature in 1961. In the early 1920s, the young Andrić was swiftly completing his doctoral dissertation on the history of Ottoman rule in Bosnia, but he never revised or published that study during his long life, preferring instead to craft much more nuanced stories and novels about everyday life in Bosnia. Yet his early thesis on the devastating presence of ‘Asiatic Turks’ in the Balkans was in fact posthumously translated and publicized, first in Serbo-Croatian and German in 1982, then later in English in 1990.  

In this widely available work, readers could learn that during four centuries of Ottoman rule, ‘the Turks could bring no cultural content or sense of higher historic mission, even to those South Slavs who accepted Islam; for their Christian subjects, their hegemony brutalized custom and meant a step to the rear in every respect’. Precisely because it had ‘fallen to Islam’, Andrić clarified, Bosnia ‘was in no position to fulfill her natural role, and to take part in the cultural development of Christian Europe, to which it ethnographically and geographically belonged’. Most literary scholars tended to uncritically accept the dissertation as ‘the genesis of all that Andrić as a literary author created’ and as another illuminating contribution made by one of the greatest writers of the twentieth century. Regardless of what Andrić might have thought about his dissertation in his later life, the perspective that he adopted from the nineteenth-century nationalist writers continued to broadly circulate throughout the twentieth century because of his uncontested status as an insightful, brilliant writer. The perception of an insurmountable chasm between ‘Asiatic Islam’ and the native peoples of ‘Christian Europe’ thus kept being discursively reconstituted by reference to ‘authoritative
sources’ that, in turn, enabled others to reproduce the underlying stereotypes with confidence and authority.24

While this brief background offers a framework for the persistence of the dominant perception of the Ottoman legacy, it also places so much stress on the ‘Muslim vs. Christian’ tension that other communities and developments remain entirely overshadowed by this uncompromising dichotomy. For instance, the historical accounts that emphasize continuity, symbiosis and syncretism of Byzantine, Ottoman, and different local traditions (such as the works of Nicolae Iorga and Frederick Hasluck) opened up provocative new research directions, but those were rarely followed up by students of Balkan history who continued to favour investigations of political and economic history within individual nation-states.25

The focus on the Muslim – Christian dichotomy also ignores the numerous Ottoman Jewish communities whose histories could potentially offer different narratives of the Ottoman past in south-eastern Europe, but they too seldom (if at all) figure in the dominant narratives.26 Oral histories and explorations of historical memory in the immediate post-Ottoman period could provide a fascinating repository of perspectives that blur the lines between ‘Christian’ and ‘Muslim’ and allow for a more diverse field of perceptions of communal differences.27

Furthermore, it is important to note that the radical breach that separated the new nations from their Ottoman past (and in process exposed the local Muslim communities as ‘unwanted minorities’ within the new states) did not develop equally in all the Balkan countries. For a variety of reasons, Albanian nationalism evolved in a way that successfully encompassed the differences between Muslim, Orthodox, and Catholic Albanian communities and formed a political space that did not recreate the decisive Christian – Muslim split that had happened earlier in Serbia and Greece.28 Such historical developments complicate the dominant picture that holds the ‘native Christian vs. alien Muslim’ dichotomy as the norm that structures all Balkan nationalisms. Yet even though Albanian nationalism did not experience lasting fragmentation along religious lines, a number of Albanian intellectuals in the twentieth century nonetheless adopted a largely negative stance toward the Ottoman past as a way of defining the country against the imperial background and in terms of a modern European nation. This perspective was recently asserted by Ismail Kadare, Albania’s most prominent writer, who unequivocally condemned the era of ‘Ottoman slavery’ that severed the Balkan nations from ‘mother Europe’.29 The dominant view of the Ottoman legacy thus once again reappears, albeit in a national setting that is substantially different from the other Balkan nationalisms.

Such different historical evolutions point to the need to further explore the period of Ottoman rule itself, an immensely complicated topic which demands a nuanced analysis of different time spans and developments for different Balkan regions, yet which is commonly treated in national narratives as a monolithic era with fixed, unvarying conventions. Since it would not be possible to provide such a study within the limits of this essay, the remainder of this section can only point to several areas of research to help initiate this important task.

The heterogeneity of the Ottoman period and the complexity of interconfessional relations can be briefly illustrated through a few historical problems from Serbia and Bosnia, regions that experienced several distinct political shifts during the four-centuries-long Ottoman rule, roughly from the fifteenth to the nineteenth century.
The first example turns to the Serbian town of Užice to highlight the different kinds of political tensions that pervaded local communities in the pre-nineteenth-century Balkans. The social crises that followed the long series of Venetian – Ottoman and Austrian – Ottoman wars at the turn of the eighteenth century (lasting sporadically from the 1680s to the 1740s) took a great toll on a number of Balkan communities. The casualties of war and plague, combined with population displacements and rapidly escalating financial demands of the Ottoman administration, loomed large in the background of the numerous local uprisings that challenged the Ottoman authorities in the Balkans throughout the eighteenth century. At the forefront of one such social movement was a certain şeyh Muhammed of Užice, a local Sufi agitator who in the 1740s supported a large local rebellion and wrote a number of scathing petitions against the Ottoman pashas, accusing them of abusing and exploiting the imperial subjects (the raya). Since such agitations tended to gain considerable appeal among the peasantry in Serbia, the Ottoman governor of Belgrade tried to undermine this threatening development by accusing the şeyh of Užice of being a deceitful Christian sympathizer, even a crypto-Christian who had no right to speak on behalf of the Muslim community. In a series of blistering proclamations, the şeyh returned the ‘insult’ to the governor, accusing him of collaborating with the ‘unbelieving’ Ottoman enemies (like the Austrians) and sheltering the supposedly ‘heretical’ Hamzevi sect. The crux of Muhammed’s criticism, however, remained focused on the government’s ‘oppression’ (zulm) of the impoverished peasants.30 Faced with a rising local rebellion, the Belgrade governor finally dispatched in 1748 a small military force that attacked the subversive şeyh’s followers at an Užice mosque, which was fired upon and badly damaged by the governor’s soldiers during a protracted skirmish. As a result of this clash, this place of worship gained the popular nickname ‘the şeyh’s mosque’. But the şeyh did not evade the authorities for long; in 1750 the Belgrade janissaries caught and executed him.31

This local conflict – particularly the Ottoman governor’s attack on ‘the şeyh’s mosque’ – affords valuable insights into the character of political and confessional tensions in Ottoman Balkan regions like Serbia and Bosnia in the eighteenth century. On the one hand, it clearly shows that most Muslims considered it rather defamatory to accuse other Muslims of being Christian sympathizers or, even worse, outright ‘infidels’ who certainly belonged outside the privileged political space reserved for the proper followers of Islam. While overtones of Muslim – Christian antagonism are evident in these exchanges, it is also clear that the conflict occurred between two opposing and at least nominally Muslim sides, one belonging to the Ottoman officialdom, the other to the şeyh-led commoners and peasants of the Užice region, which included a large number of Orthodox Christians.32 The şeyh’s protests against the abusive treatment of peasants were in fact central to the conflict; his disruptive agitation appeared threatening to the Ottoman authorities mainly for political and economic reasons. The Ottoman governor’s attack on the şeyh’s mosque is thus a significant moment because it shows how mosques – as well as churches, synagogues, monasteries, tombstones, coffeehouses, taverns and many other places – could acquire different valences imbued with heterogeneous and contrasting political agendas, social demands, cultural practices, and religious beliefs.

What is perhaps most illuminating is the fate of ‘the şeyh’s mosque’. In the years after the expanding Serb state took Užice over from the Ottomans in the 1860s, this...
structure was demolished (along with the other remaining mosques) and the vast majority of Muslims were expelled during the comprehensive re-making of the town into a modern Serbian city. The remaining rubble was purportedly used for the construction of a few nearby buildings.\textsuperscript{33} Whereas in 1750 ‘the şeyh’s mosque’ could conjure an image of local agitation \textit{against} the Ottoman government, 100 years later the mosque appeared to the new nation-builders of Serbia as just another undesirable symbol standing \textit{for} the Ottoman rule.

This radical change in the perception of Muslim and Christian communities began to occur in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as the result of the rise of nationalism, but also as complex consequences of the Ottoman Tanzimat reforms and the Great Power interventions in the ‘Eastern Question’. As the preceding discussion argued, the emergence of Serbian, Greek and Bulgarian nationalisms and their shared need to negate the Ottoman past played a pivotal role in making the Christian – Muslim contact points appear as decisive battlefields where hard lines between the rejected Ottoman past and the new national future had to be drawn. However, it should not be forgotten that in many provinces, ‘Ottoman and European discourses of reform’ of the nineteenth century also ‘made religion the site of a colonial encounter between a self-styled “Christian” West and what it saw as its perennial adversary, an “Islamic” Ottoman Empire’, as Ussama Makdisi convincingly argues. ‘This encounter profoundly altered the meaning of religion in the multiconfessional’ provinces like Lebanon (as well as Macedonia, Kosovo, and Bosnia).\textsuperscript{34}

As a process that illuminates these developments, the construction of new churches in Ottoman Bosnia during the Tanzimat reforms (1839–76) became extraordinarily sensitive political events that involved the interaction of local religious communities, the consuls of the Great Powers, and the Ottoman authorities. In the 1850s, the Ottoman government encouraged the Bosnian Christian communities to build new churches in hopes of demonstrating to the Great Powers that the Ottomans treated the Christian communities with fairness and tolerance.\textsuperscript{35} Yet on the local level Bosnian Catholics and Orthodox often encountered strong and sometimes violent opposition of many Bosnian Muslim notables who resisted ceding their dominance to the new political actors, namely the Bosnian Christians and the Tanzimat reformers. In establishing new parish houses like that at Banbrdo near Krešev, the Bosnian Franciscans reported that they were able to diffuse these tensions by negotiating with and ‘giving bribes’ to the local Muslim notables.\textsuperscript{36} In other regions, however, some Muslims increasingly attacked new church sites, which they perceived as symbolic embodiments of the changes that worked against the established patterns of Muslim dominance and in favour of the Bosnian Christians and the reformers from Istanbul. Russian, French, Austrian, and Italian consuls consistently reported acts of local Muslim vandalism against churches and often used those events to assert themselves as the protectors of Balkan Christians who suffered under Muslim rule.\textsuperscript{37} The Tanzimat policies, the escalating tensions, and the international interventions converged on religion as ‘the only viable marker of political reform and the only authentic basis for political claims’ for the local Ottoman communities.\textsuperscript{38}

These historical developments are significant because they undermine the straightforward narrative that views the endurance of ethno-confessional affiliations
in the Balkans – particularly Muslim – Christian antagonism – as a consequence stemming almost exclusively from the Ottoman discrimination against non-Muslims. The religious overtones of the ‘native Christian vs. alien Muslim’ dichotomy actually derived from several complex processes that involved the Ottoman authorities, the Western European diplomats, and the diverse local actors over the course of the nineteenth century. These decisive developments continued to be transformed and in part reinforced by later twentieth-century developments. Today, however, much of that historical background has been reduced to simple narratives that usually either condemn the Ottoman past for fostering lethal religious divisions, or occasionally uphold it as a harmonious model of multiethnic tolerance.

To move beyond such one-dimensional depictions, Maria Todorova urged scholars to consider several strategies, among them:

the important question of possible *counterperceptions* or alternative perceptions coming from different ethnic, social, or age groups within the separate nation-states. That there have been no systematic studies in this respect whatsoever is an indirect indication of the strength of the hegemonic [nationalist] view.

In effect, these alternative perspectives could constitute what Dipesh Chakrabarty called ‘minority histories’, ‘histories of previously excluded groups’ or more generally ‘all those pasts on whose behalf’ democratically minded historians have fought off the exclusions and omissions of mainstream narratives of the nation. They do not necessarily produce accounts that supplant the existing narratives, but such ‘minority histories’ are ‘begun in an oppositional mode’ that has the potential ‘to enrich the subject of history and make it more representative of society as a whole’. In the following section, I sketch three attempts aimed at re-evaluating certain aspects of the Ottoman past. Centred on creative reclamations of Ottoman literature, music, and architecture, these fields have the potential to be transformed from ‘minority histories’ into ‘good histories’ that open vital new perspectives. However, as I will try to suggest, they also tend to recast, albeit in different ways, certain conventional tropes adopted from the dominant nationalist narrative.

Because the long period of Ottoman rule ended in different ways and time spans across south-eastern Europe since the early nineteenth century, it is important to carefully set the historical context in which post-Ottoman interpretations of the Ottoman past emerged and developed. Among several Balkan regions that witnessed the collapse of the Porte’s control in 1878 was Bosnia, a province that had been a part of the Ottoman Empire since the late fifteenth century. The dissolution of Ottoman rule marked a sharp break in the province’s political life; as decreed by the Treaty of Berlin, Bosnia came under the jurisdiction of the Habsburg Empire and remained within Austria-Hungary until 1918. The Austro-Hungarian and the royal Yugoslav period that followed (1918–41) offered the first chances for Bosnian and Yugoslav public figures to reflect on the end of the long Ottoman era, to articulate new attitudes, and formulate new perceptions of what constituted the Ottoman past and legacy in that region.
The most evident feature of the initial post-Ottoman reflections on the Ottoman legacy in Bosnia is the continuity of the Serb and Croat stances that condemned and rejected ‘the Turkish yoke’ throughout the last decades of Ottoman rule. Given the immense hardships of the last Ottoman decades, the end of rule from Istanbul was for many in Bosnia a welcome and much-anticipated development. Bosnian writers like Antun Knežević (1834–89) and Vaso Pelagić (1838–99) – both of whom were political activists under and against ‘the Turkish yoke’ – continued to write about the Ottoman period as an era marked first and foremost by Muslim abuses of Christians. Many Serb public figures in particular encouraged the view that ‘the Turks’ were largely responsible for the cultural, political, and economic ‘backwardness’ of the Balkan nations. Within such narratives, Bosnian Muslims figured as a problematic legacy of the Ottoman rule, a community inextricably associated with the ‘alien Islamic’ structures yet intimately integrated into the Serbo-Croatian political and social spaces because of the shared South Slavic language and ‘ethnic origin’.

It is against such widespread Serbo-Croatian perceptions that Bosnian Muslim intellectuals began to re-assess their own culture and heritage in relation to their Ottoman past. With the collapse of Ottoman rule in 1878, a period of crisis ensued during which thousands of Bosnian Muslims, rather than face an uncertain future under the Habsburg occupation, emigrated to other parts of the Ottoman Empire. The vast majority stayed, however, and thanks to a complex series of political arrangements, maintained considerable social privileges under the Austro-Hungarian rule. Among the first Bosnian Muslims to carve out new political spaces within the post-Ottoman circumstances was Mehmed Kapetanović-Ljubušak (1839–1902), a wealthy notable who participated in Habsburg administrative structures and also started a number of cultural projects in publishing and education. One of his first interventions that defined his stance toward the Ottoman past came in 1886 in response to an anonymous polemical pamphlet predicting that Bosnian Muslims had no real future in Austria-Hungary since they were a ‘conservative’ element that either belonged to ‘Muslim Turkey’ or had to assimilate into Serbs, Croats, and other Christian South Slavs. Kapetanović’s passionate retort disputed those charges and marked a radical break with the Ottoman past: ‘In the past two centuries, everything that Turkey lost and everything that was taken from it, the Porte never did and never will regain.’ Bosnia, therefore, ‘can be everything, but can never be Turkish’. Irrevocably severed from the Ottoman past, Bosnian Muslims only had a future in the modern, Austro-Hungarian age that had just begun, Kapetanović argued. Yet as Kapetanović’s activities soon demonstrated, that future had to be forged by recovering certain ‘essential’ Bosnian Muslim traditions from the Ottoman past and fusing them with the ‘progressive’ Austro-Hungarian structures. Like the earlier Romantic nationalists of the nineteenth century, Kapetanović embarked on quasi-ethnographic projects to collect Bosnian Muslim folk epics, stories, proverbs, and songs that he compiled into his collections of *Folk* and *Eastern Treasures*.

Other Bosnian Muslim writers continued intensive work on the romanticization of the Ottoman period as a way of reclaiming Bosnian Muslim cultural traditions while inserting them within the Austro-Hungarian and Yugoslav political frameworks. Safvet Bašagić (1870–1934), a Bosnian Muslim scholar and publicist, figured especially prominently in these activities. Having studied Bosnian folk poetry while
also completing a doctorate in ‘Islamic sciences’ in Vienna at the turn of the century, he felt that he was well positioned to light ‘the old pride in the hearts of our young generation, urging it to seek after Eastern and Western education and to contribute something to the progress of our homeland’. The precondition to this fusion of ‘Eastern and Western’ learning, Bašagić insisted, would be the recovery of the Ottoman era as a ‘glorious epoch’ when Bosnian Muslim poets and philosophers bequeathed their works to ‘the Eastern Parnassus’. By establishing a canonical succession of Bosnian Muslim authors who became renowned Ottoman figures writing in the Arabic, Persian, Turkish and Slavic languages, Bašagić hoped to show how Bosnian Muslims were able to fuse the best of ‘the Oriental traditions’ with ‘folk poetry ... of the homeland’ during the Ottoman period.49

Once again, however, the immediate motivation for the urgent recovery of this heritage stemmed from the bitter Serbo-Croatian polemics about the ‘national character’ of the Bosnian Muslims. Having faced frequent Serb nationalist charges against the fanaticism of ‘the Turks’ and their ‘Oriental’ inability to accept change, Bašagić resolved ‘to say to certain people, to get out of their heads the usual prejudices that our fathers were unfamiliar with culture. They accomplished, I can freely say, in the field of Eastern scholarship as much as our neighbours did for Western learning’.50 Here, the driving force of this argument is clearly defensive; like Kapetanović before him, Bašagić felt that he had to respond to those who disparaged ‘the Turks’ and Muslims in general by compiling traditions and accomplishments that apparently proved just how cultured the Bosnian Muslims really were. However, the initially defensive, self-justifying stance also provided the impetus for a forceful appropriation of the Ottoman past and legacy as an exclusively Bosnian Muslim concern not shared by the Serbs or Croats. Precisely because Serb and Croat nationalists had already drawn lines around the Ottoman heritage and abandoned it as a barren time of foreign oppression, Bosnian Muslim intellectuals could relatively easily assert themselves as the inheritors of a great civilization and the leading guardians of the Ottoman legacy in the modern Balkans. This process required first a certain distancing from the Ottoman past, an acknowledgment that the Ottoman era was over and that new circumstances had already surpassed the imperial past. This suitably distant age could then be presented as a glorious heyday of cultural achievement – especially in poetry – that should be retrieved and cherished as ‘essential’ accomplishments of ‘the Bosnian Muslim people’. Finally, the recovered ‘old treasures’ had to be juxtaposed with the demands of the ‘modern age’ in order to establish a politically useful tension between two mutually defining poles (East and West, tradition and modernity) that could be inflected in various ways to support a number of political demands (religious autonomy, educational policies, institutional representation, and so on). In other words, all these activities required what historians of nationalism had long observed and analysed: the sustained efforts of various public figures to map out and gain control over the ‘inner domain of national culture’ within which new national agendas could be articulated and advanced.51

In that respect, the post-Ottoman Bosnian Muslim efforts to valorize the Ottoman past are parts of a nationalist project that is similar in discursive and narrative tropes (glorious age, folk wisdom, historical continuity) to the Serb and Croat national movements – so why should we regard these views as a ‘counterperception’ of...
Ottoman legacy? Even though it is structurally similar to the neighbouring Serb and Croat national movements, Bosnian Muslim nationalism departs from the familiar patterns in its sustained attempts to literally counter the condemnations of the Ottoman past with its own narratives about a glorious Ottoman civilization. Indeed, Bosnian Muslim nationalism remains one of very few political movements that have consistently advanced such evaluations of the Ottoman legacy; if we keep in mind the rejection of the Ottoman past by the Kemalist Turkish and most Arab nationalist movements, then the Bosnian Muslim reclamation of the Ottoman heritage stands out as remarkably atypical in the entire post-Ottoman political space. It produced a narrative that romanticized and valorized the much-maligned Ottoman legacy and constructed a particular version of the Ottoman past which was for many Bosnian Muslim intellectuals not only ‘a position from which to speak, but...also an absolutely necessary resource in what one has to say’. In other words, the Bosnian Muslim perception of Ottoman legacy worked in familiar cultural patterns that tend to reify identity as ‘a kind of fixed point in thought and being, a ground of action, a still point in the turning world’, as Stuart Hall put it.

Shortly after Bašagić began to map out and claim the Ottoman past as a glorious epoch for Bosnian Muslims, a different young scholar – Vladimir Dvorniković (1888–1956) – discovered in the Ottoman past a bridge to creative cultural influences that nurtured ‘the psychological character’ of the Yugoslav nation. A writer and publicist who lived and worked in Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia, Dvorniković found his intellectual calling in the burgeoning field of psychology and his political inspiration in the Yugoslav movement that sought to unite all South Slavs in one state. When the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was formed in the wake the First World War, Dvorniković, clearly influenced by the then popular theories about ‘racial types’, set out to analyse ‘the ethnic character’ of the new Yugoslav nation. After compiling a rambling series of absurd assumptions about ‘ethnic types’, he finally concluded that the South Slavs were a brooding, wistful people who were unlike the other (presumably happier) European ‘nations’. First with ‘the Orientalizing epoch of Byzantium’ and then with ‘the Orientalizing epoch of Asia’, the course of South Slavic history only accentuated the creative but inherently melancholy spirit of the Yugoslavs. Thus framed, the Ottomans may still remain ‘the worst representatives of the Orient, culturally unoriginal’, but they nonetheless formed an invaluable ‘bridge’ to the richness of ‘the East’, which allegedly provided the right kind of environment for South Slavic expression in art, craft, literature, and music. During the Ottoman period, according to Dvorniković, ‘it is as if our [Yugoslav] people felt at home with the spirit of Turkishness and Orientalness’.

In Dvorniković’s interpretation, an area of especially intense Yugoslav – Turkish convergence emerged in the soulful and sensual expressions of ballads, in the ‘passionate and mystically-exalted eroticism of Oriental music’ that ‘most characteristically’ manifested itself in the genre of sevdah, or love songs of Bosnia, Serbia, and Macedonia. Sevdah is often said to have gradually developed during the Ottoman period as the urban musical tradition usually performed by a lone (usually male) singer playing the lute-like, long-necked string instrument called the saz. It was redefined as a distinct South Slavic genre, however, only during the nineteenth century when various ethnographers started to collect and codify oral literature and vernacular music across the Balkans. Since then, the tradition of sevdah music has
been usually described as a fusion of Turkish, Slavic, Sephardi, Arabic, and Persian influences that resulted in music characterized by the use of ‘Oriental’ instruments, the presence of Turkish-derived vocabulary in the texts of the sevdalinke, and the melancholy mood of love and sorrow. By Dvorniković’s time, it became commonplace to characterize sevdah as ‘a product of deep Slavic sentimentality and strong Oriental erotic charge’, as one observer put it in the 1930s. Here the Ottoman presence in the Balkans became associated with feminine as well as masculine sensuality, seduction, and creativity, which presents a marked departure from the familiar Serb and Croat nationalist images focusing overwhelmingly on Turkish (and decidedly male) brutality, coercion, and ultimate sterility. The perceived encounter between the Yugoslav melancholy and the Oriental sensuality thus formed an openly eroticized convergence that recast – but nonetheless partly repeated – the underlying ‘native and foreigner’ dichotomy as a peculiar historical fusion that left a positive legacy for the Yugoslav peoples.

Though clearly tinged with stereotypes about the Orient as a realm of irrepressible and often feminized sexuality, the works of Dvorniković and other early twentieth-century figures nonetheless helped open up new dimensions of cultural analysis that took seriously the questions of gender, sociability, difference, and identity in their explorations of music, popular customs, and political currents. Within this Balkan context, the geographer Jovan Cvijić still remains well known for his facile but influential descriptions of ‘the Dinaric type’, but hundreds more also turned to the study of culture in innovative ways that emphasized the disparate historical and social influences in a dizzying array of local practices, as in the works of Jelica Belović-Bernadzikowska and Milenko S. Filipović. With such a background in mind, we might begin to situate Dvorniković’s writings on the Ottoman legacy not as negligible exceptions to the dominant views, but rather as parts of the thriving intellectual exchanges of the first half of the twentieth century in the Balkans. Indeed, the entire post-Ottoman period across the Balkans is rife with similar transnational developments that could shed new light on different visions of the Ottoman legacy, be it in re-evaluation of evolving gender roles, spaces of sociability, or diverse cross-cultural influences in regions like Greece, Macedonia, Kosovo, Albania and among the Roma, Muslim, and Sephardi communities. The sevdah tradition in Yugoslavia, for example, was vigorously and creatively reappropriated in socialist Yugoslavia of the 1950s and 1960s, especially by singers like Zaim Imamović and Nada Mamula and musicians like Jovica Petković and Jozo Penava; furthermore, it continues to be a rich source of inspiration for new generations of contemporary musicians who continue to reinterpret the standards of this genre.

But for a variety of reasons, such approaches have often been overshadowed by more dominant political events and eventually relegated to seldom-consulted archives and publications. Dvorniković, for example, was one of the more prominent intellectual figures of the interwar period in Yugoslavia, yet after the establishment of communism, his interpretations of Yugoslavism were deemed unsuitable for the new socialist ideology. After 1945, in the place of the earlier theories about the South Slavic melancholy came socialist narratives stressing class struggle, industrial progress, and the ‘brotherhood and unity’ of Yugoslav peoples.

In the socialist narratives, the Ottoman past became a field where new social scientists could evaluate phenomena like peasant rebellions or trading patterns as
possible deterrence (or rarely catalysts) of social consciousness and economic progress. For instance, the Yugoslav Marxist historiography, even though it tended to regard nationalism as a misguided concern that detracted from the real political struggles, nonetheless endorsed a historical trajectory that in many ways reproduced the image of the Ottoman Empire as ‘the quintessential inhibitor’; whereas the nationalists accused the Turks of stifling national self-expression, the communists disparaged the Ottoman rule for its religious conservatism, political rigidity, and economic backwardness. Quite clearly, the legacy of such an empire could only hold back the progress of a modern socialist state. Indeed, in regard to architecture, the Ottoman legacy ‘remained associated with foreign rule and Islam’ in the early years of Yugoslav socialism. Moreover, the restoration of prominent Ottoman buildings ‘could be interpreted as a threat to the Catholic and Orthodox populations’.

For those reasons, the Ottoman-era market district (Baščaršija) of Sarajevo faced plans for gradual demolition in the late 1940s. However, the Communist Party’s reconsideration of its policies toward ‘nations and nationalities’ of Yugoslavia in the 1950s and 1960s helped open the way for a reassessment of the Ottoman heritage.

In fact, socialist Yugoslav urban planners did not dismantle Sarajevo’s Ottoman market district, but rather preserved and redeveloped it. Through the assiduous work of architects like Juraj Neidhardt (1901–79) and Dušan Grabrijan (1899–1952), new visions of the Ottoman heritage were articulated in terms that reconciled the ‘foreign and reactionary’ elements of Ottoman architecture with the demands of the modern socialist Yugoslav society. Neidhardt in particular argued that during the Ottoman rule in Bosnia, ‘Oriental architecture…was not simply brought here, but grew out of our people and our soil’. A vernacular ‘Bosnian Oriental’ architectural tradition thus emerged as a distinctive melding of Slavic and Turkish cultures. Not only was this form a product of local creativity, he contended, but it was also secular and, in its functional aspects, analogous to modernist architecture since it shared its concerns with fostering the residential right to a view, flexible use of space, ‘light furniture, open relationship to nature, as well as the use of local materials and the application of traditional building techniques’. Neidhardt was certainly not the first to express such sentiments about the harmony between ‘Oriental’ and ‘modern’ ways of social organization. In the interwar period, the Sephardi Bosnian writer Laura Papo Bohoreta praised the versatile simplicity of Ottoman-era households, buildings, and decorative designs, lamenting that ‘the Jewish woman’ of the 1930s has hastily abandoned that heritage and ‘embraced that which is modern, while the most modern return to that which is age-old and Oriental’.

Neidhardt, however, drew on the precedents set by his mentor, the extraordinarily influential and prolific architect Le Corbusier, whose writings about the Balkans and ‘the Orient’ emphasized the vernacular as an indispensable source for the development of modernism. In Neidhardt’s interpretation, then, it would be desirable to incorporate ‘the Bosnian Oriental house’ into modern socialist housing and to reorganize Ottoman-era districts like Baščaršija into ‘cultural centres’ that enhanced the modernization of Yugoslav cities. In such a worldview, the Ottoman heritage no longer stood for foreign rule or dominance of religion in social life, but for secular concerns with functional urban life, vernacular culture, and pragmatism in residential architecture. Neidhardt’s and Grabrijan’s interventions and widely
published views of the 1950s and 1960s thus reinterpreted the Ottoman legacy as a valuable tradition that complemented, not contradicted, Yugoslav socialism and its modernist project.

This socialist reinterpretation of Ottoman legacy largely vanished with the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia that followed. The series of wars in the 1990s aggressively established a number of mutually opposing ‘national hate narratives’ across the former Yugoslav republics that overshadowed contributions by such diverse figures as Neidhardt or Dvorniković and instead enforced harsh dichotomies that appear to pit ‘Serbs’ against ‘Turks’, ‘Christians’ against ‘Muslims’. As the preceding discussion has argued, such nationalist narratives and the accompanying stereotypes have a long history that stretches back well into the nineteenth century. The vicious resurgence of nationalism at the end of the twentieth century underscores Todorova’s point about ‘the amazing continuity’ of the conventional images of the Ottoman past in the Balkans and prompts the question: Why do the nationalist tropes so tirelessly persist even today?

To suggest ways of answering and going beyond this question, I turn to one of the most enduring images of Ottoman legacy: that of ‘the ruins of the Ottoman Empire’. In contemporary journalistic reports and academic works, it is common to refer to a number of nations – Iraq, Serbia, Turkey, Bosnia, Greece, Lebanon, Macedonia – as having risen out of ‘the ruins of the Ottoman Empire’ at some point in their history. Today, this stock phrase is widely used to sum up the historical background of many modern nations and express it in the imagery of Ottoman ruins, of dilapidated structures crumbling before the emergence of vigorous (if unstable) modern political entities. In other words, today it is a well-rehearsed, familiar and conventional trope casually repeated in countless newspapers articles, scholarly works, online discussions, and so on.

But some 200 years ago, the political imagination needed to envision the mighty Ottoman Empire in ruins – and a different world rising out of the old – doubtless felt new and revolutionary. Far from connoting an outworn idea, in the nineteenth century the vision of a vast and unjust empire crumbling away before the political will of the native nations was immensely powerful and profoundly moving. At the time, it was cast in terms that depicted the rising peoples as ‘Christians’ freeing themselves of Ottoman rule. As the already-mentioned 1854 New York Times editorial on ‘The Future of Turkey’ forcefully put it, ‘a new power ...is only to be constructed from the present Christian population of European Turkey, and must be founded upon the ruins of the Ottoman Empire’.

Some observers still see this nineteenth-century teleology of struggle and progress as a relevant political framework for the Balkans in the twenty-first century, despite the fact that the Ottoman Empire ceased to exist almost 100 years ago. Writing in The New York Review of Books in 2000, Timothy Garton Ash reflected on the toppling of Slobodan Milošević as ‘the last revolution’ that not only concluded the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, but that also signified ‘the end of an even longer and larger story: the two-centuries-old, delayed, and long-interrupted process of the formation of modern European nation-states out of the ruins of the Ottoman
Empire’. In an uncanny (and unintended) reiteration of the 1854 phrasing, Ash recasts ‘the Christian population of European Turkey’ in secular terms as a collective of ‘modern European nation-states’. But whether in 1854 or in 2000, the process of construction of ‘the new power’ in the Balkans is perceived as still emerging, still unfolding against the same unchanging scenery: ‘the ruins of the Ottoman Empire’.

Many intellectuals have also endorsed this nation-centred historical trajectory. Regardless of the criticisms of nationalism as an invented, exclusionary and often violent political ideology, numerous scholars both in and outside of the Balkans feel they have no alternative but to accept the nationalist projects as ‘realistic’ political forces that are the unstoppable makers of Balkan history. Despite all reservations, then, a peculiar liberal-nationalist narrative is reasserted. It once again retains ‘the ruins of the Ottoman Empire’ as a dramatic backdrop for what appears to be the true subject of Balkan history: the fumbling emergence, the recurring crises and the ultimate advancement of new nation-states toward future contentment and peace in the family of other democratic European nations.

Yet the ruins themselves offer clues that undermine this generally optimistic reading of post-Ottoman history. In the first place, there are not only ‘ruins’ in the largely figurative sense of the fragments of a decaying political structure that disappeared over the course of modern history. There are also ‘ruins’ in a more literal and more unsettling sense, as in the scattered heaps of rubble left behind the burnt houses or deliberately targeted Ottoman-era bridges, mosques, churches, graveyards, and other sites across the Balkans. The nationalist destruction of the Ottoman architectural heritage in Bosnia and Kosovo during the 1990s worked in large part precisely to reduce the standing Ottoman structures to piles of debris that could be bulldozed and cleared away. To imagine the hopeful ‘formation of modern European nation-states out of the ruins of the Ottoman Empire’ in that sense evokes sites like Mostar, Foca, and Banja Luka in the 1990s, profoundly devastated sites that expose a disturbing underside of the liberal narrative endorsing the inevitable progress and the democratic potential of new nation-states.

The other disquieting connotation of ‘ruins’ offers a chance to reflect on certain limits that circumscribe human lives and accomplishments. The figure of the ruins here could function as a reminder that all material structures as well as political systems at some point disintegrate or wither away, or are largely dismantled, or reformed, or built into different networks, or are abandoned, or preserved as fragmentary remnants of long-gone times. Today, many decades after the Ottoman Empire collapsed, it is easy to speak of Ottoman ruins in any of those overlapping senses because we are aware that this Empire is indeed dead. But if we invert Ash’s phrasing and attempt to envision a radically different political constellation rising out ‘the ruins of modern European nation-states’, we will most likely discover that it is extremely difficult to conceive of such a future. Asking about expectations beyond the nation-state, beyond the networks like the European Union, or beyond the vague endorsements of globalization (all of which are already established projects) requires a different kind of political imagination, one that denormalizes the nation as a ‘natural’ unit of humanity and instead views it as one of many transitory forms of human political organization. Here I suggest the effort of imagining different futures as an attempt to generate a critical distance from the ideological frameworks of our time that have reproduced only certain conceptions of the Ottoman past.
By unsettling our own positions, we may still be able to retrieve from the site of ruins more than discarded material that serves as a backdrop to the triumphant present; we may begin to glimpse those fleeting images, voices, and insights that enrich and enter into dialogue with our own contemporary experiences. It is certainly possible to delve into the Ottoman past in such a way; indeed, as Hannah Arendt reminds us, ‘it could be that only now’, well after radical ruptures with tradition, that ‘the past will open up to us with unexpected freshness and tell us things that no one has yet had ears to hear’.  

Notes

16. For two fascinating accounts of the expulsion of ‘the Turks’ from Serbia, see: B. Rašid, Tarib-i vak’a-i hayrettâma Belgrad ve Sürbistan (Istanbul, 1291/1874); J. Dimitrijević, Pisma iz Niša o haremima (Belgrade: Parna radikalna štampanja, 1897).
21. The dissertation was originally written in German at the University of Graz; it appeared in English as *The Development of Spiritual Life in Bosnia under the Influence of Turkish Rule*, trans. Z.B. Juričić and J.F. Loud (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990).
24. For similar statements about how ‘the Ottoman Empire, completely alien to its European subjects in origin, tradition and religion, . . . brought them nothing but a degrading foreign dominance’, see the remarks by Oskar Halecki and others quoted in Mazower, *The Balkans*, pp.xl–xli.
27. For one of many similar instances, see the reports regarding a village near Trebinje; Austrian State Archive, Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Politisches Archiv XXXVIII, Box 132, folder Mostar: Report No.26, 4 Aug. 1859; Report No.27, 13 Aug. 1859; and Report No.29, 7 Sept. 1859.
28. For one of many similar instances, see the reports regarding a village near Trebinje; Austrian State Archive, Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Politisches Archiv XXXVIII, Box 132, folder Mostar: Report No.26, 4 Aug. 1859; Report No.27, 13 Aug. 1859; and Report No.29, 7 Sept. 1859.
35. For one of many similar instances, see the reports regarding a village near Trebinje; Austrian State Archive, Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Politisches Archiv XXXVIII, Box 132, folder Mostar: Report No.26, 4 Aug. 1859; Report No.27, 13 Aug. 1859; and Report No.29, 7 Sept. 1859.
46. M. Kapetanović-Ljubušak, Što misle muhamedanci u Bosni (Sarajevo: Spindler & Löschner, 1886), pp.5–6.
47. M. Kapetanović-Ljubušak, Istočno blago (Sarajevo: Spindler & Löschner, 1896); also Narodno blago (Sarajevo: Zemaljska štamparija, 1887).
49. In a gesture illustrative of his efforts to fuse ‘Eastern and Western learning’, Bašagić left his rich collection of Islamic and Ottoman manuscripts not to Istanbul or Cairo, but to a large Central European library; see the UNESCO-registered collection: http://sigma.ulib.sk/digi/Basagic/start.htm at the University Library of Bratislava, Special Collections Department, the Bašagić Collection of Islamic Manuscripts.
54. Vladimir Đvorniković wrote a great number of pieces from 1910 to 1940, but his crowning work is the massive Karakterologija Jugoslavona (Beograd: Kosmos, 1939).
56. ‘Našem narodu kao da je to turstvo i orijentalstvo po duhu svome prijalo’; in ibid., pp.44–48.
58. H. Kadragić, Umjetnička vrijednost bosansko-hercegovačke sevdaline (Sarajevo: Omer Šehić, 1933), pp.6–7; also see M.S. Popović-Rodoljub, Srpske sevdaline (Pančevo: Braco Jovanović, 1892).
59. For a start, see J. Belošević, Das Liebesleben auf dem Balkan (Dresden: P. Aretz, 1927); M.S. Filipović and E. Hammel, Among the People: Native Yugoslav Ethnology: Selected Writings of Milenko S. Filipović (Ann Arbor: Michigan Slavic Populations, 1982).
61. I thank Damir Imamović and Farah Tahirbegović for compelling me to rethink sevdah; see their Pjesma srca moga: stotinu najljepših pjesama Zaima Imamovića (Sarajevo: Buybook, 2004).


69. As of December 2007, a simple search for the phrase in scholar.google.com returned over 110 records just from recent academic books and journals.


73. Arendt, p.94.