The Constitutionality of School Corporal Punishment of Children as a Betrayal of Brown v. Board of Education

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I. INTRODUCTION

American judicial history, like any institutional history, has had its shameful moments and its glorious ones, with plenty in-between. Some of the worst and best of these decisions have concerned race relations. Consider such low points for the United States Supreme Court as Dred Scott v. Sanford1 and the Japanese-American restriction cases.2 The former, among other things, essentially upheld slavery as constitutional3 while the latter upheld the constitutionality of the mass internment of and curfew imposed upon persons of Japanese ancestry who lived on the West Coast during World War II.4 Even taking into account that these decisions were creatures of other, more backward eras, their

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2. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (affirming the United States war power right to exclude persons of Japanese ancestry from military areas); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (upholding curfew restrictions against persons of Japanese ancestry in military areas).
3. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 404-05, 411, 425-27, 450-51 (ruling that descendants of American slaves were neither “citizens” nor “persons” within the meaning of the Constitution and that when Congress outlawed slavery in federal territory, the result was a deprivation of slaveholders’ “property” under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment). The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution subsequently nullified Dred Scott’s rulings with respect to slavery. The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits slavery in the United States. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment states that any person born or naturalized in the United States is a citizen of the United States. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217–19 (upholding the constitutionality of exclusion of persons of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast regardless of their individual loyalty to the United States during World War II); Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 93–102 (upholding the constitutionality of curfews imposed upon persons of Japanese ancestry residing on the West Coast regardless of individual loyalty to the United States during World War II). But see Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 297, 300-04 (1944) (holding that the War Relocation Authority had no authority to subject a person of Japanese ancestry, who was undisputedly loyal to the United States during World War II, to its procedure for obtaining leave from internment).
remembrance is still enough to make one wince. \(^5\)

_Brown v. Board of Education\(^6\) ("Brown I") is, in my opinion, one of the United States Supreme Court’s redeeming glorious moments. The holding, stripped to its barest essentials, is that _de jure_ racial segregation of students in public elementary and secondary schools inherently violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. \(^7\) In so ruling, the Court effectively repudiated its own long-held doctrine, previously articulated in _Plessy v. Ferguson_, \(^8\) that so-called separate but equal facilities for Whites and Blacks are constitutional. \(^9\) The Court not only halted its own retrogressive momentum, but it also put itself in the vanguard of the nascent struggle for civil rights in a nation that was badly divided on the issue. \(^10\) For among Whites at that time, the dominant sentiments toward racial segregation were represented by apathy in the North and sympathy in the South. \(^11\)

The story surrounding how _Brown I_ came to be and how it has been implemented is, however, somewhat less glorious than the landmark

\(^5\) See Christopher L. Eisgruber, _The Story of Dred Scott: Originalism's Forgotten Past_, in _CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES_ 151, 151 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004) [hereinafter _CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES_] (describing the _Dred Scott_ Court’s conclusions as sullying “the Court’s reputation” and labeling them “a disaster”); Neil Gotanda, _The Story of Korematsu: The Japanese-American Cases_, in _CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES_ 249, 257 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004) (observing that the military’s internment of persons of Japanese ancestry, upheld by the United States Supreme Court in _Korematsu_, was “racist”).

\(^6\) _Brown v. Board of Education_, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) [hereinafter _Brown I_].

\(^7\) _Id._ at 495. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” _U.S. CONST._ amend. XIV, § 1.

\(^8\) _Plessy v. Ferguson_, 163 U.S. 537, 548–49, 552 (1896) (upholding under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment Louisiana’s racial segregation of railroad passengers on the theory that the facilities could be separate for the races and, at the same time, equal).

\(^9\) _Brown I_ did not expressly overrule _Plessy_, but its effect in the educational context was much the same as if it had done so. See 3 _RONALD ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK_, _TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE_ § 18.8, at 331 (3d ed. 1999).

\(^10\) See JAMES T. PATTERTON, _BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY_ 6–7 (2001) (describing the late 1940s and early 1950s as the beginnings of the full-fledged civil rights movement of later years); see also Nathaniel R. Jones, _The Harlan Dissent: The Road Not Taken—An American Tragedy_, 12 _GA. ST. U. L. REV._ 951, 959 (1996) (remarking that in the 1930s and 1940s the civil rights movement mostly took the form of litigation undermining _Plessy_, thus reflecting discontent among Blacks well before the 1950s when the civil rights movement began to burgeon).

\(^11\) See PATTERTON, _supra_ note 10, at 7–8 (describing how public opinion polls from the 1950s revealed increasing support from northern Whites for liberal policies concerning race, but that advocates had trouble “arousing active backing from White Northerners”); see also ROBERT A. LEFLAR & WYLYE H. DAVIS, _SEGREGATION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS—1953_, 67 _HARV. L. REV._ 377, 421 (1954) (describing the majority of the residents of southern states as favoring racial segregation of the schools in the early 1950s).
decision itself. In 1952, the Supreme Court was first presented with the prospect of ruling on the constitutionality of cases that came to comprise Brown I.\textsuperscript{12} Evidence suggests that the Vinson Court, so divided on so many issues in 1952, was likely to bring further divisiveness to deciding the constitutionality of public school racial segregation.\textsuperscript{13} The Court delayed before ordering rehearings of the cases in 1953.\textsuperscript{14} Nevertheless, political events were weighing on the Court to get the cases decided and decided the right way. On the domestic front, the Court faced the beginnings of a more vocal and restive civil rights movement in the Black community.\textsuperscript{15} Additionally, considerable international embarrassment arose from tolerating legalized racial segregation on American soil after fighting racially supremacist, anti-semitic Nazis and prosecuting them at Nuremberg.\textsuperscript{16} In other words, the Court, rather than leaping at the chance to lead, rather gingerly found its way into forging a more enlightened chapter of race relations in the education context.

The saga of Brown I’s implementation has been, in my opinion, even more disappointing than the story of its genesis. Although in the remedial phase of the litigation, Brown v. Board of Education\textsuperscript{17} ("Brown II"), the Court remanded to the district courts and directed

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{12} PATTERSON, supra note 10, at 45–46, 52.
\item \textsuperscript{13} See id. at 54-56 (discussing individual justices and their divergent views in the 1950s); See also Daniel Gyebi, A Tribute to Courage on the Fortieth Anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education, 38 HOW. L.J. 23, 37 n.83 (1994) (noting the 5–4 Supreme Court split led by Chief Justice Vinson in favor of upholding segregation); Mark Tushnet & Katya Lexin, What Really Happened in Brown v. Board of Education, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1870–72 (1991) (discussing Chief Justice Vinson’s inability to lead or unify the Supreme Court).
\item \textsuperscript{14} PATTERSON, supra note 10, at 57 (discussing that the reason for a scheduled re-hearing in June 1953 was so that Supreme Court Justices, notably Justice Frankfurter, could reflect on the intent of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment concerning schools); Tushnet & Lexin, supra note 13, at 1872, 1908–09.
\item \textsuperscript{15} PATTERSON, supra note 10, at 56; See also Michael J. Klarman, Twentieth-Century Constitutional History: Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7, 14, 16–21 (1994); Derrick A. Bell, Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 524–25 (1980).
\item \textsuperscript{16} See PATTERSON, supra note 10, at 56 (discussing that racial segregation in the United States made the “Jim Crow America vulnerable to the charge of hypocrisy when it claimed to lead the Free World”); Steve Bachmann, Rights on Trial, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1608 (1984) (book review) (discussing the conflict in the mid-1950s between the United States’s role as “leader of the free world” and the apparent lack of freedom for segregated Black people in the South); Bert B. Lockwood, Jr., The United Nations Charter and United States Civil Rights Litigation, 69 IOWA L. REV. 901, 941 (1984) (quoting from the government’s brief in Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950), “[o]ur position and standing before the critical bar of world opinion are weakened if segregation not only is practiced in this country but also is condoned by federal law”).
\item \textsuperscript{17} Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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them to take measures so that petitioners could, with “all deliberate speed,” be admitted on a racially non-discriminatory basis to the schools involved, the parties to many subsequent school desegregation cases hardly took this standard to heart. The law books are littered with court decisions mandating grossly recalcitrant school boards to implement Brown I. Some of the court decisions themselves arguably impeded progress by declining to order more thorough-going remedial measures. But that is another topic for another scholar on another day.

I merely raise this context to show that there has been no shortage of obstacles to Brown I’s development, even when it was only a gleam in Thurgood Marshall’s eye. Now, some obstacles are intentionally created and some are unwittingly created. Many of the obstacles referenced above seem to belong in the intentional category. This article will focus from here, however, on a roadblock of the unwitting variety.

II. INGRAHAM V. WRIGHT

The particular impediment to Brown I’s effectuation that I wish to address is Ingraham v. Wright, a 1977 Supreme Court decision that, on its face, has absolutely nothing to do with racial integration or

18. Id. at 301.
harmony. In this case, petitioners James Ingraham and Roosevelt Andrews were students at a public junior high school in Florida. The state of Florida at that time had a statute permitting corporal punishment in schools as long as it was not “degrading or unduly severe” or was not administered without consulting the principal. Because he did not follow his teacher’s directions with the desired alacrity, Ingraham received more than twenty licks with a paddle on his clothed buttocks while being pinned to a table in the principal’s office. As a result, he developed a hematoma requiring medical intervention and necessitating his absence from school for several days. Andrews was also paddled several times, sometimes on his arms, for minor violations of school rules. In one of these disciplinary sessions, he was hit so hard that he lost the full use of his arm for a week. The paddle, by the way, was a flat, wooden affair approximately two feet long, three to four inches wide, and one-half inch thick.

The Supreme Court agreed to hear two of petitioners’ claims in the ensuing suit. The first claim was that corporal punishment of public school students as a disciplinary technique constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution. The second claim was that administering such punishment without first giving students notice and an opportunity to be heard violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court rejected both claims.

For purposes of making the argument that the Ingraham ruling betrayed the promise of Brown I, it is necessary only to focus on the

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22. Id. at 653.
23. Id. at 657 n.6 (quoting Florida’s statute, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 232.27 (1961), as of the 1970–71 academic year, governing corporal punishment in the schools).
24. See id. at 657 (holding that “school authorities viewed corporal punishment as a less drastic means of discipline than suspension or expulsion”).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 656.
29. See id. at 658–59 (discussing that one count was a class action, while the other counts were individual damages actions concerning the Eighth Amendment). Petitioners’ other claim was that public school corporal punishment is a substantive due process violation. See id. at 659 n.12 (denying the review of the third question presented in the petition for certiorari: “Is the infliction of severe corporal punishment upon public students arbitrary, capricious and unrelated to achieving any legitimate educational purpose and therefore violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?”).
30. Id. at 659–60.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 671, 682.
Ingraham Court’s treatment of the Eighth Amendment issue. That Amendment provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”33 The Court essentially had one rationale for its disposition of the Eighth Amendment issue. However, before explaining that rationale, the Court seemingly strayed into a survey of “traditional common-law concepts” and “the ‘attitude(s) which our society has traditionally taken’” towards corporal punishment of children in school.34 The Court found the practice to be deeply entrenched in our history, dating back to the colonial period and continuing in most parts of the United States right up until the Ingraham opinion.35 Acknowledging that professional as well as popular opinion had been at odds for over a century on the advisability of such punishment,36 the Court concluded that “we can discern no trend toward its elimination.”37 The Court likewise found the prevailing common law principle governing the use of this punishment in 1977 to hail as far back as the American Revolution or earlier,38 i.e., the principle being that school personnel may inflict reasonable, although not excessive force, to discipline children; excessive force, however, subjects the punishers to potential civil and criminal liability.39

Why the Court went into this historical exegesis on the status of corporal punishment of schoolchildren in the United States is not entirely clear. The Court purportedly did not consider this description as part of its constitutional analysis under the Eighth Amendment, characterizing the whole exercise as “this background of historical and contemporary approval of reasonable corporal punishment.”40 It is intriguing why the Court felt compelled to set the stage so elaborately. One is left with the impression that this was not merely a stage set, but rather was tacitly integral to the Eighth Amendment analysis. That is, because the Court viewed school corporal punishment as a long-standing feature of the American experience, it became legally and politically more comfortable for the Justices to deny children the Eighth

33. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
34. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 659 (quoting Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968)).
35. Id. at 660.
36. Id. at 660–61.
37. Id. at 661.
38. Id.
39. See id. (discussing that “[a]t common law, a single principle has governed the use of corporal punishment since before the American Revolution: teachers may impose reasonable but not excessive force to discipline a child”).
40. Id. at 663.
Amendment’s protection against the practice. Such a ruling consonant with United States history could not, after all, open the Court to charges of social engineering that were alien to the nation’s traditional normative prejudices on the subject.

In any event, the Supreme Court’s acknowledged rationale for rejecting petitioners’ Eighth Amendment claim was that the Amendment’s guarantee against cruel and unusual punishments is a constraint exclusively on criminal punishments and therefore cannot be extended to protect children from public school disciplinary punishments.\footnote{Id. at 664–71.} According to the majority opinion, the stinginess of the Eighth Amendment’s reach is supported by original intent\footnote{Id. at 664–66.} and \textit{stare decisis}.\footnote{Id. at 666–68.} As to the latter, the \textit{Ingraham} Court specified that its previous Eighth Amendment decisions had limited the criminal process in three ways.\footnote{Id. at 667.} First, the decisions limit the type of punishment that can be imposed on convicts.\footnote{Id.} Second, they bar penalties grossly disproportionate to the seriousness of the crime.\footnote{Id.} Finally, they place substantive limits on what activities can be classified as criminal and punished by the criminal justice system.\footnote{Id.}

Petitioners argued that the Framers of the Eighth Amendment could not have imagined the modern American compulsory public school system and its power to mete out non-criminal punishments.\footnote{Id. at 668–69.} The inference, of course, is that had the Framers known, surely they would have desired to protect schoolchildren at least as much as they did prisoners. The Court attempted to counter this argument by distinguishing prisoners’ life situations from those of schoolchildren:

The schoolchild has little need for the protection of the Eighth Amendment. Though attendance may not always be voluntary, the public school remains an open institution. Except perhaps when very young, the child is not physically restrained from leaving school during school hours; and at the end of the school day, the child is invariably free to return home. Even while at school, the child brings with him the support of family and friends and is rarely apart from teachers and other pupils who may witness and protest any instances of mistreatment.\footnote{Id. at 670.}
I will put to one side, for the moment, the various weaknesses in the
Ingraham majority’s reasoning outlined above. There are urgent
reasons for exposing Ingraham’s problematic nature and a full exposé
of those problems will follow an explanation of the connection between
Brown I and Ingraham.

III. THE CONNECTION: BROWN I AND INGRAHAM

So, what is the relationship between Brown I and Ingraham? Brown
I’s barebones holding is that de jure racial segregation of children in
public elementary and secondary schools violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The factual linchpin of the
Court’s holding is the unanimous opinion’s famous footnote eleven
which references various social science publications supporting the
proposition that racial segregation of children at these levels of
schooling causes African-American children to feel inferior; these
inferiority feelings, in turn, undermine the motivation of Black children
to learn and impedes their “educational and mental development” in a
way “unlikely ever to be undone.”

Thus, the whole foundation for Brown I’s holding on segregated
schools is a fervent concern that the schools should imbue children,
especially Black children, with a positive sense of their intellectual
worth and should provide them with a commensurate quality of
educational experience. Specifically, the Court described the sort of
education that children should be positioned to take advantage of: an
education that prepares them for “good citizenship,” that initiates them
into the ranks of the culturally literate, and that gives them the
grounding for “later professional training.” Note that an education of
this ilk is not limited to the basics, but rather entails a well-rounded and
sophisticated curriculum designed to help all children mature into
personally fulfilled adults who will be able to make meaningful
contributions to society. The Brown I decision was contextual, and

50. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text (remarking that segregation in public
education violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
lower court in the Brown I litigation).
52. Id. at 493.
53. See Bitensky, Dream, supra note 20, at 6, nn.25–26 (stating how quality education
prepares students for life and active community participation); David Chang, The Bus Stops Here:
acquiring skills that are rewarded in society and equips Blacks to compete in society); Marvin P.
Composition and African-American Inclusion in American Society, 63 J. NEGRO EDUC. 394, 394,
that context was a concern for a high standard of education in the public schools and for Black children’s receptive psychological condition as a predicate to benefiting from such an education. Desegregation that would result in racially-integrated schoolhouses offering substandard education or even offering excellent education to children psychologically unable to profit from it would be an incomplete, if not perverse, realization of Brown I’s import. This concern is the more subtle part of Brown I’s holding, what Professor Robert Sedler has dubbed Brown I’s “educational rationale,” and what I would also call its “psychological enabling component.”

The constitutional standard which apparently should follow from this aspect of Brown I is that meaningful equal protection must involve public elementary and secondary schools in a process of psychological enabling: that is, psychologically enabling African-American children to have the confidence to succeed in a superior educational milieu. At the very least, the post-Brown I Equal Protection Clause should be understood to prohibit public schools from doing anything to deride or undercut that confidence.

Ingraham significantly hinders the fruition of Brown I’s commitment to educational excellence and psychological enabling. Recall the Ingraham Court’s holding that the Eighth Amendment does not protect children in any way from corporal punishment in the nation’s public elementary and secondary schools. As of this writing, slightly under one-half of the states have availed themselves of Ingraham’s latitude by

403 (1994) (remarking how desegregation has a positive effect on career goals and social assimilation); Peter M. Shane, School Desegregation Remedies and the Fair Governance of Schools, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1041, 1050, 1053 (1984) (discussing the psychological and academic harm that results from segregated schools). But see Brown, supra note 20, at 837–38 (contending that Brown I may actually have impeded African-American empowerment because the Court focused on the notion that racial segregation retards the intellectual development only of minority children).


55. See supra notes 30, 32 and accompanying text (explaining that the Ingraham court rejected the claim that corporal punishment of public school children as a disciplinary technique constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment).
enacting legislation permitting corporal punishment of children in the schools. This situation, I submit, is a conducive strategy—equally as conducive as segregation—for making African-American children feel inferior and thereby stifling their intellectual growth.

How can that be? What is the basis for making such an assertion? The first thing to remark by way of explanation is that the most recent scientific evidence has dispositively established that corporal punishment of children, regardless of its venue or the racial identity of the children, is correlated with ten seriously adverse psychological outcomes for the child-victims. In 2002, psychologist Dr. Elizabeth Gershoff published meta-analyses that established an association between parental corporal punishment of children and (1) decreased moral internalization, (2) increased child aggression, (3) increased child delinquent and antisocial conduct, (4) decreased quality of the parent-child relationship, (5) decreased child mental health, (6) increased risk of undergoing conventional physical child abuse; and, upon reaching maturity, (7) increased adult aggression, (8) increased adult criminal and antisocial behavior, (9) decreased adult mental health, and (10) increased risk of abusing one’s own child or spouse. She has since theorized that, in light of some of the parallels between the parent-child and teacher-student relationship, these negative impacts may result from...
school corporal punishment as well.\textsuperscript{58}

It does not require a degree in psychology to figure out that some of these outcomes will indispose children to learn optimally or even minimally. For example, an overly aggressive child or a child plagued by emotional instability is sure to be distracted by more pressing urges and needs than soaking up the school curricula. As a matter of fact, Professor Irwin Hyman, a psychologist who has extensively studied school corporal punishment, has concluded that corporal punishment does indeed interfere with students’ ability to do schoolwork.\textsuperscript{59}

I suppose putting children at risk of these insalubrious outcomes might be warranted if the scientific evidence also disclosed some extraordinary advantage unique to physical punishment, or if there was no other means of disciplining students. Nobody on either side of the spanking debate wants to deprive children of beneficial discipline or to turn schools into dens of iniquity or chaos. Dr. Gershoff’s meta-analyses do reveal that corporal punishment is correlated with one arguably positive outcome: a smack will cause a child temporarily to cease his or her misconduct.\textsuperscript{60} Since cessation is fleeting, however, this outcome is hardly the type of advantage that would justify endangering children in the ways identified by Dr. Gershoff.

Moreover, there are more effective alternative disciplinary techniques for controlling children and instilling them with moral values. Schools have at their disposal an array of traditional non-corporal penalties that may be imposed such as expulsion, suspension, detention and parental pick-ups.\textsuperscript{61} Time-outs, deprivation of privileges, and explaining why misbehavior is unacceptable can readily be adapted to the school context.\textsuperscript{62} There are also programs especially suitable to employing

\textsuperscript{58}. Email from Dr. Elizabeth Gershoff, Dept. of Social Work, University of Michigan, to Susan H. Bitensky, Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law, 1 (Sept. 1, 2004).

\textsuperscript{59}. See IRWIN A. HYMAN, READING, WRITING, AND THE HICKORY STICK: THE APPALLING STORY OF PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ABUSE IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS 96, 99 (1990) (stating that approximately seventy percent of students with traumatic stress symptoms tend to have problems with academic performance); see also Murray A. Straus, New Evidence for the Benefits of Never Spanking, \textit{SOCIETY}, Sept./Oct. 2001, at 52, 55–56 (asserting that there is evidence that corporal punishment of young children may undermine the foundations for cognitive development so that these children will continue to have difficulties with cognitive skills later in childhood).

\textsuperscript{60}. Gershoff, \textit{supra} note 57, at 543–44.


\textsuperscript{62}. Cf. MICHAEL J. MARSHALL, WHY SPANKING DOESN’T WORK: STOPPING THE BAD HABIT
school resources. These programs include providing character education curriculum, enlisting the assistance of school psychologists and counselors, giving student recognition awards for good behavior, and peer mediation.63

Dr. Gershoff’s scientific findings, however, apply to all children. On what grounds, then, can I argue that Ingraham and its legacy has particularly and uniquely disadvantaged Black schoolchildren? Those grounds lie in American history and in the racial bias with which school corporal punishment is presently administered. It is an undisputed historical fact that in the antebellum South it was de rigueur for slaveholders to whip or beat their slaves with impunity.64 Apparently, slaveholders believed that physical coercion would produce docility without offending moral or legal precepts because the victims were slaves. One historian has instructed that the lash was the primary means of controlling slaves.65 Another has revealed that the practice was so pervasive that many slaves actually conceptualized freedom as “abolition of punishment by the lash.”66 Moreover, although the Civil War put an end to slavery, it did not stop Whites’ corporal punishment of Blacks. Freed slaves were still frequently hit,67 especially if they had

AND GETTING THE UPPER HAND ON EFFECTIVE DISCIPLINE 123 (2002) (recommendating that parents should try time-out and revoking privileges to discipline their children); JANE NELSEN, ET AL., POSITIVE DISCIPLINE A–Z: 1001 SOLUTIONS TO EVERYDAY PARENTING PROBLEMS, 5, 23–26 (1993) (suggesting that parents should use family discussions and time-out in disciplining their children).

63. Center for Effective Discipline, Punishment Alternatives, supra note 61.


65. Swinney, supra note 64, at 36–37.


67. See DONALD G. NIEMAN, TO SET THE LAW IN MOTION: THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU AND THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF BLACKS, 1865–1868 passim (Harold M. Hyman & William P. Hobby eds., 1979) (giving examples of freedmen beaten and shot like wild animals); GEORGE C. RABLE, BUT THERE WAS NO PEACE: THE ROLE OF VIOLENCE IN THE POLITICS OF RECONSTRUCTION 72-73 (1984) (stating that freedmen were shot and whipped to influence votes); ALLEN W. TRELEASE, WHITE TERROR: THE KU KLUX KLAN CONSPIRACY AND SOUTHERN RECONSTRUCTION passim (Kenneth B. Clark, ed., 1971) (discussing incidents of Blacks being lashed, beaten, and murdered); Swinney, supra note 64, at 51–52, 208–09, 217–18, 279 (remarking that the Klan was responsible for hundreds of whippings in the late 1870s).
the temerity to achieve economic success or to exercise their political and legal rights. As one observer described upon touring the newly defeated South, corporal punishment of Blacks remained a “habit so inveterate with a great many persons as to render, on the least provocation, the impulse to whip a negro almost irresistible.”

During Reconstruction, the Ku Klux Klan and other like-minded ruffians terrorized the southern Black population and its allies. These vigilantes thought nothing of intimidating and assaulting entire Black families. The Klan persecuted freedmen and freedwomen with a repertoire of shootings, lynchings, and whippings, as well as with more outlandish crimes. “Whipping, however, appears to have continued from the days of slavery as a favorite, if not almost reflexive, means” of keeping Black Southerners under White thumbs. The extent of this violence against Blacks, even after emancipation, cannot be overstated. After the war, this became such a problem that Congress was moved to enact a series of statutes crafted to halt these and other continuing transgressions against Blacks.

Thus, for Black schoolchildren in the Twentieth and Twenty-first centuries, corporal punishment has been and is loaded with connotations of racism, hate, and oppression. Corporal punishment reverberates with the collective historical experience of Blacks writhing under the rod during slavery and its aftermath. Indeed, incidents of Klan beatings of

68. See TRELEASE, supra note 67, passim (discussing incidents of Blacks being lashed, beaten, and murdered).
70. FONER, supra note 66, at 425–36; Swinney, supra note 64, at 46–48; TRELEASE, supra note 67, at xxxiv.
74. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (stating that any injured party who was deprived of their rights now has redress under the laws); Reconstruction Act of 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428 (1867) (calling for an Act that called for military forces to suppress insurrections); Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (declaring Blacks are citizens of the United States and have the rights and protections of freedmen); Freedman’s Bureau Act of 1865, ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507 (1865) (establishing a War Department to control all subjects relating to freedmen).
Blacks continued right into the Twentieth century. 75 Not unlike the Klan’s cross burnings in its Black neighbors’ yards, 76 corporal punishment of American Black schoolchildren is fraught with odious meanings and implications not readily apparent to their White counterparts. And, these are meanings and implications of objectification of Blacks as “property,” or, if not “property,” objectification of these children as holding some kind of sub-human status. 77

To add insult to injury, statistics for the 1999-2000 academic year show that “[b]lack students are hit at a rate that is more than twice their makeup in the population. Blacks comprise 17% of students, but receive 39% of paddlings. Whites make up 62% of all students, but receive 53% of the corporal punishment.” 78 Along similar lines, a Memphis City Schools study published in 2004 shows that in the Memphis school district, “[b]lack students and boys were overwhelmingly more likely to get spanked than their White and female counterparts. Roughly 97% of the 27,918 paddlings last year were given to the district’s Black children, while only 2% were given to White children.” 79 The fact that corporal punishment both resurrects a semi-chattel status for Blacks and in modern times is used at least twice as frequently on Black pupils as on White students can only compound the toll that this form of punishment takes on Black children’s self-esteem and aspirations.

If ever a pedagogical practice was to carry the potential for making African-American schoolchildren feel inferior and for thwarting their opportunity for educational progress, corporal punishment would seem to be that practice. Allowing such punishment to persist in the schools is hardly the psychological enabling of individual educational potential that Brown I requires. 80 In giving public schools carte blanche

75. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 354–55 (2003) (plurality opinion) (O’Connor, J., opinion of the Court) (discussing acts of Klan violence occurring in the 1920s and during the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s); See id. at 389–90 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing the Klan’s use of violence in the 1900s).

76. See id. at 352–57 & 360 n.2 (recognizing a burning cross as a symbol of hate and White supremacy).


78. Center for Effective Discipline, States Banning, supra note 56. I was advised of the year for which the above-referenced statistics are valid by the Executive Director of the Center for Effective Discipline. Telephone Interview with Nadine Block, Executive Director, Center for Effective Discipline (Feb. 4, 2004).

79. Ruma Banerji Kumar, Paddling May Not Really Be Last Resort, Data Show, COM. APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), Feb. 27, 2004 at B1.

80. See supra notes 53–60 and accompanying text (discussing how corporal punishment
approval to use corporal punishment on children as far as the Eighth Amendment is concerned, Ingraham v. Wright represents the dashing of Brown I’s rich potential and of its chief concerns.

Ingraham does not interfere, of course, with the political discretion of individual states to outlaw school corporal punishment. But, in the absence of Eighth Amendment restraints, approximately half of the states have seen fit to allow such punishment, although, of these, some states have delegated power to local school districts to prohibit the punishment on a district-by-district basis. The result is that in many areas of the United States, school corporal punishment continues—meaning that many Black schoolchildren cannot fully benefit from Brown I’s psychological enabling component. Moreover, the Ingraham holding telegraphs quite a punch to the Black community, including its children. The Ingraham holding plays a deleterious pedagogical role in conveying that the U.S. Constitution is no barrier to the existence of the remnants of slavery and can offer no succor to the youngest victims of slavery’s legacy.

Incidentally, in identifying the infirmities that corporal punishment may inflict on any child, White or Black, some social science

hinders a child’s well-being and undermines the decision of Brown I.

81. See supra note 55–56 and accompanying text (remarking that some states still allow corporal punishment in schools).
83. As I have written elsewhere:

Generally speaking, there is a pedagogical purpose inherent in virtually all law. Laws are made to be known; otherwise, they would be ineffective as an instrument of governance or restraint. The educational impact of law is perhaps most effectually realized by the reciprocal interplay between law and social values. Law draws its content from the values of the people it governs. Law assimilates not only a society’s values and priorities as they are, but also those values and priorities which comprise that society’s goals and needs. It is in this latter initiatory phase that law has its most dramatic educative effect because it crystallizes and makes visible the norms which constitute a society’s aspirations and ideals.

researchers and theorists have proposed what I have labeled the “African-American exception.”\textsuperscript{84} They have advanced the notion that paddling does no harm to and, in fact, is beneficial for Black children in the United States even if such punishment harms White children.\textsuperscript{85} Proponents of the exception frequently offer as an explanation for it that strong physical chastisement is necessary to keep Black children out of trouble in crime-ridden environments.\textsuperscript{86}

I emphatically decline to adopt this relativistic approach, depending on skin color, to corporal punishment of children. The “African-American exception” is hardly an irrefutable fact. There are other, equally respected social science researchers and theorists who have posited that corporal punishment may be detrimental to Black children as well.\textsuperscript{87} Indeed, Dr. Gershoff’s recent meta-analyses have found an association between corporal punishment of children and serious negative behavioral outcomes regardless of the race of the children involved,\textsuperscript{88} thereby making short work of the exceptionalists. But, even assuming \textit{arguendo} that there is a split of authority on the subject, I would prefer to err, if error it is, on the side of repudiating a punishment that has well-known antecedents in the whipping of American slaves. Recommending its retention particularly for Black children seems a most grievous thing, constituting further unequal treatment of Black

\textsuperscript{84} BITENSKY, Agent of Peace, supra note 73.

\textsuperscript{85} See, e.g., Marjorie Linder Gunnoe & Carrie Lea Marinier, Toward A Developmental-Contextual Model of the Effects of Parental Spanking on Children's Aggression, 151 ARCHIVES OF PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 768, 774 (1997) (reporting that corporal punishment of African-American children deters subsequent fighting by them); Robert E. Larzelere, Child Outcomes of Nonabusive and Customary Physical Punishment by Parents: An Updated Literature Review, 3 CLINICAL CHILD & FAM. PSYCHOL. REV. 199, 210, 213 (2000) (summarizing that studies show spanking to have neutral or beneficial effects on African-American children); Arthur L. Whaley, Sociocultural Differences in the Developmental Consequences of the Use of Physical Discipline During Childhood for African-Americans, 6 CULTURAL DIVERSITY & ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCHOL. 5, 7–10 (2000) (stating that the results of studies concerning the effects of corporal punishment on African-American children are inconsistent, but that none of the studies demonstrate such punishment to cause disruptive disorders in these children).

\textsuperscript{86} See MURRAY A. STRAUS & DENISE A. DONELLY, BEATING THE DEVIL OUT OF THEM CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN FAMILIES AND ITS EFFECTS ON CHILDREN 117 (2001) (summarizing one of the rationales of those pundits who wish to retain corporal punishment for Black children).

\textsuperscript{87} See, e.g., JAMES P. COMER & ALVIN F. POUSSAINT, RAISING BLACK CHILDREN: TWO LEADING PSYCHIATRISTS CONFRONT THE EDUCATIONAL, SOCIAL AND EMOTIONAL PROBLEMS FACING BLACK CHILDREN 49–51 (1992) (stating that those children punished by hitting have a greater tendency for violence); Kristin M. McCabe et al., Family Protective Factors Among Urban African-American Youth, 28 J. CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 137, 139, 147 (1999).

\textsuperscript{88} See Gershoff, supra note 57, at 543–44 (indicating parental corporal punishment is associated with undesirable behaviors and experiences).
children, both in comparison to adults and to children of other races. Human beings have it in common to flinch from pain; they share psychological reactions to being rendered simultaneously helpless and maddened by the use of force against which there is no recourse. To adopt this form of African-American exceptionalism is to deny Black children fulfillment of this fundamental aspect of their human nature and to put them on the same footing as their enslaved ancestors. This is, of course, totally unacceptable both morally and humanistically speaking.

IV. UNDOING INGRAHAM’S BETRAYAL OF BROWN I

Before proposing legal reform to revive Brown I’s full vitality for Black children, it may be helpful for me to summarize my thesis up to this point. Corporal punishment of Black schoolchildren is laden with historical and cultural messages that they are inferior to other children, and these messages are reinforced by the fact that Black students are twice as likely to suffer such punishment as White students. The lack of confidence thereby inspired in African-American students is apt to interfere with the learning process. It was precisely the Supreme Court’s dismay over Black children’s harboring such inferiority feelings, with the resultant impediment to education, that undergirded and formed part of the holding in Brown I. When the Ingraham Court ruled that the Eighth Amendment does not apply to public school corporal punishment, the Court effectively sanctioned the continuation of this practice as a constitutional matter and betrayed Brown I’s potential to equalize, truly and substantively, schooling for Blacks and Whites in this country.

Can anything be done to remedy the damage Ingraham has wrought? There is probably no way to repair the inferiority feelings and educational loss suffered by Black schoolchildren in the past. Those children cannot have a “rerun” of their childhoods and of the developmental milestones through which they passed under the burden of corporal punishment. However, there are feasible and long overdue
measures that can be taken to spare future generations of Black schoolchildren from the same fate.

The time has come to overturn Ingraham v. Wright. Yes, I know, stare decisis and all that. Yet, the U.S. Supreme Court has not shied away from reversing course when it has perceived its direction to be outdated and/or misguided. Ingraham, a 5-4 decision to begin with, is ripe for overruling for several reasons in relation to its Eighth Amendment holding. First, the decision was not convincingly reasoned when it was made in 1977. Justice White’s Ingraham dissent highlights that a textualist construction of the Eighth Amendment conflicts outright with the majority’s originalist interpretation limiting the amendment’s application to criminal proceedings—the latter interpretation created out of a patchwork of inferences rather than from any directly relevant historical evidence. Justice White explains that the Framers’ failure to cabin the language of the Amendment with the word “criminal” demonstrates that the provision was drafted to forbid “all inhumane or barbaric punishments,


94. There seems to be an inexplicable dearth of commentary critiquing the holding of Ingraham in relation to the Eighth Amendment. But see Lynn Roy, Chalk Talk: Corporal Punishment in American Public Schools and the Rights of the Child, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 554, 558–59, 563 (2001) (taking the Ingraham majority to task for deviating from the Court’s own previously used standards in interpreting the Eighth Amendment, for failing to give the amendment a “flexible and dynamic” construction and calling for lower federal courts to subvert the effects of Ingraham); Margaret Meriwether Cordray, Contempt Sanctions and the Excessive Fines Clause, 76 N.C. L. REV. 407, 447 (1998) (observing that “Ingraham’s entire discussion of the scope of the Eighth Amendment is now of dubious value” since the Court subsequently ruled in another case that the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause governs civil forfeiture proceedings); RONALD T. HYMAN & CHARLES H. RATHBONE, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN SCHOOLS: READING THE LAW 3–4 (1993) (paraphrasing another scholar’s indictment of the Ingraham Court’s Eighth Amendment analysis in Irene Merker Rosenberg, Ingraham v. Wright: The Supreme Court’s Whipping Boy, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 76–89 (1978)); infra notes 95–107 and accompanying text (discussing the flaws of the majority’s reasoning in Ingraham).

95. HYMAN & RATHBONE, supra note 94, at 3; Roy, supra note 94, at 554, 558–59.

no matter what the nature of the offense for which the punishment is imposed."\(^\text{97}\) At a minimum, Justice White’s sensible textualism raises questions about the plausibility of an originalist analysis predicated entirely on inferences drawn by the Court.

Moreover, as Justice White observes, the Supreme Court itself has not limited the application of the Eighth Amendment only to criminal punishments.\(^\text{98}\) For example, in *Estelle v. Gamble*,\(^\text{99}\) the Court held that intentional disregard by correctional authorities of prisoners’ medical needs violated the Eighth Amendment’s guarantee against cruel and unusual punishments.\(^\text{100}\) Obviously, ignoring a prisoner’s medical needs is not a judicially-imposed punishment for perpetration of a crime.\(^\text{101}\)

Finally, the *Ingraham* majority opinion’s attempt to immunize school corporal punishment from Eighth Amendment strictures on the theory that schoolchildren are in certain key ways distinguishable from prisoners seems embarrassingly flimsy.\(^\text{102}\) I am not suggesting that the Court erred because schoolchildren are subject to exactly the same circumstances as prisoners; clearly, there are many circumstances that are different for each group. The problem is that the particular living conditions selected by the Court are ones actually shared by schoolchildren and prisoners, at least to an appreciable degree. School attendance is not, as the majority opinion suggests, *sometimes* involuntary.\(^\text{103}\) All states make a number of years of schooling compulsory.\(^\text{104}\) Children, and not just the “very young” ones singled

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\(^\text{97}\) *Ingraham*, 430 U.S. at 685 (White, J., dissenting).

\(^\text{98}\) *Id.* at 688 n.4 (White, J., dissenting).


\(^\text{100}\) *Id.* at 104–05, 108.

\(^\text{101}\) See *Ingraham*, 430 U.S. at 688 n.4 (White, J., dissenting) (stating that the Eighth Amendment’s application extends beyond criminal punishments).

\(^\text{102}\) *Id.* at 668–70.

\(^\text{103}\) *Id.* at 670.

out by the Court,\textsuperscript{105} are therefore restrained from leaving school during school hours. To say, as the majority did, that a child “brings with him [to school] the support of family and friends”\textsuperscript{106} is chimerical, a notion unsupported by any data; and more appropriate to a romantic, Norman Rockwellian vision of the lives of American schoolchildren. Indeed, during my stint as Associate Counsel to the New York City Board of Education, it was quite evident that many children saw their schools as refuges from dysfunctional, abusive and/or neglectful families and the often anarchic neighborhoods in which they resided. The majority’s further offering that children in school have the protection of their teachers,\textsuperscript{107} strikes me as a ridiculous distinction since it is usually the teachers who do the punishing.

Ill-conceived when it was decided in 1977, \textit{Ingraham} has become increasingly absurd. For example, consider it in comparison to the Supreme Court’s 1992 decision in \textit{Hudson v. McMillian}.\textsuperscript{108} In that case, a prison inmate was beaten by security guards while he was handcuffed and shackled.\textsuperscript{109} The guards punched him in the mouth, eyes, chest, and stomach, and kicked him from behind.\textsuperscript{110} As a result, the victim suffered minor bruises and swelling, some loosened teeth, and a crack in his partial dental plate.\textsuperscript{111} The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit acknowledged the use of force to be excessive but refused to rule for the prisoner because his injuries were minor, requiring no medical attention.\textsuperscript{112} The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the use of excessive force against a prisoner may constitute an Eighth Amendment violation even though the prisoner’s injuries, which must be more than \textit{de minimis}, are minor.\textsuperscript{113} In contrast, in \textit{Ingraham} a schoolchild who suffered injuries requiring medical intervention after being paddled over twenty times was denied recourse to an Eighth Amendment claim.\textsuperscript{114} Putting \textit{Ingraham} together with \textit{Hudson} creates the bizarre situation in which convicted criminals are afforded more protection against violence in prison than children are provided in school. Something is very wrong with this picture, and the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{105} \textit{Ingraham}, 430 U.S. at 670.
  \item \textsuperscript{106} \textit{Id}.
  \item \textsuperscript{107} \textit{Id}.
  \item \textsuperscript{108} \textit{Hudson v. McMillian}, 503 U.S. 1 (1992).
  \item \textsuperscript{109} \textit{Id} at 4.
  \item \textsuperscript{110} \textit{Id}.
  \item \textsuperscript{111} \textit{Id}.
  \item \textsuperscript{112} \textit{Id} at 5.
  \item \textsuperscript{113} \textit{Id} at 9–10.
  \item \textsuperscript{114} \textit{Ingraham v. Wright}, 430 U.S. 651, 657 (1977).
\end{itemize}
Ill-conceived when Ingraham was decided in 1977 and made absurd by juxtaposition of the Hudson case in 1992, it is now fair to say that Ingraham has become a complete anachronism in 2004. No, that is too kind. Ingraham is rotting on the vine and continuing to damage lives in the process. There is no reason why, under the Supreme Court’s own Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, Ingraham should not be long gone. It is well accepted that the cryptic phraseology of “cruel and unusual punishments” in the Eighth Amendment can best be meaningfully interpreted and applied by resorting to sources beyond the Constitution itself. The Supreme Court has determined that the Clause “must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society” and that the Clause’s meaning may be updated “as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.”

Standards of decency and humanity do evolve. They are affected by increasing knowledge and by a populace’s gravitation, sometimes sudden and sometimes incremental, toward altered practices. There are signs that a palpable evolution has taken place within the United States in relation to corporal punishment of children—signs that were not present when Ingraham was decided in 1977. Our knowledge base has undergone a radical expansion with respect to understanding corporal punishment’s possible detrimental outcomes for children, as disclosed by Gershoff’s meta-analyses. Commentators have begun sharpening our awareness of corporal punishment’s link to slavery and racism. There is a growing consensus among child-care and other professionals in the United States that school corporal punishment should be forbidden. And, unlike the situation in 1977 when only two states

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118. See, e.g., STRAUS & DONELLY, supra note 86, at 117 (asserting that “corporal punishment has become a part of Black culture in response to slavery and oppression”); Bitensky, Agent of Peace, supra note 73, at 333-35 (noting abolitionists criticized both slavery and fought to end corporal punishment of children); Bitensky, Spare the Rod, supra note 83, at 422–23 (hypothesizing that corporal punishment has its roots in slavery).
119. Among the forty national organizations opposed to school corporal punishment are the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American Bar Association, the American Medical Association, the American Psychiatric Association, the American Psychological Association, the National Association of Elementary School Principals, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the National Association of Social Workers, the National Education Association, the National Mental Health Association, the National Association of
banned this punishment, \(^{120}\) now more than half of the states prohibit it. \(^{121}\) In short, the standards of decency and humanity have been shifting rather dramatically against physical chastisement of children in American schools.

At times and on an unpredictable basis, the Supreme Court has also consulted international and foreign law in order to define what evolving standards of decency are in a given period. \(^{122}\) If the Court was to use this interpretive technique in a relitigation of school corporal punishment under the Eighth Amendment, I suspect that the Justices would be shocked at what they would find. At least five human rights treaties have been authoritatively construed to implicitly prohibit not just school corporal punishment of children but all corporal punishment of children. \(^{123}\) Those treaties are the United Nations Convention on the

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120. *Ingraham v. Wright*, 430 U.S. 651, 663 (1977) (referring to Massachusetts and New Jersey as the only two states that had outlawed all corporal punishment in the public elementary and secondary schools as of 1977).

121. See Center for Effective Discipline, *States Banning*, supra note 56 (observing that currently twenty-six states have banned corporal punishment and nine other states have more than half of all students in districts with no corporal punishment).


Rights of the Child, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the European Social Charters, and the American Convention on Human Rights. That corporal punishment of children is a human rights law violation marks the evolving standards of decency in the international community with respect to right treatment of children and reflects an advance in our comprehension as to what is “humane justice” toward children. As such, this body of human rights law should infuse the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of whether and how the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment applies to corporal punishment of children in public schools.

Similarly, if the Court in this hypothetical relitigation was to refer to the laws of foreign jurisdictions, it would learn that, as of this writing, fourteen countries have banned all corporal punishment of children within their respective borders. Those countries are Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark, Austria, Cyprus, Germany, Iceland, Croatia, Latvia, Bulgaria, Israel, Ukraine, and Romania. In addition, all industrialized countries except, the United States and one state in


129. See Bitensky, Agent of the Peace, supra note 73; see also Bitensky, Spare the Rod, supra note 83, at 361-86 (recounting that as of 1998, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark, Austria, and Cyprus had enacted bans on all corporal punishment of children and Italy’s highest court had issued a decision to that effect).
Australia, have banned school corporal punishment of children. These facts too are persuasive evidence of evolving modern standards of decency—evidence available to inform any reconsideration of whether the Eighth Amendment should apply to corporal punishment in the public schools and, if so, whether the amendment’s application should dictate the abolition of the practice.

V. CONCLUSION

Ideally, what I would like to see happen is a relitigation of the Eighth Amendment issue using the interpretive technique and current information described above. Again, in the best of all possible worlds, I would like to see the Supreme Court hold that Ingraham is no more and that the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments not only applies to public school corporal punishment, but actually forbids it. Without reading the ban into the Eighth Amendment, states will remain free to permit public school corporal punishment. Granted, in the absence of a constitutional ban, additional states could exercise the political will to enact their own prohibitions on public school corporal punishment, but this piecemeal approach could take forever, and some states might never embrace such a legal reform. In the meantime, in the intransigent states, Brown I’s quality education and psychological enabling components would continue to be undercut, and African-American schoolchildren would continue to suffer the educationally disabling consequences. Neither of these results seems tolerable as a constitutional or a moral matter.

Of course, repudiating Ingraham and recognizing a prohibition on corporal punishment of public schoolchildren in the Eighth Amendment will not by itself be a nostrum for all that ails Brown I or the education of African-Americans. Taking these steps is just that—some steps in the right direction. The problems posed in implementing Brown I and doing justice to Black students in comparison to White students are complex and call for a multiplicity of ameliorative responses. The steps that I have proposed, however, at least remove one obstacle to and provide one prerequisite for the consummation of Brown I and the fuller

blossoming of Black schoolchildren’s intellectual lives.